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Congress enacted §162(m) based upon the assumption that CEOs controlled their own 
compensation design.  Compliance with §162(m) preserves the firm’s tax deduction for CEO 
compensation, but limits CEO salary and generally increases the use of risky incentives.  Therefore, 
ceteris paribus, I predict that CEOs prefer and attempt to use their influence to secure §162(m) 
noncompliant compensation.  To evaluate how CEOs influence firm §162(m) noncompliance, I examine 
the factors related to firm §162(m) noncompliance, CEO compensation design trends at firms affected 
by §162(m), and how the SEC’s 2003 independence governance requirements and 2006 compensation 
disclosure mandate affected the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation.   
First, I find that CEO power is positively related to firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior, 
suggesting that CEOs use their influence to increase firm noncompliance.  However, I also find that 
noncompliance with §162(m) is generally related to the economic determinants of CEO compensation 
design in a manner consistent with agency theory, and do not find consistent evidence that 
noncompliance is decreasing in the quality of firm governance.  Therefore, the evidence does not 
suggest that §162(m) noncompliance is systematically the consequence of inefficient CEO influence 
enabled by poor quality governance, consistent with managerial power theory.  I find that firm §162(m) 
noncompliance behavior is generally explained by agency theory.   
Second, I document that CEO salaries at firms affected by §162(m) tended to remain relatively 
flat with evidence of an informal $1 million benchmark and decreased as a percentage of total 
compensation.  Further, the 2003 SEC board independence regulation weakened the positive relation 
between CEO power and CEO salary in excess of $1 million, noncompliant with §162(m), for those firms 
with lower pre-2003 independent governance processes.  These findings suggest that §162(m) 
weakened CEO influence over salary levels.   
Third, I provide evidence that the 2006 disclosure mandate strengthened the CEO power-
§162(m) noncompliance relation, instead of weakening it as arguably intended.  In addition, I do not find 
evidence that §162(m) slowed the growth of CEO total compensation levels or increased its relation to 
firm performance from 1994 through 2012.  These findings suggest that that §162(m) did not reduce 
CEO influence over their total compensation arrangements. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Revenue Act of 1894 established the principle of taxing corporations separate from their owners.  
Although this particular act was ruled unconstitutional, the principle survived.  In 1909, Congress passed 
a new constitutional method of taxing corporate income and established the federal corporate income 
tax.1  Since then, Congress has enacted various tax provisions designed to motivate selected behavior 
through the use of tax incentives, e.g. research and development credits and opportunity zone credits.   
In the early 1990s, believing that powerful CEOs received inefficient, excessive compensation 
arrangements, Congress considered limiting CEO compensation levels (Rose and Wolfram, 2002) or 
limiting the CEO compensation tax deduction without regard to firm size or performance (Murphy, 
2011).  Instead, in 1993 Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code §162(m), which does not mandate 
compensation practices, but provides a tax incentive to firms to increase the link between executive pay 
and firm performance (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  Compliance with §162(m) generally requires firms to 
increase their use of incentive compensation, which increases the risk imposed upon the CEO.  As a 
result, §162(m) presents firms with a CEO compensation design decision as to whether to comply with 
§162(m) to preserve the CEO compensation tax deduction and rely upon risky incentives to satisfy the 
CEO’s reservation utility or to elect some level of noncompliance and sacrifice some tax deduction.   
                                                 
1
Jack Taylor for Beth Kilss, Chief, Statistical Section, Internal Revenue Service, Corporation  Income Tax Brackets 
and Rates, 1909-2002, Data Release; www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf 
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CEO compensation design is influenced by various factors, including the CEO’s preferences 
(Gibbons, 2005).  It is generally accepted that CEOs have some influence over their compensation 
design, although there is no consensus as to whether the relation between CEO power and 
compensation design is generally efficient (Core et al., 2005) or excessive (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
Section 162(m) noncompliance is a compensation design decision because compliance limits fixed salary 
and increases the use of risky incentives.  All else being equal, I predict that risk averse CEOs prefer that 
firms select §162(m) noncompliance.  As a result, CEOs will likely attempt to influence their 
compensation design to secure noncompliant compensation and their ability to do so should increase 
with their individual power.  Because §162(m) presents firms with a compensation design decision that 
is likely related to CEO power, I examine firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior, focusing on its relation 
to CEO power.   
  Congress enacted §162(m) to affect CEO compensation design and reduce excessive 
compensation (Balsam and Ryan, 2007).  During his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton attacked 
“overpaid” executives and designated pay above $1 million as clearly excessive (Rose and Wolfram, 
2002).  Therefore, firms which limit executive total annual compensation to $1 million or less are 
unaffected by §162(m).  Public firms which pay an executive2 annual compensation in excess of $1 
million are subject to and affected by §162(m)’s tax deduction provisions.  When calculating their 
federal taxable income, firms cannot deduct compensation which is noncompliant with §162(m).  Since 
1994, firms have paid noncompliant3 compensation every year.  From 1994 through 2012, I estimate 
                                                 
2 Initially, §162(m) applied to the CEO and the next four highest paid executives.  On June 5, 2007, the IRS released 
Notice 2007-49 to clarify §162(m) in recognition of the 2006 SEC “amended disclosure rules.”  Per Notice 2007-49 
for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006, the CFO is excluded from §162(m) and the CEO and the next 
three highest paid executives are covered by §162(m).   
3 I define §162(m) noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million in a fiscal year: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-performance based plan cash 
awards, and restricted stock awards. 
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that the 2,872 Execucomp firms paid their executives an estimated $81.7 billion of noncompliant 
compensation generating an estimated $15.8 billion in extra federal tax expense,4 as shown in Table 1.  
Of this total, firms paid $2.2 billion of noncompliant salary, the portion of annual salary in excess of $1 
million.  The total annual noncompliant compensation and extra federal corporate income tax expense 
have increased from 1994 through 2012, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.  Because 
noncompliant CEO compensation is fundamentally nonperformance-based annual compensation in 
excess of $1 million paid to a public firm CEO without the benefit of a tax deduction,5 it is important to 
evaluate the factors which influence noncompliant compensation to understand CEO compensation 
design and the influence of CEOs on these decisions. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
In Chapter 2, I examine the factors which influence §162(m) noncompliant CEO compensation 
from 1998 through 2011 to evaluate the extent to which the motivation of CEO compensation design is 
shareholder welfare maximization as argued by agency theory versus CEO welfare maximization to the 
detriment of shareholders as argued by managerial power theory.  Compensation design defines the 
tradeoff between fixed salary and incentives, influenced by firm and CEO characteristics, and 
compliance with §162(m) influences this allocation.   
Agency theory and managerial power theory are two of the primary theories proposed to 
explain CEO compensation design practices.  Agency theory predicts that CEO compensation design 
                                                 
4 I calculate the tax cost by multiplying the total annual noncompliant compensation paid by the average annual 
simulated corporate income tax rate of this dissertation’s sample set discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
5 In addition to the performance-based standard, compensation can be classified as noncompliant if the firm fails 
to follow certain procedural requirements discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.  
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maximizes shareholder utility, subject to the CEO’s reservation utility and incentive compatibility 
constraints (Holmstrom, 1979).  According to agency theory, noncompliance with §162(m) should be 
influenced by economic factors, such as firm risk, firm size, and firm performance.  Managerial power 
theory proposes that weak governance allows powerful CEOs to secure excess rents and to inefficiently 
maximize their own welfare, subject primarily to the shareholders’ outrage constraint (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004).  According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), CEOs camouflage their rent extraction to avoid a 
negative shareholder response, creating compensation design inefficiency such that the shareholders’ 
losses will exceed the rents extracted by managers.  To the extent that managerial power theory 
explains CEO compensation design, noncompliance behavior should be increasing with CEO power and 
poor quality governance and may demonstrate less relation with the economic factors that should 
influence compensation design.  Therefore, an examination of the factors associated with 
noncompliance should provide evidence concerning the relative importance of agency theory and 
managerial power theory in explaining executive compensation design.   
Chapter 2 examines the relation between §162(m) noncompliance and firm, CEO and 
governance factors and provides evidence generally consistent with agency theory predictions.  To 
examine the influence of firm characteristics as economic determinants of CEO compensation design, I 
examine the relation of §162(m) noncompliance with firm risk, size and performance.  Consistent with 
agency theory, I predict and find that firm noncompliance behavior generally increases with firm risk in 
Hypothesis I, consistently increases with firm size in Hypothesis II, and, with limited evidence, decreases 
with firm performance in Hypothesis III.  All three findings support the proposition that firms design 
their compensation arrangements to maximize shareholder welfare as predicted by agency theory.   
I predict that CEOs prefer noncompliant compensation, use their influence to secure 
noncompliant compensation, and their success in doing so increases with their power.  However, a 
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positive relation between CEO power and noncompliance does not necessarily demonstrate that CEOs 
inefficiently influence their compensation design.  A powerful, yet valuable CEO will likely negotiate a 
lucrative compensation arrangement to satisfy a high reservation utility.  Managerial power theory 
predicts that excessive, suboptimal CEO influence will be more likely given poor quality firm governance 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Therefore, both CEO power and poor quality governance should 
demonstrate a positive relation with noncompliance if managerial power theory better explains CEO 
compensation design.  Based upon the many documented cases of inefficient, excessive compensation 
arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), I predict that §162(m) noncompliance decreases in the quality 
of corporate governance. 
Chapter 2 examines both the relation between §162(m) noncompliance and CEO power in 
Hypothesis IV and the relation between §162(m) noncompliance and the quality of governance in 
Hypothesis V.  Consistent with Hypothesis IV, I provide strong evidence that §162(m) noncompliance 
increases with CEO power.  However, my study does not provide consistent evidence that §162(m) 
noncompliance increases with poor quality governance and therefore does not support Hypothesis V.  
Measures of governance quality, including executive entrenchment, board interlock and board 
independence, fail to demonstrate a consistent relation with noncompliance and therefore do not 
support my prediction.  I find that noncompliance increases with board size.  Because prior literature 
traditionally predicts that the quality of governance is decreasing in board size, this finding apparently 
provides initial support for Hypothesis V.  However, there is recent evidence that board size may not be 
a good measure of poor governance, particularly for larger firms (Coles et al., 2008), which are generally 
those affected by §162(m).  Therefore, my results do not document a consistent relation between the 
quality of corporate governance and firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior, and thereby do not support 
the prediction that noncompliance decreases in the quality of governance.   
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In summary, Chapter 2 provides evidence that CEO compensation design is generally consistent 
with shareholder wealth maximization as predicted by agency theory.  I find that firm factors, which are 
economic determinants of compensation, are related to §162(m) noncompliance behavior in a manner 
consistent with agency theory.  I provide strong evidence that noncompliance is positively related to 
CEO power, but I do not provide consistent evidence of a relation between §162(m) noncompliance and 
the quality of corporate governance that supports managerial power theory.  Because this study 
provides evidence that §162(m) noncompliance is related to the economic determinants of CEO 
compensation and mixed evidence relating noncompliance to the quality of governance, there is 
generally insufficient evidence to conclude that noncompliance behavior is the consequence of poor 
governance enabling powerful CEOs to control their compensation design as predicted by managerial 
power theory.  Therefore, although there are certainly individual instances of CEO compensation 
excesses, agency theory appears to offer a more complete description than managerial power theory of 
the relation of §162(m) and CEO compensation design practices. 
Chapter 2 provides evidence of a positive relation between CEO power and firm §162(m) 
noncompliance behavior over the period 1998 through 2011.  However, since the passage of §162(m), 
two important regulatory changes have affected the environment in which firms make §162(m) 
noncompliance decisions.  The SEC provided SEC Release No. 34-48745 in 2003, which increased board 
independence requirements, and SEC Release No. 33-8732A in 2006, which increased compensation 
disclosure requirements.  Both regulations were designed to limit the CEO’s control over his or her own 
compensation by expanding the independence and disclosure requirements associated with §162(m).  
Therefore, in Chapter 3, I examine the extent to which the two SEC regulations influenced the relation 
between CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  To empirically examine the changing 
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influence of CEO power in my primary analysis, I use principal component analysis to form a single 
measure of CEO power.6 
To better understand CEO compensation design under §162(m) and the influence of CEOs, 
Chapter 3 also examines CEO compensation design trends for those firms affected by §162(m) from 
1994 through 2012.  To the extent CEOs influence their own compensation, they will likely use their 
influence to increase their total compensation levels, increase the fixed salary component, and shield 
their variable compensation from risk and performance variance.  I find that over the 1994 to 2012 
period CEO total compensation levels increased, but CEO salary levels stagnated.  As a consequence, as 
a percentage of total compensation, CEO salary declined steadily since 1994.  The evidence suggests 
that §162(m) affected salary levels, establishing $1 million as an implicit benchmark for CEO annual 
salary.   
While there is some evidence that the relation between CEO compensation and accounting 
performance increased from 1997 through 2012, the overall evidence concerning CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity is mixed over this period.  In summary, the evidence suggests that §162(m) 
affected CEO salary levels, limiting its growth and minimizing the noncompliant component that is salary 
in excess of $1 million, but did not limit the growth of CEO total compensation levels, and at most 
increased modestly its sensitivity to firm performance.  Based upon my descriptive compensation trends 
analyses, my findings suggest that §162(m) limited CEO influence over salary levels, but did not limit CEO 
influence over total compensation levels nor did it sharply increase the sensitivity of CEO compensation 
to firm performance.  
                                                 
6 The single measure of CEO power is CEO FACTOR.  I define CEO FACTOR in Section 3.3.1. and provide its loadings 
and descriptive statistics in Section 3.4. 
8 
 
Issued by the SEC in 2003, Release No. 34-48745 mandated greater independence requirements 
for a firms’ boards of directors and its compensation and nomination committees.  CEOs exert some 
influence over directors and generally have more influence over insider directors (Core et al., 2005).  If 
independent directors design CEO compensation arrangements, the contracts are more likely to be the 
products of “arm’s-length” arrangements over which CEOs have less control (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; 
Core et al., 2005).  Because the 2003 regulation increased the mandated level of board independence, 
the SEC regulation should weaken CEO influence over the Board of Directors and compensation design, 
thereby weakening the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.   
I predict that the 2003 SEC independent governance regulation weakened the relation between 
CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance in Hypothesis VI.  I empirically examine the relation and provide 
some evidence that the regulation weakened the positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliant salary at firms with lower pre-2003 board independence.  First, I empirically examine all 
§162(m) affected firms and find no evidence that the 2003 regulation changed the relation between 
CEO power and firm noncompliance.  Second, based upon the assumption that the regulation should 
have the greatest effect on firms with lower pre-2003 board independence, I divide my sample into two 
groups, lower and higher pre-2003 board independence firms,7 and examine the two groups separately.  
I find that for those firms with lower pre-2003 board independence, the 2003 regulation weakened the 
positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliant salary, which is annual salary in excess 
of the $1 million benchmark.  However, I find no consistent evidence that the 2003 regulation changed 
                                                 
7 I divided firms into lower and higher board independent firms based upon BOARD FACTOR, a general measure of 
independent governance.  I use principal component analysis to construct BOARD FACTOR from three proxies of 
board independence.  I define BOARD FACTOR in Section 3.3.2. and provide its loadings and descriptive statistics in 
Section 3.6.2. 
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the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliant CEO total compensation or §162(m) 
noncompliance in general.  
Issued by the SEC in 2006, SEC Release No. 33-8732A was the first major overhaul of 
compensation disclosures since the passage of §162(m), significantly increasing the executive 
compensation disclosure requirements (Robinson et al., 2011).  Section 162(m) compliance requires that 
shareholders vote ex ante to authorize incentive performance goals, but does not mandate that firms 
provide specific, quantitative performance requirements.8  Following the passage of §162(m), it was 
common practice for firms to provide lower risk incentives to minimize the costly imposition of risk from 
§162(m) compliant incentives while satisfying the federal income tax deduction requirements for CEO 
compensation (Murphy, 2012).  These lower risk CEO incentives were designed to reserve board 
discretion over CEO compensation decisions while still complying with §162(m) deductibility 
requirements, a practice which generally weakens the link between CEO compensation and firm 
performance.  Prior literature has documented that increased compensation disclosure increases the 
link between compensation and firm performance, commonly referred to as sensitivity.  (Craighead et 
al., 2004; Ferri and Maber, 2013).  Because the 2006 regulations increased the mandatory CEO 
compensation disclosure requirements, the 2006 regulation may have increased the sensitivity of 
§162(m) compliant incentives to firm performance, which should limit a firm’s ability to provide the CEO 
with low risk compliant performance goals.   
Assuming the 2006 disclosure requirements limited the use of the lower risk but still compliant 
CEO incentives, without a corresponding increased risk premium, CEO expected utility from compliant 
incentives would have decreased following the 2006 regulatory changes.  That is, following 2006, firms 
would have to provide higher risk incentives to remain compliant or increase their use of noncompliant 
                                                 
8 26 CFR §1.162-27(e)(4)(iii)(A) 
10 
 
compensation to avoid the costly imposition of additional risk.  Because I assume that CEOs prefer 
noncompliant compensation, I predict that CEOs have greater incentive to use their power to secure 
noncompliant compensation following 2006.   
In Hypothesis VII, I predict that the 2006 SEC compensation disclosure regulation strengthened 
the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.  I empirically examine the relation and 
find evidence supporting the prediction.  Because I find no evidence that the CEO power-noncompliance 
relation weakened, including the relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary, the evidence 
suggests that the increased disclosures did not weaken the ability of CEOs to use their power to secure 
noncompliant compensation.  This finding is also consistent with my assumption that CEOs prefer 
noncompliant compensation.   
 In summary, Chapter 3 provides descriptive evidence that §162(m) affected CEO salary levels, 
providing a $1 million salary benchmark so that salary as a percentage of CEO total compensation 
declined from 1994 through 2012.  Second, Chapter 3 provides evidence that the 2003 enhanced 
independence regulation weakened the positive relations between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliant salary for firms with lower pre-2003 board independence.  Finally, I find that the 2006 
disclosure mandates strengthened the relation between CEO power and noncompliance.  The 2006 
disclosures did not reduce noncompliance behavior nor reduce the influence of CEOs on their total 
annual compensation arrangements.    
In conclusion, I extend prior literature by conducting a long-term, empirical examination of firm 
§162(m) noncompliance behavior, focusing on the relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance.  I find that CEO power is positively related to §162(m) noncompliance, suggesting that 
CEOs influence firm noncompliance and their own compensation design.  However, I find no consistent 
evidence that the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation is the result of poor quality governance.  
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I find that firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior is related to the economic determinants of 
compensation design in a manner that maximizes shareholder welfare and better explained by agency 
theory relative to managerial power theory.  If noncompliance was systematically the consequence of 
inefficient, excessive CEO influence, the 2006 increased CEO compensation disclosure requirements 
should have reduced the suboptimal use of noncompliant compensation and the relation between CEO 
power and noncompliance.  However, noncompliance increased in 2006 and I find no indication that the 
2006 disclosures weakened the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation.  Instead, I find evidence 
that the relation strengthened.  As a whole, my findings suggest that the use of noncompliant 
compensation is not necessarily the consequence of poor quality governance, but may well be optimal 
for shareholders in many cases.        
Further, I provide descriptive evidence that §162(m) affected CEO compensation design by 
affecting CEO salary levels and reducing salary as a percentage of total compensation.  The evidence 
suggests that §162(m) established $1 million as an implicit benchmark for CEO salary and limited CEO 
power over salary levels in excess of the benchmark.  The 2003 regulation further limited CEO power 
relating to noncompliant salary for those firms with lower pre-2003 board independence, which 
provides empirical evidence that increased independent processes improves the quality of governance.  
However, I find no evidence that §162(m) affected CEO total compensation levels or sensitivity to firm 
performance.  Therefore, in conjunction with my finding that CEO power is positively related to §162(m) 
noncompliance, I cannot conclude that §162(m) weakened CEO influence over their total annual 
compensation design from 1994 through 2012.     
 Next, Section 1.2 provides details of the history and provisions of §162(m).  In Chapter 2, I 
examine the §162(m) noncompliance decision.  In Chapter 3, I examine CEO compensation design trends 
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from 1994 through 2012 and the influence of the 2003 and 2006 SEC regulations on the relation 
between CEO power and firm noncompliance behavior.  I conclude in Chapter 4. 
 
1.2 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 162(m) 
It has been estimated that twenty percent of the 75 wealthiest people of all time were a product of the 
U.S. 19th Century Industrial Revolution.9  The private wealth generated in this era was extraordinary.  
Perhaps not coincidentally, this era preceded both the 1913 passage of the 16th Amendment, which 
authorized federal income taxes, and the 1934 creation of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the S.E.C., which mandated executive compensation disclosures.   
Since 1934, the SEC has mandated that publicly traded firms disclose CEO compensation levels, 
which is likely to result in evaluation and comparison of compensation levels.  Although the lack of 
computer records limits access to the pre-1992 compensation data, prior studies have documented a 
general history of CEO compensation levels since 1934.  Adjusting for inflation, average CEO 
compensation in the period 1934-1938 exceeded average CEO compensation in the period 1974-1986 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  CEO compensation declined sharply during World War II and slowly in the 
late 1940s (Fryman and Jenter, 2010).  Through the 1950s, ‘60s and part of the ‘70s, CEO compensation 
grew, but slowly, averaging 0.8% growth per year from 1950 to 1975 (Fryman and Jenter, 2010), a 
growth rate outpaced by the average worker.10  Starting in the mid-1970s, CEO compensation growth 
accelerated, both in absolute and relative terms (Fryman and Jenter, 2010).  From 1981 to 1991, CEO 
compensation increased by an average of 212%.  In comparison, during the 1980s, factory workers 
                                                 
9 The top two are (1) John D. Rockefeller and (2) Andrew Carnegie.  Cleopatra is 21st. Outliers: The Story of Success 
by Malcom Gladwell (2008) 
10 Calvin, Geoffrey, Ann Harrington, and Paola Hjelt (June 25, 2001) The Great CEO Pay Heist Executive 
Compensation has Become Highway Robbery, Fortune  
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experienced a 53% increase in compensation and the earnings per share on the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Index grew by 78%.11  During the 1980s, the growth rate of CEO compensation outpaced most high 
earners, except for a few “superstars” such as major league baseball players (Hall and Liebman, 2000). 
Since the 1950s, the press, the general public, politicians, and academic researchers questioned 
the legitimacy of CEO pay (Core and Guay, 2010).  There were proposals to limit executive pay in the 
1980s (Rose and Wolfram, 2002).  By the early 1990s, the public sentiment against “excessive” 
compensation had grown, motivating congressional action (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  The final trigger for 
§162(m) appears to have been President George H.W. Bush’s trip to Japan with U.S. automobile 
executives in 1991 (Rose and Wolfram, 2002; Donahue, 2008).  The sharp contrast between U.S. and 
Japanese executives caused an international outrage as the media coverage focused on the dramatic 
comparison of the compensation of the American executives versus the significantly lower paid 
Japanese executives (Birmbaum, 1992; Cowan, 1992).12  Congress reacted by enacting §162(m) to 
modify corporate behavior and increase the link between CEO compensation and firm performance, not 
to raise revenue (Perry and Zenner, 2001).   
Internal Revenue Code §162(a) is a broad statute which authorizes a federal income tax 
deduction for reasonable and necessary business expenses, including executive compensation.  Section 
162(m) supersedes §162(a) and prescribes new requirements for publicly traded firms to deduct CEO 
compensation as a federal income tax expense.  By this modification to the tax code, Congress hoped to 
increase the link between compensation and performance and reduce excessive compensation as 
reflected in the following statement of the House Ways and Means Committee: 
Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the 
subject of scrutiny and criticism.  The committee believes that excessive compensation 
will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than performance-based 
                                                 
11 Byrne, J. A. (May 6, 1991) The flap over executive pay, Business Week p. 90 
12 In light of the recent automobile bail out scandals, this story becomes rather ironic. 
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compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is limited to $1 
million per year.13 
President Clinton signed §162(m) into law on August 10, 1993 as part of the Omnibus Budget 
and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 and it became effective for tax years beginning on or after 
January, 1, 1994.   
Section 162(m) authorizes a deduction for the first $1 million of CEO compensation, but 
executive compensation over $1 million is deductible only if two primary requirements are satisfied.  
First, the firm’s compensation committee, comprised of independent directors, must obtain shareholder 
pre-approval of the executive bonus plan.  The bonus plan must specify the incentives that are to be 
paid “solely on account of the attainment of … pre-established, objective performance goals,” based 
upon an outcome which is “substantially uncertain.” 14  The second requirement is that the 
compensation committee must certify that the firm satisfied the performance goals.  By definition, all 
salary in excess of $1 million is nondeductible as a federal income tax expense.  Any bonus paid to the 
CEO pursuant to the pre-approved executive compensation plan is deductible for tax purposes, while 
any bonus paid outside of the plan is nondeductible to the extent that total executive compensation 
exceeds $1 million.  If the board fails to follow the statutory bonus qualification requirements, all cash 
compensation and restricted stock grants in excess of $1 million are non-tax deductible.  I define 
noncompliant compensation as all CEO annual compensation that is nontax deductible pursuant to the 
requirements provided by §162(m).  To estimate §162(m) noncompliant compensation for the purposes 
of this dissertation, I define noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, to the extent 
their payment exceeds $1 million, salary, non-incentive plan based cash bonus, any separately detailed 
miscellaneous compensation components, and restricted stock awards.    
                                                 
13 1993 U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 877 
14 26 CFR §1.162-27(e)(2)(i) 
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To illustrate the application of §162(m), Table 2 presents scenarios for three CEOs who receive 
the same total annual cash compensation of $8.5 million.  CEO#1 of Firm#1 receives compensation 
which fully complies with §162(m)’s deduction requirements.  His salary is limited to $1 million and his 
$7.5 million bonus is fully §162(m)-qualified.  Therefore, assuming a flat corporate income tax rate of 
35%, Firm#1 can deduct all of CEO#1’s $8.5 million cash compensation as a tax expense, which reduces 
Firm#1’s federal income tax expense by $2,975,000 ($8.5 million * 35%).  CEO#2 of Firm#2 receives a 
§162(m)-qualified $7 million bonus, but his $1.5 million salary exceeds the $1 million maximum.  Section 
162(m) disallows a tax deduction for CEO#2’s $500,000 of salary in excess of $1 million.  Firm#2’s CEO 
compensation tax deduction is therefore limited to $8 million, which reduces Firm#2’s federal income 
tax expense by $2.8 million ($8 million * 35%).  CEO#3 of Firm#3 is paid a salary of $750,000 and a non-
§162(m)-qualified bonus of $7.75 million.  CEO#3’s cash compensation in excess of $1 million is 
nondeductible under §162(m).  Firm#3 can deduct only $1 million of the $8.5 million total CEO 
compensation as a tax deduction, which reduces Firm#3’s federal income tax expense by only $350,000 
($1 million * 35%). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Ceteris paribus, Firm#1 has the greatest book income of the three firms as a direct result of 
§162(m).  Relative to Firm#1, Firm#2 will pay an additional $175,000 ($2,975,000-$2,800,000) of federal 
income tax expense, reducing net book income by $175,000.  Firm#3 will pay an additional $2,625,000 
($2,975,000-$350,000) of federal income tax expense relative to Firm#1, reducing Firm#3’s net book 
income by $2,625,000. 
Subject to minimal requirements, stock options and stock appreciation rights are deemed to 
meet the “pre-established objective performance requirement” of §162(m) by definition and qualify as 
deductible compensation for federal income tax purposes (Kautter, 1994).  The options must be granted 
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by an independent compensation committee and the executive compensation plan must state a 
maximum number of shares which can be exercised or granted during a specified period.  15   If the option 
price equals the market value on the date of the option grant, the increase in value is performance 
based.   
I next examine the factors which influence firms’ §162(m) noncompliance decisions from 1998 
through 2011 in Chapter 2 and further examine the relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance in Chapter 3.  Chapter 3 also examines CEO compensation design trends from 1994 
through 2012 and how two SEC regulations influenced the CEO power-firm §162(m) noncompliance 
relation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 26 CFR §1.162-27(e)(2)(iv) 
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2.0 AN EXAMINATION OF §162(m) NONCOMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) defines procedures for qualifying the CEO compensation tax 
deduction for publicly traded firms.  The resulting incentive for firms to preserve the tax deduction was 
intended to result in increased CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance and to also reduce 
“excessive” CEO compensation levels (Perry and Zenner, 2001: Balsam and Ryan, 2008).  To increase 
sensitivity, compliance with §162(m) generally requires firms to increase their use of incentive 
compensation, which increases the risk imposed upon the CEO (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  However, 
§162(m) does not mandate CEO compensation design and firms may elect some level of noncompliance 
with the procedures provided in §162(m), which results in firms sacrificing some tax deduction.  Given 
that noncompliance is optional, each affected firm must select compliance with §162(m) and rely upon 
inherently risky incentives to satisfy the CEO’s reservation utility or select noncompliance and lose some 
tax deduction.  Like any compensation design decision, this noncompliance with §162(m) decision is 
influenced by firm, CEO, and governance characteristics, as well as by the fundamental motivation for 
CEO compensation design.             
Agency theory argues that CEO compensation plans are designed to maximize shareholder 
utility, subject to the CEO’s reservation utility and incentive compatibility constraints (Holmstrom, 1979).  
Managerial power theory argues that powerful CEOs influence their compensation arrangements to 
receive excess rents and maximize their own utility, subject only to a shareholder outrage constraint 
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(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  The extraction of the excess rents can potentially lead to suboptimal 
incentives which reduce shareholder value more than they increase manager wealth (Bebchuk et al., 
2002).  Because publicly traded firms are a major component of the U.S. economy, it is important to 
understand whether CEO compensation design practices efficiently maximize shareholder wealth or 
inefficiently transfer excess rents to managers.  Because §162(m) noncompliance is optional and the 
choice should reflect idiosyncratic firm, CEO and governance characteristics, an examination of the 
§162(m) noncompliance decision will provide evidence as to the motivation for CEO compensation 
design.  The research question that I address in Chapter II is the extent to which firms’ §162(m) decisions 
are explained by agency theory versus managerial power theory.  To address this question, I examine 
the factors related to firm noncompliance with §162(m).    
Following the 1993 passage of §162(m), agency theory predicts that firms would evaluate their 
compensation arrangements and adjust them to maintain optimality (Core et al., 1999).  If the costs of 
compliance with §162(m), which may include a greater CEO compensation risk premium and greater 
contracting costs, exceed the costs of noncompliance, which may include the lost tax deduction and 
intangible political costs, a firm should elect noncompliance (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  Consistent with 
this prediction, prior literature has documented that from 1994 through 1998, the likelihood of §162(m) 
noncompliance increased with factors associated with a greater compensation risk premium.  These 
factors include market return variance, the total CEO salary in excess of $1 million pre-1994 and the 
number of executives with a minimum salary of $1 million pre-1994.  Further, these studies found that 
noncompliance decreased with factors associated with a smaller CEO compensation risk premium 
including firm size, Return-on-Assets, CEO tenure, and CEO abnormal compensation16 (Balsam and Ryan, 
1996; Perry and Zenner, 2001; Balsam and Yin, 2005).  Prior literature documented that the likelihood of 
                                                 
16 I define abnormal compensation consistent with prior literature as the residual from a cross-sectional regression 
estimating CEO compensation.  
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noncompliance decreased with firm size, a factor which is also positively related to public scrutiny and 
the political costs of noncompliance (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  In addition, the likelihood of §162(m) 
noncompliance decreased as the tax benefit from compliance increased (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Balsam 
and Yin, 2005).  Therefore, during the period 1994 through 1998, firms responded to the exogenous 
shock of the passage of §162(m) in a manner which reflected the costs and benefits of §162(m) 
noncompliance, consistent with agency theory.   
These prior studies laid the foundation for subsequent research concerning firms’ §162(m) 
noncompliance decisions.  The prior studies generally focused on firms’ initial responses to §162(m) over 
the period 1994 through 1998.  Because of the availability of additional compensation data, changing 
circumstances, and the accumulation of additional evidence over time, I expect that a new examination 
of §162(m) is likely to reveal new insight about firm noncompliance behavior and CEO compensation 
design.  I next discuss how changes to data availability and environmental changes may influence 
§162(m) noncompliance over the longer term from 1998 through 2011. 
Because some influential governance measures, such as the board independence percentage, 
were not available in machine-readable format during the period 1994 through 1998, they were 
excluded from the original studies of noncompliance behavior.   Because I expect firm governance 
characteristics to influence compensation design (Core et al., 1999) and that data are now available, I 
include several measures of governance quality in my analysis.   
Second, the §162(m) compensation environment changed from 1994 through 2011 because the 
§162(m) limit of $1 million of deductible salary is not adjusted for inflation.  Time should change the 
influence of the $1 million limit on compensation design practices as inflation and economic growth 
increase executive compensation levels.  In 1994, total CEO compensation for the S&P 500 firms 
averaged $3.7 million per year.  Therefore, an average 1994 CEO with $3.7 million in total compensation 
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and a $1 million compliant salary received 27% of his or her total compensation in the form of salary.  By 
2004, the average S&P 500 CEO’s total compensation increased to $9.1 million,17 or $7,139,333 in 1994 
dollars.  Further, in 2004, a $1 million salary had $784,54218 of purchasing power in 1994 dollars.  
Therefore, to comply with §162(m) in 2004, the average CEO could receive only 11% of his total 
compensation in the form of salary.  By 2011, $1 million in 1994 dollars had less than $659,000 of 
purchasing power.  Because inflation reduces both the purchasing power of the $1 million salary 
allowance and its percentage of total CEO compensation, over time the percentage of incentive 
compensation paid to CEOs of §162(m) compliant firms must increase, influencing CEO compensation 
design.   
Third, the passage of time with the associated effect of the declining purchasing power of the 
dollar is likely to have changed the influence of certain factors on noncompliance.  In particular, firm size 
was negatively associated with noncompliance from 1994 through 1998.  That is, over this initial period, 
larger firms were more likely to comply with §162(m).  Balsam and Ryan (1996) propose that firm size’s 
influence on CEO compensation resulted from its positive association with the political costs of 
noncompliance, a consequence of media and shareholder attention increasing with firm size, and its 
negative influence on risk. From 1998 through 2011, I expect the political costs of noncompliance to 
have significantly diminished as inflation reduced the purchasing power of the $1 million salary 
allowance and its associated public stigma.  In addition, while firm size is commonly negatively 
associated with firm risk, it is also the most important single determinant of CEO compensation levels, 
consistently demonstrating a positive influence (Murphy, 2012).  As firm size increased from 1998 
through 2011, CEO compensation levels also increased (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).   
                                                 
17 Epstein, Keith and Eamon Javors (November 26, 2006) How Bill Clinton Help Boost CEO Pay, Bloomberg Business 
Week Magazine at Businessweek.com. 
18 The Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator at http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator 
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For compliant firms which capped CEO salary at $1 million, an increase in CEO compensation 
levels would require the increased use of incentive compensation with an associated increase in the risk 
premium necessary to retain the CEO.  Therefore, firm size generates both a negative influence on the 
compliance risk premium via its negative influence on firm risk and a positive influence on the 
compliance risk premium through its positive influence of CEO compensation levels.  Because firm size 
generally increases significantly with time over my sample period, I expect firm size’s positive influence 
on the risk premium through the increased compensation levels to dominate its negative influence on 
firm risk.  Coupled with the likelihood that the political costs decreased, this suggests that the likelihood 
of a positive relation between firm size and noncompliance increased over time and during my sample 
period.  I expect this to result in a different effect of firm size over my sample period of 1998 to 2011 
versus the results from the initial studies with sample periods such as 1994 to 1998.   
Finally, while the initial studies examined the likelihood that a firm elected noncompliance with 
§162(m), they did not examine the factors which influence the level of CEO annual compensation that is 
nontax deductible as a result of §162(m) noncompliance.  Therefore, I extend prior research by 
empirically examining the characteristics which influence §162(m) noncompliance for CEO 
compensation from 1998 through 2011, including additional firm, CEO, and governance characteristics 
not examined in the prior studies, and by examining the relation between the characteristics and both 
the likelihood of noncompliance and the level of noncompliant compensation.     
The firm factors affecting §162(m) noncompliance that I examine are firm risk, firm size and firm 
performance.  Consistent with agency theory, I expect noncompliance to increase with firm risk, 
increase with firm size and decrease with firm performance and I provide evidence consistent with the 
predictions.  I first provide some evidence of a positive association between firm risk and §162(m) 
noncompliance.  Consistent with the prediction, measures of firm risk in terms of firm performance 
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variance and firm leverage are positively related to noncompliance.  In contrast, I find that poor 
liquidity, another firm risk proxy, is negatively related to noncompliance.  However, this association is 
likely explained by the previously documented positive relation between options, a compliant form of 
compensation, and poor liquidity (Core and Guay, 2001).  That is, cash poor firms rely more heavily on 
options to compensate their CEOs relative to those firms with greater liquidity.  Second, I provide 
strong, consistent evidence that an increase in firm size increases the likelihood and level of 
noncompliance from 1998 through 2011.  Third, I provide some evidence of a negative relation between 
firm performance and noncompliant compensation, consistent with more profitable firms being more 
likely to base their compensation on performance standards.  Taken together, my study provides 
evidence that firm factors relate to noncompliance behavior in a manner consistent with agency theory, 
suggesting that firm noncompliance behavior is motivated by firms’ optimization of shareholder welfare.  
My analysis also discusses various qualifications of these general patterns. 
I predict and provide evidence that CEO power has a positive relation with firm noncompliance 
behavior from 1998 through 2011.  CEO power measures demonstrate a positive influence on the 
likelihood and level of salary, cash and total noncompliant compensation.  Every CEO power measure 
which I use demonstrates a positive influence in at least some of the empirical tests reported in this 
chapter.     
This positive link between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliant compensation is potentially 
consistent with both managerial power and agency theories.  Managerial power theory provides that 
powerful CEOs use their influence to secure a noncompliant compensation arrangement in the absence 
of effective governance.  Agency theory also allows a powerful, yet valuable CEO with a high reservation 
utility, to demand a high risk premium to accept a compliant compensation arrangement (Core et al., 
2005).  The firm risks losing the valuable CEO or may fail to motivate the optimal effort if it fails to 
23 
 
compensate the CEO for higher risk associated with compliance.  Given these potential opportunity 
costs, it may be efficient for some firms to provide noncompliant CEO compensation rather than to fully 
comply with §162(m).  Therefore, even a strong, positive link between CEO power and noncompliance 
does not necessarily demonstrate that the compensation arrangement is inefficient.   
Managerial power theory contends that CEOs can abuse their power to secure excess rents 
when governance fails to operate effectively (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Therefore, I predict that 
noncompliant compensation is decreasing in the quality of firm governance.  I examine the relation 
between the quality of governance and firm noncompliance and fail to detect a consistent association.  
Governance quality measures, including executive entrenchment, board interlock and board 
independence, fail to identify a consistent relation between poor quality governance and §162(m) 
noncompliance.  Alternatively, consistent with the prediction, I do find that board size, a common proxy 
for poor governance, is positively related to noncompliance.  However, recent literature provides some 
evidence that board size is not necessarily a good proxy for governance quality.  Larger boards may be 
optimal for larger, more complex firms (Coles et al., 2008).  Because firms affected by §162(m) are 
generally larger, the quality of governance for §162(m) affected firms may increase with board size, 
introducing noise into board size as a proxy for poor governance.  Therefore, even though there is 
strong evidence that CEO power is positively related to noncompliance, the evidence of a positive link 
between poor governance and §162(m) noncompliance is mixed, failing to provide strong support for 
my prediction. 
In summary, this study presents findings generally consistent with agency theory.  I find that 
increased CEO power increases with §162(m) noncompliance behavior and, therefore, my findings 
suggest that CEOs have some influence over their compensation design, which increases with their 
power.  I also find that one measure of poor governance, board size, is positively related with 
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noncompliance.  Both of these findings are consistent with managerial power theory.  However, 
managerial power theory conditions the ability of CEOs to secure excess rents on poor governance and 
my study does not produce consistent evidence that noncompliance increases with poor quality 
governance.  Instead, I provide evidence that firm risk, firm size, and, with noted limitations, firm 
performance are related to §162(m) noncompliance in a manner consistent with agency theory.  
Because the evidence suggests that noncompliance is related to the economic determinants of 
compensation and not necessarily poor governance, the evidence does not demonstrate a general 
pattern of noncompliance resulting from poor governance enabling powerful CEOs to sub-optimally 
influence their compensation design.  As a result, this paper does not provide strong support for the 
proposition that managerial power theory systematically explains CEO compensation design.  The 
evidence presented in this study is more generally consistent with the positive relation between CEO 
power and noncompliance being the consequence of firms using noncompliant compensation to satisfy 
the high reservation utility of a valuable CEO, consistent with an agency theory definition of 
compensation design.     
 I present the literature review in Section 2.2 and the hypothesis development in Section 2.3.  
The research design is presented in Section 2.4 and the sample selection and descriptive statistics in 
Section 2.5.  I present the results in Sections 2.6 and supplemental analysis in Section 2.7.  I conclude in 
Section 2.8.   
 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Following the passage of §162(m) in 1993, many affected firms were forced to restructure their CEO 
compensation arrangements to comply with §162(m) or to sacrifice some corporate tax deduction for 
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executive compensation.19   I provide a detailed discussion of the procedural requirements necessary to 
comply with §162(m) in Section 3.2.1.  The prior literature examined firm response to the passage of 
§162(m) for the period 1994 through 1998, including the percentage of affected firms which sacrificed 
some tax deduction and what factors influenced this noncompliance decision.   
2.2.1. The Percentage of §162(m) Noncompliant Firms 
Prior literature first documented that noncompliance with §162(m) differed among affected firms, i.e., 
some firms fully complied while others chose noncompliance.  Because §162(m) applies to all tax years 
beginning on or after January 1, 1994, Balsam and Ryan (1996) examined firm noncompliance behavior 
in 1994 to estimate the percentage of firms affected by §162(m) that changed their compensation 
design to preserve their CEO compensation tax deduction.  To focus on firms that were required to 
either make a change to their pre-1994 CEO compensation design or lose some tax deduction, their 
sample included only firms which paid their CEO at least $1 million of cash compensation in 1992.  Of 
the 155 firms included in their sample, 78 (50.3%) did not fully comply in 1994.  Of these 78 firms, 48 
stated that they would not comply and 30 stated that they needed more time to consider their decision 
and/or needed the permanent regulations.     
Perry and Zenner (2001) and Rose and Wolfram (2002) examined firm noncompliance from 1994 
through 1997.  Of 143 firms which paid their CEO more than $1 million in salary during any single fiscal 
year from 1992 through 1996, 120 (84%) firms did not reduce CEO salary levels to comply with §162(m) 
                                                 
19 There is one exception to this statement.  If a firm paid only options plus other compensation which totaled $1 
million or less, the firm would already be fully compliant with §162(m) without further action. 
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from 1994 through 1997 (Perry and Zenner, 2001).  From 1994 through 1997, 53% of affected20 firms 
paid noncompliant, non-tax deductible bonus compensation (Rose and Wolfram, 2002).  
Balsam and Yin (2005) examined noncompliance from 1994 through 1998.  Of the 119 firms in 
their sample that paid their CEO more than $1 million annual cash compensation, 59 firms paid to their 
CEO some compensation that is non-tax deductible according to §162(m) at least once during their five 
year sample period.  In total, firms in 38% of their study’s firm-year observations sacrificed some tax 
deduction.   
While many firms carefully complied with the provisions of §162(m), the percentage of firms 
which elected to pay some noncompliant compensation ranged from 38% to 84%, dependent upon the 
sample selection and form of noncompliant compensation evaluated, either noncompliant salary or cash 
bonus.     
2.2.2. The Factors which Influence §162(m) Noncompliance 
Because firm response to §162(m) varied, prior literature also examined the factors which increased the 
likelihood that a firm paid compensation which is noncompliant with §162(m).  Agency theory predicts 
that firms weighed the costs of noncompliance, which include the lost tax deduction and political costs, 
against the costs of compliance, which include an increased risk premium and increased contracting 
costs, and selected the option which maximized firm utility (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  Consistent with 
agency theory, prior literature documented that §162(m) noncompliance behavior was influenced by 
the costs of the noncompliance decision, as one factor in the design of the firm’s executive 
compensation system and as one component of the firm’s corporate tax strategy.  I next discuss the 
                                                 
20 Rose and Wolfram (2002) defined a firm as affected if its CEO’s cash compensation should have exceeded $1 
million based upon pre-1994 compensation practices. 
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factors that influence the costs of compliance, including the tax costs, the political costs, and the 
compliance risk premium, and the findings of the prior literature. 
If a firm chooses noncompliance with §162(m), it must sacrifice some of its CEO compensation 
tax deduction and risk poor shareholder relations (Perry and Zenner, 2001).  The lost deduction may 
increase the firm’s federal corporate income tax expense as long as the firm faces a positive marginal tax 
rate.  This additional tax that the firm must pay is a cost of §162(m) noncompliance.  Consistent with this 
perspective, the prior literature documented that the likelihood of noncompliance decreased as the tax 
cost of noncompliance increased (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Balsam and Yin, 2005).   
Because large firms receive more attention and greater public scrutiny, the political costs of 
noncompliance is hypothesized to increase as firm size increases.  Consistent with this analysis, studies 
based on samples of the initial period between 1994 and 1998 found that firm size was negatively 
related to noncompliance.  That is, larger firms tended to comply more (less noncompliance) with 
§162(m) (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Balsam and Yin, 2005).   
Compliance with the income tax deduction requirements of §162(m) limits executives’ fixed 
salary to $1 million and requires that risky incentives provide sufficient utility to satisfy the employee 
compensation requirements (Reitenga et al., 2002).  Therefore, a greater risk premium is a cost of 
§162(m) compliance and the prior literature documented that firm noncompliance increased with 
factors which increase compensation risk.   
As with all compensation design decisions, the size of the risk premium associated with 
contingent compensation increases with the riskiness of the factors on which the compensation is 
based.  Unique to §162(m) compliance, the costliness of this compliance risk premium adjustment is also 
dependent upon the compensation’s proximity to compliance as explained next.  There are two types of 
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compliance proximity: magnitude and sensitivity.  As an example of magnitude proximity, a firm whose 
CEO received a pre-§162(m) $1.1 million salary would need to reduce the salary by $100,000 in 1994 to 
be compliant, whereas a firm whose CEO received a pre-§162(m) $3 million salary would need to make a 
$2 million salary reduction.  Ceteris paribus, the former CEO would likely require a lower risk premium 
adjustment relative to the latter because the risk premium adjustment should reflect the magnitude of 
the salary reduction.   
As an example of sensitivity proximity, a firm’s whose CEO’s pre-§162(m) incentive program 
included clearly defined performance goals which strictly linked cash incentives to firm performance 
would not need to significantly modify their incentive arrangement, whereas a firm whose CEO’s 
incentive program was at the discretion of a friendly board would need to greatly modify their incentive 
arrangement to provide performance goals.  Ceteris paribus, the former CEO would likely require a 
lower risk premium adjustment relative to the latter because the risk premium adjustment should 
reflect the different sensitivity adjustment.  If the CEO’s compensation is already tied to performance 
pre-1994, §162(m) compliance only requires the formalization of an existing compensation policy with 
little additional costly risk imposed upon the CEO (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).   
The more costly the compliance incentive risk premium, the more likely the firm will select 
noncompliance.  Consistent with agency theory, the prior literature demonstrated that the factors which 
increase (decrease) compensation risk premiums increased (decreased) the likelihood of §162(m) 
noncompliance.  Balsam and Ryan (1996) document that in 1994, the likelihood of noncompliance 
decreased as firm size increased, the CEO’s abnormal compensation increased, and the strength of the 
pre-1994 relation between CEO cash compensation and firm performance increased.  First, firm size is a 
common risk measure, with larger firms generally being less risky.  Larger firms are generally more 
diversified and are less risky because they have a lower frequency of failure and provide a lower 
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variance of rate of return (Beaver et al., 1970; Fama and French, 2002).  Second, prior literature suggests 
that abnormal compensation is negatively related to compensation risk.  Greater executive power tends 
to reduce compensation risk (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Albuquerque et al., 2010) and abnormal 
compensation is a proxy for executive power (Lambert et al., 1993).  The third factor measures 
sensitivity proximity, the firm’s compensation sensitivity prior to the passage of §162(m).  Because 
compliance would be less costly for those firms with higher pre-§162(m) compensation sensitivity, 
greater pre-§162(m) compensation sensitivity should be negatively related to noncompliance.  
Therefore, risk decreases as each of these three measures increase and, consistent with the 
corresponding predictions, the Balsam and Ryan (1996) study documented a negative relation between 
each of these three measures and noncompliance.  That is in 1994, noncompliance with §162(m) 
decreased as measures of compensation risk increased.   
Perry and Zenner (2001) examined how the CEO’s salary level influenced §162(m) 
noncompliance.  Their study documented that, from 1994 through 1997, firm noncompliance behavior 
was influenced by magnitude proximity, as measured by the proximity of the CEO’s salary level to $1 
million.  For CEOs with compensation above $1 million, the likelihood that the firm reduced the CEO’s 
salary to comply increased as the CEO’s pre-§162(m) salary approached the $1 million deduction 
allowance.     
In their study of firm noncompliance behavior from 1994 through 1998, Balsam and Yin (2005) 
provided further evidence that noncompliance was influenced by the cost of the compliance risk 
premium.  Factors used to measure risk in the prior literature include firm size and CEO abnormal 
compensation, as discussed above, and CEO tenure (Finklestein and Hambrick, 1989; Hamm et al., 
2011), accounting performance (Bowman, 1980), and performance variance (Core et al., 1999).  All of 
the preceding factors, with the exception of performance variance, are associated with lower risk.  Risk 
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is increasing with performance variance.  Results were consistent with the predicted effects.  With the 
exception of performance variance, all of the factors demonstrated a negative relation with 
noncompliance, while performance variance demonstrated a positive relation with noncompliance.  The 
Balsam and Yin (2005) study also examined factors which measure the compliance risk premium 
adjustment (magnitude proximity), the level of compensation in excess of $1 million and the number of 
executives at a firm with at least $1 million salary pre-§162(m).  Both measures should increase the cost 
of the compliance risk premium adjustment and, consistent with the prediction, both increased the 
likelihood of noncompliance.   
The prior studies document that from 1994 through 1998 the likelihood that a firm provided 
noncompliant compensation increased with those factors which should increase the cost of compliance 
with §162(m), the corporate income tax cost and the compliance risk premium, and decreased with firm 
size which should be positively related to the political cost of noncompliance.  These findings are 
consistent with agency theory. 
2.2.3. Summary and Foundation for Research Extension 
Therefore, prior literature documented that firms’ noncompliance decisions were influenced by the 
applicable costs.  The findings are consistent with agency theory and suggest that firm §162(m) 
noncompliance behavior from 1994 through 1998 was generally motivated by shareholder welfare 
maximization.   
 The prior research has laid the foundation for extending the empirical analysis in several ways.  
First, the studies cited above examined the influence of factors on the decision to pay noncompliant 
compensation but did not analyze the level of noncompliant compensation.  Second, there is evidence 
that the quality of corporate governance significantly influences CEO compensation (Lambert et al., 
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1993; Core et al., 1999).  Many governance measures were not effectively available prior to 1998, and 
therefore were not included in the 1994 through 1998 studies.   
Third, the prior studies examined only the responses of firms over the 1994-1998 period.  From 
1998 through 2011, several important circumstances have changed.  First, from 1998 through 2011, 
inflation reduced the purchasing power of the $1 million compliance allowance by an additional 27.5%.  
This effective reduction of the fixed compensation limit increases the reliance upon incentives in order 
to qualify all CEO compensation as §162(m) compliant and the associated compliance risk premium.  
Because continuing inflation during the period 1998 through 2011 changed the noncompliance decision 
environment, the factors that influence the noncompliance decision, such as firm size, may also have 
evolved with the passage of time.  Further, important changes in regulatory and exchange requirements 
with respect to firm governance also altered the environment between 1998 and 2011.   
In addition, the percentage of affected firms that elect some noncompliance with §162(m) 
increased significantly from 1994 through 2012.  In my Chapter 3 sample of affected firms as provided in 
Table 13, the percentage of firms paying their CEO some noncompliant salary in excess of $1 million 
increased from 9% in 1994 to 28% in 2011 and 25% in 2012.  From just 2006 to 2011, the percentage of 
affected firms paying their CEO some noncompliant cash compensation increased from 66% to 86%, as 
shown in Table 11.  This significant and continued increase in firm noncompliance behavior suggests that 
the CEO compensation environment, in terms of the costs and benefits of noncompliance, has evolved 
from the initial studies pre-1999 and through the period Chapter II examines, 1998 through 2011.   
Finally, the passage of time revealed that firms’ §162(m) noncompliance decisions are generally 
sticky.  Without a CEO turnover, for Chapter 3’s 1994 through 2012 observations, 96% of firms which 
elect to pay their CEO noncompliant compensation in one year will repeat the practice.  Because 
noncompliance is sticky, a firm which elects noncompliance can expect to pay increased tax expense in 
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the current year and in future years, comparable to an annuity.  I estimate that the present-value of the 
mean (median) expected tax cost from noncompliance is $4.3 million ($1.6 million) in the year that a 
firm first elects to pay noncompliant salary and $3 million ($1 million) in the year that the firm first 
elects to pay some cash compensation that is nontax deductible pursuant to §162(m).  A detailed 
explanation of this calculation and my assumptions are provided in Appendix A.  Because 
noncompliance is a sticky executive compensation design decision that increases a firm’s annual federal 
income tax expense, it is important to understand the motivation of this decision over the longer term.   
Therefore, to extend prior literature in light of the preceding changes, I examine the relation of 
firm, CEO, and governance factors with the likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliance for the years 
1998 through 2011.   
 
2.3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
As a compensation design decision, the §162(m) decision is influenced by the factors which influence 
CEO compensation design.  The motivation of the firm’s §162(m) noncompliance decision is likely to 
reflect both pressure for shareholder welfare maximization, as predicted by agency theory (Holmstrom, 
1979; Gibbons, 2005), as well as potential executive preference enhancement as predicted by 
managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).21  It then follows that the factors associated with 
noncompliance should reflect the firm’s motivation for its compensation practices.  Therefore, I examine 
the factors related to §162(m) noncompliance as evidence concerning the motivation for CEO 
compensation design. 
                                                 
21 I describe the agency theory and managerial power theory predictions of CEO compensation design in greater 
detail in Section 2.1.   
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2.3.1. Hypothesis I: Risk and §162(m) Noncompliance 
If shareholder welfare is the motivation, firm noncompliance with §162(m) should be related to the 
costs associated with the noncompliance decision, consistent with prior literature analyzing the 1994 - 
1998 period (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Perry and Zenner, 2001; Balsam and Yin, 2005).  Optimal 
compensation design includes the allocation between salary and variable compensation (Gibbons, 
2005).  Section 162(m) compliance requires that firms cap CEO salary at $1 million and rely on incentives 
for the balance of the CEO compensation arrangement.  Because incentives require a risk premium, one 
cost of §162(m) compliance is an increased compensation risk premium (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  
Because the cost of the compliance risk premium increases with risk, the likelihood that the CEO 
receives noncompliant compensation and the level of noncompliant compensation received by the CEO 
should increase with risk.  Therefore, consistent with the findings of the prior studies of the 1994 
through 1998 period, I predict that §162(m) noncompliance is positively related to firm risk. 
Hypothesis I:  The likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliant compensation increases with firm risk. 
2.3.2. Hypotheses II and III: The Relation of Firm Size and Firm Performance with §162(m) 
Noncompliance 
 
The relation between some risk proxies and the noncompliance decision may have evolved since 1998, 
the final year included in the prior studies.  For example, certain firm characteristics that are sometimes 
used as measures of firm risk, such as firm size and firm performance, influence noncompliance two 
ways.  The first is based upon their relation with risk and the second is based upon their relation with 
CEO compensation levels.  I will next discuss the two forms of influence of firm size and firm 
performance. 
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Larger firms and more profitable firms are generally associated with lower risk (Fama and 
French, 2002).  Based upon their influence on compensation via risk, an increase in firm size and 
performance should reduce risk, and therefore reduce the cost of the compliance risk premium, all else 
being equal.  Thus, considering only their link with risk, an increase in firm size and performance should 
reduce noncompliance.  However, prior literature has also documented that both firm size (Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Frydman and Jenter, 2010) and firm performance (Carter et al., 2007) exert a strong, 
positive influence upon CEO total compensation levels.  If the CEO’s salary remains capped at $1 million 
as the CEO’s total compensation level increases, risky incentives must necessarily increase, which 
increases the cost of the compliance risk premium.  Based upon their influence on compensation levels, 
an increase in firm size and performance should indirectly increase the cost of the compliance risk 
premium.  Therefore from their link with compensation levels, an increase in firm size and performance 
should indirectly lead to an increase in noncompliance, all else being equal.  The theory supports the 
proposition that firm size and firm performance should demonstrate a negative relation with §162(m) 
noncompliance because both factors reduce risk and a positive relation with §162(m) noncompliance 
because both factors increase compensation levels.  How firm size and firm performance relate to 
§162(m) noncompliance is an empirical question which is dependent upon which relation dominates, 
either firm size’s and firm performance’s relation with risk or their relation with compensation levels. 
Prior research based on the initial period following the passage of §162(m), 1994 through 1998, 
provides evidence that firm size reduced noncompliance over this period, consistent with the direct 
effect of firm size on the compliance risk premium dominating the indirect effect on compensation risk 
premium via firm size’s relation with compensation levels.  However, this link was examined when the 
purchasing power of the $1 million salary allowance was at or near $1 million in 1994 dollars.  As a result 
of inflation progressively shrinking the purchasing power of $1 million, CEO total compensation levels 
would have then had to increase over time in order to maintain CEO reservation utility, all else being 
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equal.  With the purchasing power of the fixed salary component of compensation falling over time, 
§162(m) compliance would require progressively greater levels of CEO incentive compensation, an 
effect which is further strengthened by increases in firm size for CEOs in growing firms.  Firm size is the 
single greatest determinant of CEO compensation levels (Murphy, 2012), demonstrating an influence 
which is 50% greater than firm performance (Boyd, 1994).  I predict that the indirect influence of firm 
size on the risk premium operating through CEO compensation levels will dominate the direct effect of 
firm size on the compensation risk premium over the longer time examined in my study, 1998-2011.  
Therefore, in Hypotheses II, I predict that an increase in firm size should increase the likelihood that the 
firm pays §162(m) noncompliant compensation and the level of noncompliant compensation.     
Hypothesis II:  The likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliant compensation increases with firm 
size.  
Prior research based on the initial period following the passage of §162(m), 1994 through 1998, 
provides evidence that firm performance reduced noncompliance over this period, consistent with the 
direct effect of firm performance on the compliance risk premium dominating the indirect effect on 
compensation risk premium via firm performance’s relation with compensation levels.  Firm 
performance has a positive influence on CEO total compensation levels to the extent that the CEO’s 
compensation is increasing in firm performance, which is generally the case.  Almost all firms rely upon 
some accounting performance measures in their CEO compensation design (Murphy, 1999).22   
Additionally, prior literature has documented that a firm’s market performance has a positive influence 
upon CEO compensation levels (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Boschen et al., 2003).  However, some prior 
research finds that the influence of firm performance on compensation levels is not as strong as firm 
size (Boyd, 1994).  Perhaps more importantly, high performance firms are more likely to satisfy incentive 
                                                 
22 This statement describes those firms which disclosed quantitative standards (Murphy, 1999). 
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performance goals, increasing the likelihood that the firm pays compliant compensation, and further, 
that the amount of such compensation is larger.  As a result, I predict that firm performance’s direct 
negative relation with risk continued to dominate is indirect positive relation with risk operating through 
compensation levels in the longer time examined in my study, 1998-2011.  Therefore, consistent with 
the 1994 through 1998 studies, Hypothesis III predicts that noncompliance is decreasing in firm 
performance.   
Hypothesis III:  The likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliant compensation decreases with firm 
performance.  
2.3.3. Hypothesis IV:  CEO Power and §162(m) Noncompliance 
Similar to firm size and firm performance, CEO power may influence compensation design in two ways.  
First, prior literature has documented that greater executive power can enable the CEO to take actions 
to reduce the CEO’s compensation risk and, therefore, the associated incentive risk premium 
(Albuquerque et al., 2010).  However, compliance with §162(m) mandates that shareholders approve 
incentive performance goals which may weaken the negative relation between CEO power and 
compensation risk.  Alternatively, prior literature has also documented that CEO power has a second, 
positive influence on CEO total compensation (Core et al., 1999; Bebchuk et al., 2002).  CEO tenure and 
age, common measures of CEO power, consistently demonstrate a positive relation with total 
compensation levels (Finklestein and Hambrick, 1989; David et al., 1998).  As firm size grows and, along 
with inflation, increases the high reservation utility of powerful CEOs, the relation between CEO power 
measures and compensation levels should not weaken and, if anything, may strengthen over time.  
Therefore, I predict that CEO power’s positive influence on compensation levels will dominate the 
negative influence on compensation levels that operates via firm risk.   
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As compensation levels increase with CEO power, the incentive component of CEO 
compensation must increase if the firm is to remain compliant, increasing the likelihood and level of 
noncompliance.  More fundamentally, any risk averse CEO would prefer a greater portion of total 
compensation in the form of a fixed salary and less in the form of risky incentives, which makes 
noncompliance more likely.  CEOs have some influence over their compensation design which increases 
with their individual power (Core et al., 1999).  To some degree this influence may efficiently reflect the 
board accommodating the CEO’s ability to use their power to increase firm value, as provided by agency 
theory (Core et al., 2005, Section II.A.).  A valuable CEO can demand a high risk premium for the risks 
associated with compliance and the limitations on salary levels.  The firm risks losing the CEO or 
motivating optimal effort if it fails to satisfy the CEO’s compensation requirements.  Alternatively, a 
positive association between CEO power and the level of CEO compensation may be the consequence of 
poor governance, as provided by managerial power theory.  Both theories support the proposition that 
CEO influence is a function of CEO power.  Based upon the assumption that CEOs prefer a noncompliant 
compensation arrangement, I predict that CEOs use their power to secure noncompliant compensation 
and their success in achieving noncompliant compensation increases with their power.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis IV predicts that CEO power has a positive relation with §162(m) noncompliance. 
Hypothesis IV:  The likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliant compensation increases with greater 
CEO power.  
2.3.4. Hypothesis V: Governance and §162(m) Noncompliance  
It is generally accepted that CEOs’ power enables them to have some influence over their compensation 
arrangements (Murphy, 1999).  However, the fact that a CEO exerts significant power does not 
necessarily mean that his compensation design is suboptimal for shareholders (Core et al., 2005).  A 
powerful CEO may be valuable with a high reservation utility and still subject to efficient governance 
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oversight.  Without a proper benchmark for comparison, the CEO’s compensation can appear excessive 
even though it is designed to efficiently increase shareholder wealth (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Core 
et al., 2005).  Firms are increasingly “poaching” executive talent from outside the company (Murphy and 
Zabojnik, 2007).  To retain a valuable CEO, firms may need to proactively adjust compensation to satisfy 
increasing reservation utility levels (Fulmer, 2009).  Lucrative compensation arrangements may reflect 
the necessary rewards to retain valuable executives (Fulmer, 2009), rather than exclusively representing 
excess rents.   
Managerial power theory proposes that without proper governance or oversight, powerful CEOs 
exert influence to secure compensation arrangements which are suboptimal for shareholders (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004).  The CEO’s influence over his or her compensation design may be a consequence of the 
CEO’s power with little to no reference to his or her value to the firm.  In other words, a firmly 
entrenched, but not necessarily talented CEO may influence the board to control his or her 
compensation design and secure an inefficient, rent extracting compensation arrangement.  Inefficient 
policies that involve excess compensation can arise when boards are not sufficiently independent 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) and widely dispersed shareholders have little incentive to appropriately 
monitor compensation policies (Burkart et al., 1997).  The level and composition of compensation is 
likely to reflect the preferences of the group, management or ownership, with the preponderance of 
power (O’Reilly et al, 1988, David et al., 1998).  With proper governance oversight, CEO compensation 
design should maximize shareholder welfare, even if the CEO is highly influential (Core et al., 1999).  
With less effective governance, management is more likely to exert more influence on compensation 
design to reflect management preferences at the expense of shareholders, including the §162(m) 
noncompliance decision.   
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If the CEO is able to use his power to influence compensation design, he will likely use this 
influence to increase his compensation level and increase the non-incentive proportion of his total 
compensation arrangement to avoid the risk associated with incentive compensation (David et al., 
1998).  To the extent that firms select noncompliance and sacrifice some tax deduction to retain 
valuable and powerful CEOs, CEO power factors may increase the likelihood and levels of 
noncompliance, as predicted in Hypothesis IV.  However, if firms select noncompliance primarily 
because weak governance enables powerful CEOs to influence their compensation design as predicted 
by managerial power theory, i.e., without a corresponding benefit to shareholders from allowing the 
CEO to exert more power, poor governance indicators should be positively associated with 
noncompliance.  Recognizing that there have been many well documented instances of inefficient CEO 
compensation arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), I predict that a weakening of corporate 
governance increases §162(m) noncompliance.   
Hypothesis V:  The likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliant compensation is decreasing in the 
quality of corporate governance.  
 
2.4. RESEARCH METHOD 
To test Hypotheses I through V, I estimate Equation (1) relating §162(m) noncompliance to the firm, 
CEO, and governance measures.  As the dependent variable, I use alternative measures of §162(m) 
noncompliance.  When the measure is an indicator variable, I estimate a logistic regression and 
otherwise I estimate an OLS regression, both with firm and CEO clustered standard errors.   
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𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡  
    + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑊𝑁%𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂/𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐴𝑌 𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽13𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾%𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽15𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷%𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀%𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽17𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡    +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡   (1)  
 
I use six measures of §162(m) noncompliance which I refer to as NC MEASURE, three indicators 
variables and three continuous measures.  I define noncompliant compensation as compensation which 
is non-tax deductible per §162(m).  I measure noncompliance in terms of three compensation measures, 
salary noncompliance, cash noncompliance, and total noncompliance.  A firm is salary noncompliant if it 
pays its CEO a salary in excess of $1 million (Salary NC) because the amount of salary in excess of $1 
million is not deductible by the firm.  Similarly, a firm is cash noncompliant if it pays its CEO any 
noncompliant cash compensation (Cash NC).  I define cash compensation as noncompliant , and 
therefore non-tax deductible per §162(m), to the extent the sum of the CEO’s salary,  non-incentive plan 
based cash bonus, and miscellaneous compensation, which includes severance payments, debt 
forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of stock options, payouts for unused vacation, 
tax reimbursements and signing bonuses, exceeds $1 million.  A firm is total compensation 
noncompliant if it pays its CEO any noncompliant compensation (Total NC).  I define compensation as 
noncompliant, and therefore non-tax deductible per §162(m), to the extent the sum of the CEO’s salary, 
non-incentive plan based cash bonus, restricted stock grants, and miscellaneous compensation exceeds 
$1 million. 
If a firm is salary noncompliant, the firm’s board made an ex ante decision to pay its CEO non-tax 
deductible compensation regardless of performance.  In contrast, if a firm is cash noncompliant, the 
firm’s decision to pay its CEO non-tax deductible cash compensation may have been made ex post, 
reflecting a subjective cash bonus awarded by the board based upon firm performance.  If a firm is total 
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compensation noncompliant, the CEO’s non-tax deductible compensation may include restricted stock 
with a value dependent upon market performance.  
Therefore, I define §162(m) noncompliance using three compensation measures, salary, cash, 
and total compensation, and measure each on a dichotomous and also a continuous basis, yielding six 
measures of noncompliance. To examine the likelihood that the firm pays noncompliant compensation, 
the first three noncompliance measures are indicator variables, SALARY_I, CASH_I, and TOTAL_I, binary 
variables equal to 1 if the CEO receives noncompliant salary, cash, and total compensation, respectively 
and 0 otherwise.  To examine the level of noncompliance, the second noncompliance measure is the 
CEO’s noncompliant salary, cash, and total component scaled by the CEO’s total compensation, as 
reflected in the three continuous measures, SALARY_R, CASH_R, and TOTAL_R, respectively.     
The independent variables in Equation (1) include firm, CEO, and governance measures.  A 
positive (negative) coefficient on an independent variable will provide evidence that the measure 
increases (decreases) the likelihood of noncompliance in the logistic regressions or the level of 
noncompliant compensation in the OLS regressions.   
Firm Measures.  Hypotheses I, II and III predict the relation of three firm characteristics, risk, size 
and performance, with §162(m) noncompliance.  Therefore, the independent variables include 
measures of these firm characteristics.   
To test Hypothesis I concerning the relation of firm risk with the likelihood and levels of §162(m) 
noncompliance, I include the following four measures of firm risk: LEVERAGE, ILLIQUIDITY, σ(ROA), and 
σ(RET).  The amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure is a natural indicator of firm risk (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958).  A low cash-to-total assets ratio can be an indication that the firm is cash poor and a 
greater credit risk (Ericsson and Renault, 2006).  Therefore, I include the debt-to-total asset ratio, 
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LEVERAGE, (Beaver et al., 1970; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005) and one minus the cash-to-total asset ratio, 
ILLIQUIDITY (Beaver et al, 1970) as measures for firm capital structure risk.  As measures of firm 
performance risk, I include the standard deviation of Return-on-Assets, σ(ROA),and market returns, 
σ(RET), over the five prior years (Balsam and Yin, 2005; Core et al., 2008).  A positive coefficient on any 
of the risk proxies will provide some evidence that noncompliance increases with firm risk. 
To test Hypothesis II concerning the relation of firm size with the likelihood and levels of 
§162(m) noncompliance, I use the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(ASSETS), to measure firm size 
(Balsam and Yin, 2005; Carter et al., 2007).   
To test Hypothesis III concerning the relation of firm performance with the likelihood and levels 
of §162(m) noncompliance, I include two measures of firm performance.  To measure accounting 
performance, I include Return-on-Assets, book net income scaled by average total assets, ROA 
(Robinson et al., 2011).  To measure market performance, I include market returns, RET (Balsam and Yin, 
2005; Robinson et al., 2011).   
CEO Characteristics.  To test Hypothesis IV concerning the relation of CEO power with the 
likelihood and level of §162(m) noncompliance, I use four proxies as measures for CEO power: ln(CEO 
TENURE), CEO OWN%, CEO/CHAIR, and CEO PAY SLICE.  CEO tenure has long been a common proxy for 
CEO power (Finklestein and Hambrick, 1989; Laksmana, 2008; Hamm et al., 2011) and increases CEO 
decision making authority (Dechow and Sloan, 1991).  Therefore, I include the natural log of CEO tenure, 
ln(CEO TENURE), as a proxy for the CEO’s power as a manager.  CEO power should be positively related 
to the CEO’s stock ownership (Ittner et al., 1997) and the CEO’s voting power (Mehran, 1995).  
Therefore, I include the CEO’s percent of firm ownership, CEO OWN%, as a proxy for the CEO’s power as 
an owner.  The CEO’s influence over the Board of Directors will generally increase if he also serves as the 
Chairman of the Board (Ittner et al., 1997) and governance may be influenced by the CEO also serving as 
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the Chairman (Robinson et al., 2011).  Therefore, I include an indicator variable, CEO/CHAIR, to 
represent this additional power over the board which equals 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of 
the Board, and 0 otherwise (Ittner et al., 1997; Robinson et al., 2011).  As defined in Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), a CEO’ pay “Slice” is the CEO’s fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top-five 
executives.  The “Slice” reflects the CEO’s power relative to the firm’s top-five executive team and his 
ability to extract rent and is related to lower accounting performance, indicating agency problems 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011).  Therefore, I include CEO PAY SLICE as a proxy for CEO power relative to the other 
top executives.     
Governance Measures.  To test Hypothesis V concerning the relation of the quality of 
governance with the likelihood and levels of §162(m) noncompliance, I use the following five measures 
of the quality of firm governance: BOARD SIZE, E- INDEX, INTERLOCK%, Non-I BOARD %, and Non-I COMP 
COMM%.  The effect of CEO power is dependent upon the quality of governance and larger boards are 
generally less effective and more susceptible to CEO influence (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996).  Larger 
boards enable director free-riding which inhibits their monitoring of management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003).  Board size is a common proxy for the level of board diligence in the governance 
function (Laksmana, 2008).  Therefore, I include the number of members on the board of directors, 
BOARD SIZE, as a measure of board effectiveness.  However, some prior literature has provided 
evidence that larger boards may be optimal for larger, more complex firms (Coles et al., 2008).  This 
introduces noise into the use of BOARD SIZE as a governance measure, particularly for my study of large, 
§162(m) affected firms.   
The board’s insulation from shareholder action, commonly referred to as “entrenchment,” is 
positively associated with executive power, rent extraction and lower firm value (Gompers et al., 2003; 
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Bebchuk et al., 2009).  Therefore, I include the Bebchuk et al. (2009)23 six-factor E-Index, E- INDEX, as the 
measure of entrenchment.  Because independent directors are more likely to make unbiased judgments, 
they should be less influenced by CEO preferences (Jensen, 1993).  Interlocked and linked directors are 
less independent of the CEO and more likely to be less effective monitors (Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 
1999).  Insider directors may be less effective monitors because they are more loyal to management 
(Pfeffer, 1981) and their careers are subject to the CEO’s influence (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  I include 
three board interlock measures, reflecting insider and linked Board of Director and Compensation 
Committee members.  To measure the relation of interlocked board members, the independent 
variables include the percent of interlocked board members, INTERLOCK%.   To measure the relation of 
insider and linked board and compensation committee members, the independent variables include the 
percentage of non-independent board members, Non-I BOARD%, and the percentage of non-
independent compensation committee members, Non-I COMP COMM%.  For all five governance 
measures, poor governance is increasing in the measure and a positive coefficient provides some 
evidence that poor governance increases the likelihood or level of noncompliance.   
To control for growth and investment opportunities, I include the Market-to-Book ratio, MTB, 
(Carter et al., 2007; Cadman et al, 2010).  To control for the tax cost of noncompliance, I include TAX 
BENEFIT, the simulated marginal tax rate multiplied the CEO’s total compensation in excess of $1 million 
scaled by firm total assets (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Balsam and Yin, 2005).  To control for year and 
                                                 
23 The six factors include staggered board terms, “poison pill” and “golden parachute” provisions, and limitations 
upon the shareholder ability to amend charter amendments and by-laws and approve mergers.  The Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Farrell (2009) paper provides a detailed description of the factors within the E-index.  
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml is the link to a list of research papers which utilize the E-
Index, 158 as of October 21, 2012. 
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industry effects, the independent variables include year indicator variables, YEAR INDICATORS, and the 
Fama/French 12 industry classification24 indicator variables, INDUSTRY CODES, respectively.     
Based upon the preceding development, I estimate Equation (1) to examine the relation of 
factors with firm noncompliance with §162(m) by testing Hypotheses I through V.   
 
2.5. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I obtain my data from the following WRDS data bases: Compustat Execucomp; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Marginal Tax Rate; and RiskMetrics.  Because ExecuComp’s reporting of CEO 
ownership is incomplete, especially through the mid-2000s I hand collected the missing CEO ownership 
percentage information using annual firm proxy statements publicly available at sec.gov.  I used two 
sources of the simulated marginal tax rates.  The first is the simulated marginal tax rates available from 
John Graham, Duke University.25  The second is the Compustat Marginal Tax Rate database.  If only one 
rate is available for an observation, I use it.  If both are available, I use the average of the two.  To 
include all observations affected by §162(m), I included all observations with tax years beginning on or 
after January 1, 1994 through 2012.   
To avoid biased results from the inclusion of small public firms with CEO compensation not large 
enough to be constrained by §162(m), I include only firms which paid their CEO at least $900,000 in cash 
compensation and $1 million in total compensation for a minimum of two years during the sample 
period.  If a firm satisfies this requirement, I include all of its firm-year observations during the sample 
period, without interruption for a failure to satisfy the minimum income requirement.  However, I 
                                                 
24Fama-French industries are defined at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
25 https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html 
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exclude all observations prior to the first year that the firm pays a CEO a minimum of $1 million total 
compensation.  After excluding observations missing information, the final data set consists of 11,626 
unique firm-year observations for the period 1998 through 2011, as shown in Table 3.  These 
observations include 1,601 unique firms with a mean (median) of 7.3 (7) firm-year observations per firm.  
The observations include 2,399 unique CEOs with an average (median) of 4.8 (4) firm-year observations 
per CEO.   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 In Table 4, I provide the descriptive statistics for my sample, which are large firms.  Mean 
(median) firm total book assets equal $8.7 (2.3) billion with mean (median) total market capitalization of 
$9.7 (2.4) billion.  The mean (median) CEO tenure is 7.3 (5) years.  This is generally comparable to the 6.9 
(5) years tenure of CEOs at all Execucomp firms estimated by Cadman et al. (2010).  Mean (median) CEO 
total annual compensation equals $6.3 (4.0) million of which $1.7 (0.3) million is noncompliant with 
§162(m) provisions for tax deductibility.  The mean (median) percentage of the board of directors who 
are insiders is 18% (14%), linked members is 10% (8%), and independent members is 73% (75%).   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
I classify the sample firms by industry utilizing the Fama/French 12-Industry Classification.  Table 
5 provides the number of observations and §162(m) noncompliance rates, Salary NC, Cash NC and Total 
NC, by industry.  Firms paid noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash compensation or any noncompliant 
compensation in 20%, 50% and 61% of the 11,626 unique firm-year observations, respectively.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
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 Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables in Equation (1).  Mean 
(median) accounting performance, ROA, is 0.05 (0.05) and market performance or annual market return, 
RET, is 0.07 (0.03).  The mean (median) CEO firm ownership percentage, CEO OWN%, is 2.7% (0.7%).  
Sixty-five (65%) percent of all CEOs also serve as the Chairman of the Board, CEO/CHAIR.  Boards have a 
mean (median) of 9.5 (9) members, BOARD SIZE, and the mean (median) E-Index is 2.32 (2). 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
2.6. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 7 presents the results of the estimations of Equation (1) to test Hypotheses I through V.  To test 
Hypothesis I, the estimated coefficients and statistical significance for the measures of firm risk, 
LEVERAGE, ILLIQUIDITY,  σ(ROA), and σ(RET), estimate the relation between risk and §162(m) 
noncompliance, where the predicted signs are positive.  The findings, with the exception of the 
coefficients on ILLIQUIDITY, provide at least modest support for Hypothesis I.  First, all of the 18 
estimated coefficients on LEVERAGE, σ(ROA), and σ(RET) (three measures of firm risk times six measures 
of noncompliance) are positive.  Second, for LEVERAGE, two of the six coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant and two others are positive and at least approach marginal significance.  For 
σ(ROA), two of the six estimated coefficients are positive and marginally significant.  Finally, for σ(RET), 
two of the six estimated coefficients are positive and at least marginally statistically significant (one at 
p<0.01, one at p<0.10).  Therefore, the coefficients on LEVERAGE, σ(ROA), and σ(RET) provide some 
empirical evidence supporting Hypothesis I.   
The fourth measure of firm risk is ILLIQUIDITY.  Inconsistent with the prediction, two of the six 
coefficient estimates on ILLIQUIDITY are negative and statistically significant (-0.886, p=0.010; -0.007, 
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p=0.008) and a third approaches marginal significance (-0.870, p=0.157).  One potential explanation for 
the unexpected negative relation between illiquidity and noncompliance concerns the association 
between illiquidity and the use of option compensation.  Prior literature documents that the use of 
option compensation increases as firm liquidity decreases (Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 2001) 
because firms attempt to conserve cash by compensating employees with options.  Because the value of 
option compensation is dependent upon firm performance, option compensation automatically qualifies 
under §162(m) as deductible compensation for tax purposes for the firm.  Therefore, the negative 
relation between ILLIQUIDITY and noncompliance is most likely the result of firms using option 
compensation as a result of low liquidity and not evidence that high risk firms pay less noncompliant 
compensation.  Nevertheless, although results for the other measures generally provide modest support 
for Hypothesis I, this negative relation is inconsistent with the prediction in Hypothesis I.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 The coefficients on ln(ASSETS) estimate the relation between firm size and noncompliance, 
which Hypothesis II predicts will have positive signs.  Consistent with the prediction, in all six estimations 
of Equation (1), ln(ASSETS) demonstrates a positive, statistically significant (p < 0.001) relation with the 
decision to pay noncompliant compensation and the level of noncompliant compensation.  Therefore, 
the estimations of Equation (1) provide strong evidence that an increase in firm size increases 
noncompliance, supporting Hypothesis II.   
 The coefficients of ROA and RET estimate the relation between firm performance and 
noncompliance, which Hypothesis III predicts will have negative signs.  Consistent with the prediction, 
the only two statistically significant coefficients are negative.  Four of the six coefficients on ROA, which 
measures accounting performance, are negative of which two are statistically significant (CASH_R: -
0.038, p=0.019; TOTAL_R: -0.066, p=0.016), providing some evidence supporting Hypothesis III.  This is 
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consistent with agency theory and the proposition that a more profitable firm is less risky, and therefore 
more likely to satisfy its §162(m) performance based standards.  The coefficients on RET are mixed and 
fail to demonstrate statistical significance.  Accounting performance may have a greater relation with 
noncompliance because firms generally rely on accounting performance measures for compensation 
performance goals.  Although the evidence is not strong, the results provide at least modest support 
firm accounting performance being negatively related to §162(m) noncompliance.   
 The coefficients on ln(CEO TENURE),  CEO OWN%, CEO/CHAIR  and CEO PAY SLICE estimate the 
relation between CEO power and noncompliance, which Hypothesis IV predicts will have positive signs.  
The results from estimating Equation (1) provide evidence that the relation is positive and support the 
Hypothesis IV prediction.  Of the 24 coefficients, 16 are positive and statistically significant at the .10 
level or lower and only one estimated coefficient is negative.  In each of the six estimations of Equation 
(1), there is at least one CEO power measures that demonstrates a positive, statistically significant 
influence on noncompliance.  Further, each of the four CEO power measures has a positive estimate 
coefficient in at least three of the six estimations of Equation (1).  These results provide at least some 
support for each of the four measures of CEO power being positively associated with the firm’s 
noncompliance decision.  In total, CEO power demonstrates a positive relation with the likelihood of all 
forms of noncompliant compensation and the level of all forms of noncompliant compensation.  
Therefore, the results in Table 7 provide strong evidence that noncompliance increases with CEO power, 
supporting Hypothesis IV.26   
                                                 
26 As a supplemental analysis, based upon the proposition that CEO power is limited by greater board 
independence, I separated my sample into two groups, low and high board independence firm, and estimated a 
modified version of Equation (1) separately for each group.  The separation was based upon BOARD FACTOR, a 
measure of board independence defined in Section 3.3.2.  The positive relation between CEO power and 
noncompliance was positive and consistent with Table 7 for both groups of firms.  Therefore, I do not present 
these results for brevity. 
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 The coefficients on BOARD SIZE, E-INDEX, INTERLOCK%, Non-I BOARD% and Non-I COMP 
COMM% estimate the relation between measures of governance quality and §162(m) noncompliance 
and demonstrate mixed results.  Positive coefficients on these measures would support Hypothesis V’s 
prediction that noncompliance decreases in the quality of governance.  Inconsistent with my prediction, 
the only statistically significant coefficient on E INDEX is negative (-0.003, p=0.008) and three of the six 
coefficients on Non-I COMP COMM% are negative.  INTERLOCK% and Non-I BOARD% demonstrate a 
mixed relation with noncompliance.  Four of the six coefficients on BOARD SIZE are positive and 
statistically significant, the only evidence which is consistent with the prediction.  However as noted, 
some prior literature questions the validity of BOARD SIZE as a measure of board effectiveness for larger 
firms.  Therefore in total, there is no clear pattern of influence demonstrated by the measures of 
governance quality, and therefore the results generally fail to support Hypothesis V. 
As a supplemental analysis, I estimate an alternative regression to test Hypotheses I through V.  
Using principal component analysis, I consolidate the fifteen Equation (1) independent variables that 
test Hypotheses I, III, IV and V, plus the log of the CEO’s age, into seven factors.  The CEO’s age was 
excluded from Equation (1) to minimize multicollinearity.  I estimate the alternative regression six times 
using the six measures of firm noncompliance, NC MEASURE, discussed in Section 2.4.   
Because the results are generally consistent with Equation (1), with the exception of Hypothesis 
III, I summarize the findings without a detailed discussion.  In Appendix C, I provide the tables of the 
loadings in Table C1 and of the results in Table C2.  The four measures of firm risk combine to form two 
factors, which proxy for firm risk and test Hypothesis I.  The coefficients on the proxy for firm structural 
risk, the factor formed from LEVERAGE and ILLIQUIDITY, are mixed and do not support Hypothesis I.  
This is consistent with the Equation (1) results that provide some evidence of a negative relation 
between ILLIQUIDITY and noncompliance.  However, the six coefficients on the proxy for firm 
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performance risk, the factor formed from σ(ROA) and σ(RET), are all positive with four statistically 
significant at the .10 level and one marginally significant, also consistent with the Equation (1) results.  
Therefore, this alternative regression provides evidence that noncompliance increases with firm 
performance risk, supporting Hypothesis I.   
 All six coefficients on ln(ASSETS) are positive and statistically significant at the .01 level, 
supporting Hypothesis II and consistent with Equation (1).  However, the coefficients on the proxy for 
firm performance, the factor formed from ROA and RET, are mixed and do not support Hypothesis III, 
somewhat inconsistent with the Equation (1) results that provide limited support for Hypothesis III.  
Because the coefficients are not generally positive, these results do not provide evidence that 
noncompliance increases with firm performance. 
 The five measures of CEO power form two CEO power factors.  Eleven of the twelve coefficients 
on the CEO power factors are positive with ten statistically significant at the .01 level.  These results 
support Hypothesis IV and are consistent with the Equation (1) results.  The five measures of board 
quality form two governance factors.  Consistent with the Equation (1) results, the coefficients on the 
board factors are mixed and fail to provide empirical support for Hypothesis V. 
In conclusion, consistent with the results of Equation (1), this supplemental analysis provides 
some evidence supporting Hypothesis I, II, and IV, but not Hypothesis V.  Unlike Equation (1), this 
analysis does not provide empirical evidence that supports Hypothesis III. 
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2.7. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS:  AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHANGE IN FIRM NONCOMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOR 
 
Private firms and small public firms27 are unaffected by §162(m).  However, firms will become affected if 
they go public or grow to the point that CEO total annual compensation exceeds the $1 million limit.  
Once affected, the firm must choose between compliance and noncompliance.  A firm can reject 
noncompliance and structure their compensation so as to preserve the tax deduction.  However, the 
firm can also reverse their decision at any point in the future by paying noncompliant compensation.  In 
this supplemental analysis section, I examine the factors which influence a firm’s initial decision to pay 
noncompliant compensation, using three measures of noncompliance, salary in excess of $1 million, 
noncompliant cash compensation, and any noncompliant compensation. 
To estimate the factors which influence a firm’s decision to pay nondeductible compensation for 
the first time, I estimate Equation (2).  Equation (2) is a hazard model, influencing the criteria for 
admittance into the sample set.  Comparable to a survival model in which a patient leaves a clinical trial 
at death, this hazard model will help demonstrate those factors which influence the initial decision to 
pay noncompliant salary, cash, or total compensation.  In other words, this analysis evaluates those 
factors which contribute to a firm initially abandoning the practice of compliance with §162(m) just as a 
survival model evaluates the factors which contribute to the death of the patient. 
There are 1,601 firms included in my total sample set.  For the hazard model sample set, I 
exclude the 96 firms which always pay noncompliant salary if SALARY_I is the dependent variable, the 
323 firms which always pay noncompliant cash compensation if CASH_I is the dependent variable, and 
the 451 firms which always pay any form of noncompliant compensation if TOTAL_I is the dependent 
                                                 
27 Because firm size is positively related to CEO total compensation levels, I assume that public firms that 
consistently pay their CEO less than $1 million annual total compensation are generally smaller firms. 
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variable.28  I include the 1,128 firms, 325 firms, and 228 firms which never pay noncompliant salary, 
cash, or any noncompliant compensation dependent upon whether the dependent variable SALARY_I, 
CASH_I, or TOTAL_I, respectively.  The 377, 953, and 922 remaining firms switch from being salary, cash 
or total compliant to salary, cash or total noncompliant, respectively.  For the switching firms, I include 
all of their compliant observations and their first year as §162(m) salary, cash or total noncompliant, as 
appropriate.   
For Equation (2), the independent variables are the same as Equation (1), described above, with 
the following exceptions.  To control for the significant influence from firm size and the likelihood that 
firm size generally increases so that it is its largest when the firm selects noncompliance, I replaced the 
natural log of total assets with the natural log of the mean total assets for the five prior years, ln(5 YR 
μ(ASSETS )).  Unless TOTAL_I is the dependent variable, the independent variables include PRIOR NC, an 
indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm paid any noncompliant compensation in the prior year, 0 
otherwise.  This will control for the firm’s preference to pay any noncompliant compensation in its 
decision to pay noncompliant salary or cash compensation.  I exclude PRIOR NC when the dependent 
variable is TOTAL_I because PRIOR NC equals 0 for all observations.29      
The dependent variable, NC MEASURE, is one of three §162(m) noncompliant indicators 
variables, SALARY_I, CASH_I, and TOTAL_I, discussed above.  If SALARY_I, CASH_I, or TOTAL_I is the 
dependent variable, the equation estimates the factors which influence a firm’s decision to pay 
noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash, or any noncompliant compensation, respectively.   
 
                                                 
28 I define a firm as “always” paying a form of compensation if it paid the applicable form of noncompliant 
compensation in all of the firm’s observations in my sample. 
29 For comparison, I also estimate Equation (2) without PRIOR NC using SALARY_I or CASH_I as the dependent 
variable.  Because these estimations demonstrate comparable results, I do not present the findings for brevity.  
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𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽4𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽5 ln(5 𝑌𝑅 𝜇(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆))𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑊𝑁%𝑖𝑡   
    + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂/𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐴𝑌 𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽13𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡   
    + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾 %𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 %𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽16 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀%𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽17𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽18𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  [+𝛽19𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡] † 
    + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                                           (2) 
† 𝛽19𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 is excluded when TOTAL_I is the dependent variable. 
Table 8 provides the hazard model estimation results of Equation (2), which examine 
Hypotheses I through V.  The results are generally consistent with the estimations of Equation (1) 
presented in Tables 7.  The estimations of Equation (2) provide additional evidence that noncompliance 
increases with firm size and CEO power, supporting Hypotheses II and IV, respectively.  The results do 
not provide statistically significant evidence supporting or opposing the Hypotheses I, III, or V.   
The coefficients on the risk proxies evaluate Hypothesis I.  Eight of the nine coefficients on 
LEVERAGE, σ(ROA) and σ(RET) are positive, but none demonstrate statistical significance at the .10 level.  
One coefficient on ILLIQUIDITY is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that poor liquidity 
reduces the likelihood that a firm pays noncompliant cash compensation for the first time.  As discussed 
previously, this finding may be the consequence of firms with poor liquidity relying more heavily on 
compliant options.  Therefore, Equation (2) does not provide evidence supporting Hypothesis I, but it 
does not provide strong evidence that noncompliance decreases with firm risk. 
Providing additional, consistent support for Hypothesis II, all three coefficients on ln(5 YR 
μ(ASSETS)) are positive and statistically significant (p<.001), providing evidence that  firm size has a 
positive relation with firms’ initial decisions to pay any form of noncompliant compensation.  However, 
ROA and RET demonstrate mixed results and fail to provide additional support for Hypothesis III.   
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Consistent with Hypothesis IV, seven of the twelve coefficients on the CEO power measures are 
positive.  Eight of the twelve coefficients are statistically significant at the .10 level or lower of which 
seven are positive.  One CEO power proxy, ln(CEO TENURE) demonstrates mixed results.  While 
coefficient on ln(CEO TENURE)is positive when SALARY_I is the dependent variable (0.273, p=.001), the 
coefficient is negative when CASH_I (-0.133, p=.024) and TOTAL_I (-0.277, p<.001) are the dependent 
variables.  This mixed result indicates that CEO tenure has a positive relation with a firm’s initial decision 
to pay noncompliant salary, but a negative relation with a firm’s initial decision to pay noncompliant 
cash and total noncompliant compensation.   
Consistent with the Equation (1) analysis, the governance quality measures fail to demonstrate a 
consistent relation with noncompliance.  Only two of the fifteen measures demonstrate statistical 
significance.  One coefficient of the three coefficients on BOARD SIZE (0.055, p=.075) and one of the 
three coefficients on Non-I BOARD% (1.236, p=.024), are positive and statistically significant.  Both occur 
when SALARY_I is the dependent variable, suggesting some relation between lower quality corporate 
governance and firms’ initial decision to pay noncompliant salary.  However, these findings do not 
provide consistent evidence that increased poor quality governance increases the likelihood that a firm 
switches to noncompliant behavior and fail to consistently support Hypothesis V. 
In summary, Equation (2) provides additional evidence that firm noncompliance behavior 
increases with firm size and CEO power.  In addition, this analysis provides some weak evidence that a 
firms’ initial decisions to pay their CEO noncompliant salary may increase with poor quality governance.   
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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2.8. CONCLUSION 
This study examines firms’ decisions not to comply with Internal Revenue Code §162(m) to determine 
the extent to which the motivation for CEO compensation design comes from shareholder utility 
maximization versus CEO utility maximization.  I examine the relation of firm compensation 
determinants, CEO power measures and measures of governance quality with §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation and provide evidence that firm §162(m) noncompliant behavior is better defined by 
shareholder utility maximization as argued by agency theory. 
Hypotheses I, II and III make predicts that relate the economic determinants of CEO 
compensation to firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior in a manner consistent with shareholder utility 
maximization.  Consistent with Hypothesis I, this analysis provides some evidence that noncompliance 
with §162(m) increases with firm risk.  My study provides strong, consistent evidence supporting 
Hypothesis II which predicts that noncompliance increases with firm size.  My study provides some 
evidence of a negative relation between firm accounting performance and noncompliance, providing 
limited support for Hypothesis III.   
Hypothesis IV predicts a positive relation between CEO power and firm noncompliance which is 
consistent with a prediction based upon either shareholder or CEO welfare maximization.  Consistent 
with the prediction, this study provides evidence that §162(m) noncompliance increases with CEO 
power, supporting Hypothesis IV.   
If firms’ decisions not to comply with §162(m) reflect the motivation of CEO compensation 
design such that poor governance enables powerful CEOs to secure compensation arrangements that 
maximize CEO welfare to the detriment of shareholders, measures of the quality of corporate 
governance should demonstrate a positive relation with firm noncompliance.  Hypothesis V predicts that 
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firm noncompliance is decreasing in the quality of governance and my study does not provide consistent 
evidence supporting the prediction, with qualifications relating to board size as noted in Section 2.6.     
In summary, even though my study provides evidence that CEO power is positively related to 
noncompliance, I do not find consistent evidence that §162(m) noncompliance increases with poor 
quality governance.  Because managerial power theory conditions excessive CEO influence on poor 
quality governance, my study does not support the proposition that firm §162(m) noncompliance 
decisions are explained by managerial power theory.  In addition, the economic determinants of 
compensation, firm risk, size and performance, demonstrate a relation with noncompliance in a manner 
consistent with shareholder welfare maximization as predicted by agency theory.  Because this study 
provides evidence that noncompliance is influenced less by poor quality governance and more by 
economic factors, this study does not support the proposition that managerial power theory 
systematically explains firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  My study provides evidence that firm 
§162(m) noncompliance is motivated by shareholder wealth maximization and better explained by 
agency theory.   
My results are generally consistent with agency theory, but subject to the following caveat.  
Agency theory predicts that CEO compensation design, including firm noncompliance, maximizes 
shareholder welfare.  However, I do not examine the relation between §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation and shareholder wealth.  My study examines how firm noncompliance relates to the 
quality of governance.  Empirical evidence of a negative relation would support the prediction that firms 
with poor quality governance pay their CEOs more noncompliant compensation, suggesting that 
noncompliant compensation is positively related to CEOs’ inefficiently controlling their own 
compensation design and, as a consequence, poor future firm performance.  However, my study does 
not provide evidence of a consistent relation between firm noncompliance behavior and the quality of 
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governance.  Therefore, the findings of my study do not support the conclusion that noncompliant 
compensation is evidence of inefficient CEO influence.  The lack of a relation between governance 
quality and noncompliance suggests that noncompliant compensation may be positively related to 
future firm performance.  However, I do not examine this question nor do I claim that this study 
documents a positive relation between noncompliant compensation and shareholder wealth.  Instead, 
because my study provides evidence of a positive relation between CEO power and noncompliance, my 
study lays the foundation for future research to examine the influence that noncompliant compensation 
has upon future shareholder wealth. 
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3.0 THE EFFECT OF GOVERNANCE AND DISCLOSURE REGULATORY CHANGES ON §162(m) 
NONCOMPLIANCE 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Congress enacted §162(m) in response to the popular belief that CEOs controlled their own 
compensation design to the detriment of shareholders (Rose and Wolfram, 2002).  Compliance with 
§162(m) preserves the tax deduction for CEO compensation, but it limits CEO annual salary to $1 million.  
Therefore, a §162(m) compliant firm generally must provide increasingly greater levels of performance-
based incentive compensation as CEO total compensation increases over time, which will generally 
increase the riskiness of CEO compensation.  Risk averse CEOs would prefer noncompliance with 
§162(m) if their total compensation remained unchanged and they received a greater proportion of 
fixed salary with a smaller proportion of uncertain incentive compensation.  Further, such CEOs are 
likely to attempt to influence their compensation arrangements to secure §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation.   
Because a CEO’s influence on the firm’s CEO compensation design is a function of the CEO’s 
individual power (Core et al., 1999), assuming the CEO’s compensation preferences are as described in 
the preceding paragraph and that the CEO’s total compensation is held constant, noncompliance should 
increase with CEO power.  This prediction also assumes that more powerful CEOs are able to bargain 
more effectively with the board over the design of their compensation contract than are less powerful 
CEOs.  Consistent with this perspective, Chapter II provides evidence that over the period 1998 to 2011 
CEO power was generally positively associated with CEO noncompliant compensation.  That is, more 
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powerful CEOs tended to receive a greater proportion of noncompliant compensation than less 
powerful CEOs.  During this period, two major regulatory changes sought to reduce CEO influence over 
compensation arrangements, the increased board independence requirements of SEC Release No. 34-
48745 in 2003, and the increased compensation disclosure requirements of SEC Release No. 33-8732A in 
2006.  To better understand CEO compensation design and the influence of CEOs, I examine how these 
two exogenous regulatory shocks to the CEO compensation environment affected the relation between 
CEO power and firms’ §162(m) noncompliance decisions.     
The relationship between a publicly owned corporation and its CEO is a classic example of the 
principal-agent problem (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Prior to 1900, businesses were predominantly 
small and managed by their owners.  As firms grew,30 management became more separated from 
ownership.  Well before Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalized the conflict between shareholders and 
managers and the agency costs of control, firms recognized this conflict and offered incentive 
compensation to motivate CEOs to act in the shareholders’ interest.  For example, by 1928 nearly two-
thirds of the large, industrial firms offered bonus plans and, in 1929 for those firms which provided 
bonus plans, bonuses provided 42% of executive compensation (Baker, 1938).  However, executive 
compensation practices remained confidential, unavailable to both shareholders and even to some 
directors (Washington, 1942; Wells, 2010).   
In the early 1930s, fueled by the depression and a series of public scandals which disclosed 
extraordinary executive compensation levels, the investment community and the general public 
questioned executive compensation practices and demanded full disclosure (Wells, 2010).  Therefore, 
since the creation of the SEC in 1934, public firms have been required to disclose CEO total 
                                                 
30 Between 1895 and 1904, nearly 2,000 small manufacturing firms combined to form 157 large corporations 
(Murphy, 2012) 
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compensation and its particular components.  Although the SEC increased compensation disclosure 
requirements in 1978, 1993 and 2006, the belief that powerful CEOs secured inefficient compensation 
arrangements with excess rents31 continued, prompting some to conclude that CEO compensation is 
“Pay-Without-Performance” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Because similar claims of excessive executive 
compensation continue,32 understanding CEO compensation design and the influence of CEO power 
remains important.        
Prior research generally recognizes that CEOs influence their compensation arrangements and 
that their influence increases with their individual power (Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 2011).  Examining 
the relation between CEO power and compensation design is difficult because of endogeneity concerns, 
particularly the firm’s joint design of CEO compensation and whether to comply with §162(m).  CEO 
compensation tends to be sticky over time such that compensation design and §162(m) noncompliance 
are jointly determined.  The allocation between salary and incentives may be affected by CEO power and 
its association with board quality, firm performance, or other compensation determinants.  The two SEC 
regulations changed the CEO compensation environment, creating natural experiments which alleviate 
some of the endogeneity concerns.  Each regulation produced an exogenous shock which can be 
exploited to examine the relation between CEO power and firm noncompliance behavior.   
I extend the prior literature and empirically examine how the SEC regulatory changes affected 
the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  To provide a single measure of 
CEO power, I use principal component analysis to combine four proxies of CEO power.  By combining 
                                                 
31 Compensation arrangements in some circumstances may include optimal rents, such as rents provided to 
motivate the CEO to reveal private information, which provides the CEO with above-market compensation while 
still serving the interests of shareholders.  In contrast, throughout this Chapter 3, I use the term rents to refer to 
suboptimal rents which are secured by the CEO as a function of CEO power and inefficiently maximize CEO wealth 
at the expense of the shareholders. 
32 Bloxham, Eleanor (April 13, 2011) How can we address excessive CEO pay? CNNMoney; Kim, Susanna (August 16, 
2012) Taxpayers Subsidize CEO Pay, Report Says, abc news; Smith, Elliot B. and Phil Kuntz (April 30, 2013) CEO Pay 
1,795-to-1 Multiple of Wages Skirts U.S. Law, Bloomberg 
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multiple proxies into a single measure, I can use the resulting overall CEO power measure to empirically 
examine the changing relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance. 
To provide the background for understanding CEOs’ influence on their own compensation 
design at firms affected by §162(m), I first describe CEO compensation trends from 1994 through 2012.  
I find that salary levels stagnated and salary as a percentage of CEO total compensation declined 
consistently from 1994 through 2012.  The evidence supports the proposition that §162(m) defined $1 
million, the tax deductible fixed compensation allowance, as an informal benchmark for CEO fixed 
salary, suggesting that §162(m) weakened CEO influence over salary levels.  However, I find that CEO 
total compensation levels increased and the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to firm performance 
did not significantly increase from 1994 through 2012.  Although the evidence suggests that §162(m) 
affected salary levels and the allocation between variable and fixed compensation, my time-series 
analysis does not reveal general evidence that §162(m) weakened the influence of CEOs over their total 
compensation design.   
In 2003, the SEC issued Release No. 34-48745 which provides that public firms must establish a 
Board of Directors comprised of a majority of independent directors and compensation and nominating 
committees comprised solely of independent members to increase board independence and improve 
the quality of firms’ governance processes.  Section 162(m) compliance requires that firms establish an 
independent compensation committee, but imposes no requirement on firms which elect 
noncompliance with §162(m).  Therefore, the 2003 regulation expanded the independence 
requirements of §162(m) by increasing the mandated level of board independence for all public firms.  
To the extent that CEOs use their power to influence their compensation arrangements and mandatory 
board independence reduces CEO influence, the 2003 regulatory changes should weaken the relation 
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between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.   Therefore, I predict that the exogenous shock of the 
2003 independence regulation weakened the CEO power-firm noncompliance relation. 
I empirically examine how the 2003 SEC regulatory change influenced the relation between CEO 
power and §162(m) noncompliance and provide evidence that the 2003 regulation weakened the 
positive relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary at firms with lower board independence.  
I first examine all firms in my sample and find no evidence that the CEO power-firm noncompliance 
relation was affected over the entire sample.  Based upon the assumption that firms with lower board 
independence should be the most affected by the 2003 regulation, I next divide my sample into those 
with less versus more independent governance processes based upon their pre-2003 board 
independence.  I examine firms with lower and greater board independence separately and provide 
evidence that the 2003 regulation weakened the positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliant salary for firms with lower pre-2003 board independence but not for the regulatory 
change.  This suggests that at firms with lower board independence the 2003 regulation weakened a 
CEO’s ability to use his power to secure §162(m) noncompliant salary, which is salary in excess of $1 
million.  For my overall sample, however, I find no consistent evidence that the 2003 regulation affected 
the relation between CEO power and a firm’s general use of §162(m) noncompliant compensation.   
For firms with more independent boards, my results suggest that the 2003 regulation did not 
have a general, broad effect on the relation between CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance 
behavior and, in more general terms, compensation design.  This result suggests that either (a) further 
improving board independence for firms that already had relatively independent boards is not necessary 
to improve the quality of governance, (b) for such firms, the 2003 regulations did not change board 
independence sufficiently to have a significant influence on the quality of governance, or (c) for such 
firms, independent directors are an ineffective mechanism for controlling CEO power because the SEC 
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definition of an independent director fails to provide independent review.  For example, with respect to 
the final condition, a director with social ties to the CEO can qualify as an independent director and prior 
literature has documented that social ties influences governance quality (Hwang and Kim, 2009).  
Therefore, the independence regulations may fail to increase the quality of governance because the 
regulations allow the CEO to fill the board with “friends.”        
In summary, I predict that the 2003 board independence regulation weakened the association 
between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance and provide some evidence supporting the prediction 
under very limited circumstances, specifically noncompliant salary at lower board independent firms.  
Because the SEC further modified the CEO compensation environment in 2006, Chapter 3 also examines 
how the 2006 regulation changed the link between CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance. 
In 2006, SEC Release No. 33-8732A mandated a significant increase in the disclosure of CEO 
compensation arrangements.  Compliance with §162(m) to achieve full tax deductibility of all 
compensation requires that all CEO compensation in excess of $1 million must be based on shareholder 
approved performance goals, i.e. risky incentives.33  Because §162(m) compliance generally increases 
the reliance on risky incentives, the risk premium for a compliant compensation arrangement should 
exceed the risk premium for an equivalent noncompliant arrangement (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  Prior 
literature concludes that to reduce the risk premium from compliance, firms responded to §162(m) by 
providing lower risk compliant incentives, with performance goals designed to preserve board discretion 
to award CEO bonuses without requiring high sensitivity between compensation and performance 
(Murphy, 2012).  Because the 2006 regulations greatly increased the compensation disclosure 
requirements and prior literature has provided evidence that increased disclosure generally increases 
compensation sensitivity (Craighead et al., 2004; Ferri and Maber, 2013), I propose that the exogenous 
                                                 
33 I discuss further procedural requirements in greater detail in Section 3.2.1. 
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shock of the 2006 regulations increased the sensitivity of compliant incentives, which increases the 
riskiness of §162(m) compliant incentives.   
Assuming that the 2006 disclosure mandates resulted in an increase in the riskiness of compliant 
incentives, a CEO’s expected utility from compliant incentives would have decreased in 2006, in absolute 
terms and relative to noncompliant incentives.  To remain compliant with §162(m), firms can increase 
the riskiness of the compliant incentives.  To avoid the imposition of the additional risk, firms can 
increase their use of noncompliant compensation.  Under such circumstances, because CEOs prefer less 
risky compensation, they are likely to attempt to influence their compensation arrangements to secure 
lower risk noncompliant compensation, as discussed in greater detailed in Section 2.3.3.  Therefore 
following the 2006 regulatory change, risk averse CEOs have greater incentive to use their influence to 
secure noncompliant compensation and their success should increase with their individual power.  
Therefore, I predict that the 2006 SEC disclosure regulation strengthened the relation between CEO 
power and §162(m) noncompliance.     
I empirically examine how the 2006 SEC disclosure regulation influenced the relation between 
CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance and provide evidence that the 2006 disclosure requirements 
resulted in a stronger relation.  This finding is important for what it reveals about CEO compensation 
practices and firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  First, these findings provide some support for the 
popular belief that firms used low risk performance standards to minimize the compliance risk premium 
and that increasing shareholder awareness, via increased disclosures, motivates firms to modify their 
compensation arrangements and §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  Second, the evidence supports the 
proposition that CEOs prefer noncompliant compensation and use their power to secure lower risk, 
noncompliant compensation.   
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Finally, because the 2006 changes did not weaken the relation between CEO power and 
noncompliant compensation, my study provides evidence that the increase in disclosure did not weaken 
CEO influence over §162(m) noncompliance behavior and his or her own compensation design.  The 
influence of the 2006 mandates on CEO compensation practices demonstrated by my study is consistent 
with results in Robinson et al. (2011), who demonstrated a positive relation between a firm’s failure to 
properly comply with the 2006 compensation disclosure requirements and excess CEO total 
compensation levels.  This suggests that firms which paid their CEO greater compensation relative to 
comparable CEOs also tended to fail to fully comply with the 2006 disclosure requirements, consistent 
with an effort to camouflage compensation practices.  After the disclosure defects were made public by 
the SEC, the firms continued to provide their CEO excess compensation in the subsequent year without 
any significant reduction.  Similar to my study, the disclosures increase shareholder awareness, but do 
not necessarily reduce CEO influence on CEO compensation design. 
 Chapter 3 makes three primary contributions to the compensation literature.  First, I provide 
some descriptive evidence that CEO salary levels have not grown in constant dollars, suggesting that 
§162(m) affected CEO salary levels by providing $1 million as an effective salary benchmark.  One result 
of this effect was to reduce the percentage of CEO total compensation from fixed salary.  This suggests 
that §162(m) weakened the ability of CEOs to secure salary in excess of this $1 million benchmark.  
Second, I provide evidence that at those firms with lower independent governance prior to 2003, the 
2003 independence regulations weakened the positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliant salary in excess of the $1 million benchmark.  This suggests that increased board 
independence further weakens the ability of CEOs in certain circumstances to use their power to secure 
noncompliant salary and provides evidence that increased board independence improves the quality of 
governance.  Third, I find that the 2006 disclosure regulations strengthened the relation between CEO 
power and §162(m) noncompliance.  In summary, my study suggests that §162(m) affected salary levels 
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and the ability of CEO to influence the fixed salary component of their total compensation, but I cannot 
conclude that §162(m) affected CEO influence over their total compensation design.  
 I present the background and hypothesis development in Section 3.2.  The research methods are 
presented in Section 3.3.  The sample selection and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3.4.  I 
present CEO compensation trends in Section 3.5 and the regression results in Section 3.6.  I conclude in 
Section 3.7.        
 
3.2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
To understand the long-term implications of §162(m) on CEO compensation design and the influence of 
CEOs, I begin by describing how §162(m) was designed to influence CEO compensation arrangements in 
Section 3.2.1.  Section 3.2.2 presents the prior literature which examined the initial effect34 of §162(m) 
on CEO compensation levels and sensitivity.  Section 3.2.3 develops my hypotheses. 
3.2.1. The intention of §162(m) to Influence CEO Compensation 
In 1993, Congress passed §162(m) to influence CEO compensation design, specifically to reduce 
“excessive” compensation and increase the link between compensation and firm performance (Perry 
and Zenner, 2001; Balsam and Yin, 2005).  To accomplish this goal, §162(m) provides a tax incentive such 
that a firm35 must design its CEO compensation arrangements to comply with §162(m) or lose some tax 
deduction.  Section 162(m) denies the federal corporate income tax deduction for all CEO compensation 
in excess of $1 million, unless the compensation is paid pursuant to a §162(m) compliant performance 
                                                 
34 The exact years examined by the early studies vary and are provided in Section 3.2.2, primarily 1994 through 
2000. 
35 I refer to those firms affected by §162(m).  Section 162(m) applies to only publicly traded firms and only when 
the firm pays at least one executive more than $1 million total of annual compensation. 
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based incentive arrangement which was authorized by an independent compensation committee and 
pre-approved by the shareholders.  Congress intended that §162(m) should influence CEO compensation 
design by the following three mechanisms: increased use of performance based incentives, increased 
oversight of compensation arrangements by establishing independent compensation committees, and 
increased shareholder awareness of, and participation in, CEO compensation practices.   The first 
mechanism is provided to increase the link between CEO compensation and firm performance, an 
express purpose of §162(m).  However, §162(m) was enacted because of the common belief that CEOs 
controlled their own compensation design (Rose and Wolfram, 2002).  Consistent with this belief, the 
second two mechanisms are provided to reduce CEO influence over his or her own compensation 
design.  I next describe these three mechanisms. 
The first mechanism is that §162(m) preserves the tax deduction for executive compensation 
paid “solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance goals,”36encouraging firms to use 
incentive compensation.  Empirical studies have documented a positive relation between incentive 
compensation and firm performance in certain circumstances (Mehran, 1995; Ittner et al., 2003).  
However, an increased use of incentive compensation may impose additional risk on the CEO for which 
the firm must provide a risk premium.  Therefore, an increased risk premium may be a cost of 
compliance with §162(m) (Balsam and Ryan, 1996) which should increase CEO compensation levels 
(Reitenga et al., 2002).   
If a firm limited salary to less than $1 million and closely linked incentives to performance goals 
prior to the passage of §162(m), compliance with §162(m) only required the formalization of the firm’s 
compensation policy (Balsam and Ryan, 2008).  For these firms, §162(m) compliance imposed little to no 
additional risk and, as result, required little to no compliance risk premium.  If a firm paid a salary in 
                                                 
36 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C) 
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excess of $1 million and/or did not closely link incentives to performance pre-§162(m), continued 
compliance with §162(m) required that the firm modify the CEO’s compensation arrangement by 
increasing their use of performance based incentives, which increased the riskiness of the incentives 
offered.37  For these firms, compliance imposed additional risk which required a larger compliance risk 
premium, increasing compensation levels.  However, this increased use of incentives may have also 
increased the compensation’s sensitivity to performance, a goal of §162(m).   
The second mechanism is that §162(m) compliance requires that a firm establish and maintain a 
Compensation Committee of two or more members.  Based upon the belief that independent review 
improves the quality of governance which should influence CEO compensation design, only “outside 
directors”38 can serve as committee members.  The Board Compensation Committee is responsible for 
the review and approval of the compensation arrangements of all executives covered by §162(m), 
including the CEO.  The Compensation Committee defines the incentive compensation performance 
goals, certifies that the goals were satisfied, and authorizes the payment of any §162(m) compliant, 
performance-based compensation.39  
The third mechanism through which §162(m) compliance operates is increased shareholder 
awareness of and participation in CEO compensation practices.  Section 162(m) preserves the tax 
                                                 
37 Firms could have provided weak, low risk performance standards to avoid the imposition of additional risk as 
discussed in greater in Section 3.2.3.2. 
38 Section 1.162-27(e)(3)(i) of the Regulations provides that a director is an “outside director” if the director (A) is 
not a current employee of the publicly held corporation; (B) is not a former employee of the publicly held 
corporation who receives compensation for prior services (other than benefits under a tax-qualified retirement 
plan) during the taxable year; (C) has not been an officer of the publicly held corporation; and (D) does not receive 
remuneration from the publicly held corporation, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity other than as a 
director. For this purpose, remuneration includes any payment in exchange for goods or services.   
Section 1.162-27(e)(3)(vi) provides that whether a director is an employee or a former officer is determined on the 
basis of the facts at the time that the individual is serving as a director on the compensation committee. Thus, a 
director is not precluded from being an outside director solely because the director is a former officer of a 
corporation that previously was an affiliated corporation of the publicly held corporation.  Revenue Ruling: 2008-
32.  
39 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C)(i) 
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deduction for incentives only if the performance goals are “disclosed to shareholders and approved by a 
majority of the vote in a separate shareholder vote before the payment of such remuneration,” 40 i.e., ex 
ante shareholder approval of the disclosed incentive compensation performance goals.  Furthermore, 
on November 29, 1993, the SEC mandated that all firms must disclose their §162(m) policy.  Therefore, 
firms must disclose both the incentive performance goals for all executives covered under §162(m) for 
whom the firm is attempting to qualify41 their incentive compensation arrangement and the firm’s 
general §162(m) policy.  However, firms are not mandated to disclose if they paid any §162(m) 
noncompliant compensation.  As a result, firms can disclose that they intend42 to qualify their incentive 
compensation plans pursuant to §162(m), present §162(m) compliant performance goals to their 
shareholders, secure ex ante shareholder approval of the incentive arrangement, and still pay their CEO 
compensation which does not qualify under §162(m).     
3.2.2. Literature Review: The Influence of §162(m) on CEO compensation 
Prior studies have examined the impact of §162(m) on CEO compensation levels and sensitivity to firm 
performance.  Overall, CEO total compensation levels grew dramatically from the passage of §162(m) in 
1993 (Hall and Liebmann, 2000; Rose and Wolfram, 2000) through the year 2000 (Murphy, 2011).  If this 
increase in total compensation levels is at least partially the result of increased risk premiums from an 
increased reliance on incentives, the link between CEO compensation and firm performance, pay-for-
performance sensitivity (PPS), may have also increased. 43  Consistent with this proposition, there is 
                                                 
40 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C)(ii) 
41 I use the term “qualify” to indicate that the firm seeks to design a compensation arrangement which is compliant 
with §162(m), and therefore qualifies for the tax deduction. 
42 The exact language of each firm’s §162(m) policy is extremely important.  For example, in Seinfeld v. O’Connor, 
774 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667 (D. Del. 2011), the court emphasized that the firm did not mislead their shareholders 
because their proxy statement only stated that they intended for their incentive compensation plan to qualify 
under §162(m), but did not assert that it will be tax deductible.        
43 The sensitivity studies discussed in this literature review examined the following periods: Hall and Liebman, 
1980-1998; Perry and Zenner, 1991-1997; Rose and Wolfram (2000) 1994-1997; Johnson et al., 1993-1994; Balsam 
and Ryan, 1995-2004; and Rose and Wolfram (2002) 1993-1997. 
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some indication that CEO PPS increased following the passage of §162(m) (Hall and Liebman, 2000; 
Perry and Zenner, 2001).  Firms reduced their reliance on salary for compensation growth, substituting 
an increased reliance on performance based incentives which thereby increased PPS, especially for 
those firms with CEO salaries near the $1 million limit (Rose and Wolfram, 2000).  PPS increased 
following media attention (Johnson et al., 1997) and for new hires (Balsam and Ryan, 2007).  While Perry 
and Zenner (2001) argued that §162(m) contributed to increased CEO PPS post-1993, Rose and Wolfram 
(2002) concluded that the early studies failed to provide consistent, reliable evidence that PPS increased 
as a result of §162(m).   
Law review commentators commonly refer to §162(m) as a classic example of a law of 
unintended consequences (Salley, 2009).  It was designed to reduce compensation levels, but instead 
increased pay packages (Miske, 2004; Polsky, 2007).  Firms increased executive compensation while 
sacrificing valuable tax deductions, both contrary to the intent of Congress (Polsky, 2007).   
3.2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Although there are different theories which seek to describe compensation practices, principally agency 
and managerial power theories, it is generally accepted that CEOs have some influence over their 
compensation arrangements and their influence increases with their individual power (Core et al., 1999; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Murphy, 2011).  Because I predict risk averse CEOs generally prefer 
noncompliant compensation all else being equal, to the extent that CEOs influence their compensation 
design, Chapter 2 predicts that CEOs use their influence to increase the use of noncompliant 
compensation.  Consistent with this prediction, Chapter 2 provides evidence that CEO power is 
positively related to firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior from 1998 through 2011.  This evidence 
suggests that more powerful CEOs are more likely to receive noncompliant compensation and the level 
of noncompliant compensation increases with their individual power.  However, CEO compensation is 
72 
 
highly persistent overtime such that compensation and the influential factors are jointly determined, 
raising endogeneity concerns (Lilling, 2006).   
Since §162(m) became effective on January 1, 1994, the SEC imposed new governance 
standards in 2003 and expanded compensation disclosure requirements in 2006.  As exogenous shocks, 
these two regulatory changes created natural experiments which alleviate some endogeneity concerns.  
In addition, these regulations expanded the two §162(m) mechanisms that were designed to limit CEO 
influence, increased independent governance and shareholder awareness, to all publicly traded firms 
and not only those firms that elect compliance with §162(m).  If the regulations changed CEO influence 
over his or her compensation design, the relation between CEO power and firm noncompliance behavior 
should be affected.  Therefore, I extend prior literature and examine how these regulatory changes 
influenced the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance to better understand how 
CEOs influence their compensation design.   
3.2.3.1. Hypothesis VI: The Influence of Mandatory Board Independence on CEO power 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, an independent Compensation Committee is one of the three 
mechanisms provided by §162(m) to influence the level and pay-performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation.  However, §162(m) does not mandate that noncompliant firms form a Compensation 
Committee consisting of independent members.  Therefore, not all firms formed a compensation 
committee with independent members.  In fact, a common error discovered by the IRS on audits were 
firms which claimed compliance, but had Compensation Committee members who failed to qualify as 
outside directors.44  This provides some indication that even some pseudo-compliant45  firms failed to 
                                                 
44 Struve, Robin (2008) Executive Compensation: A Million Dollar Problem? Bloomberg Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 
3: 556-66. 
45 I refer to those firms which deducted some CEO compensation in excess of $1 million on their Form 1120, 
claiming that it qualified under §162(m), but failed to maintain a Compensation Committee with only outside 
directors.  Without the proper committee, the CEO compensation tax deduction is limited to $1 million.   
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increase the level of independent review provided by their board.  Because §162(m) failed to motivate 
sufficient board independence for many in the investment community, some investors continued to 
argue for greater independent oversight over executive compensation as evidenced by the following 
action of the major self-regulating trading organizations and the SEC.  On November 4, 2003, at the 
recommendations of the NYSE, the AMEX and NASDAQ, the SEC issued Release No. 34-48745 (2003 
IND).  Following a phase-in period,46 this new regulation required public firms to establish a 
Compensation Committee comprised solely of independent members, a Nominating Committee 
comprised solely of independent members, and a Board of Directors comprised of a majority of 
independent directors.  Therefore, regardless of a firm’s §162(m) noncompliance behavior, the level of 
board independence and, specifically the independent review of CEO compensation design practices, for 
publicly traded firms increased for many firms following 2003 IND.   
The board independence requirements provided by §162(m), 2003 IND, and SOX47 reflect the 
popular belief that independent review improves the quality of governance.  Prior research documents 
that director/committee member independence is positively related to firm value (Dahya et al., 2008) 
and buy-and-hold returns (Farber, 2005), while negatively related to financial reporting fraud (Beasely, 
1996; Dechow et al., 1996), poor internal controls (Krishnan, 2005) and earnings management (Klein, 
2002).  However, there is analytical research which suggests that greater independent governance does 
not necessarily improve CEO compensation design (Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008) and the 
empirical findings are mixed, which I next discuss.   
Prior studies provide evidence that director/committee independence is positively related to 
compensation disclosures (Laksmana, 2008) and equity based compensation (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), 
                                                 
46 Firms had until the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2004 or October 31, 2004 to comply 
with the new standards. 
47 SOX mandates that all firms form an independent audit committee charged with the responsibility of hiring the 
firm’s independent auditor. 
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but can be either negatively (Core et al., 1999; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009) or positively 
(Armstrong et al., 2012) related to CEO compensation levels.  Prior empirical studies document that 
board independence is negatively related to CEO bonuses (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), but positively 
related to CEO total compensation (Guthrie et al., 2012).  However, the prior studies may be influenced 
by an important omitted variable.  Directors with social ties to the CEO nevertheless can qualify as 
independent per the SEC regulations and §162(m).  Using a unique data set, Hwang and Kim (2009) 
demonstrate that the presence of technically independent, but socially connected directors are positive 
related to CEO compensation levels and reduced pay-for-performance sensitivity, suggesting that 
socially connected directors weakens the quality of governance.  Therefore, unmeasured social 
relationships may contribute to the mixed results demonstrated by the prior studies.  Although the 
evidence evaluating the relation between board independence and CEO compensation is mixed, 
increased independent governance processes demonstrate a consistent positive relation with firm 
performance, internal controls and reporting quality, which provides empirical support for the value of 
independent review.   
Although agency theory predicts that CEO contracts will be designed optimally (Gibbons, 2005), 
prior literature has documented many instances of ineffective directors enabling powerful CEOs to 
secure excessive and potentially suboptimal compensation arrangements (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
CEOs have some influence over directors and generally have more influence over inside directors (Core 
et al., 2005).  If independent directors design CEO compensation arrangements, the contracts are more 
likely to be the products of “arm’s-length” deals over which CEOs have less control (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004; Core et al., 2005).  Because 2003 IND increased the mandatory level of board independence, 2003 
IND should have reduced CEO influence over the Board of Directors and compensation design, including 
§162(m) noncompliance decisions.  Therefore, I predict that the 2003 IND reduced CEO influence over 
compensation design, weakening the positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
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noncompliance, such that the positive relation is significantly smaller or insignificant following the 2003 
IND.            
Hypothesis VI:  The relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance weakened following the 
2003 SEC increased independence requirements. 
3.2.3.2. Hypothesis VII: The Influence of Increased Mandatory Compensation Disclosure on CEO power 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, increased reliance on incentive compensation is another 
mechanism provided by §162(m) to increase the link between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
To qualify as a tax deductible expense under §162(m),48 executive compensation in excess of $1 million 
must not be fixed salary, but instead be incentives that are payable “solely on account of the attainment 
of one or more performance goals.”49  However, §162(m) does not define “performance goals.”  Instead, 
the statute provides that the performance goals must be “determined by” the independent 
Compensation Committee50 and “disclosed to” and “approved by” the shareholders.51  Therefore, the 
efficiency of CEO incentive compensation performance goals depends upon the other two §162(m) 
mechanisms, the board’s independent review and shareholder awareness.   
An increased use of incentives will generally increase the risk imposed upon the CEO for which 
the CEO must receive a costly risk premium, the compliance risk premium.  As discussed in Section 3.1, 
because §162(m) does not define “performance goals,” firms could minimize the cost of the compliance 
risk premium by providing performance goals which imposed minimal risk on the executive (Rose and 
Wolfram, 2002).  Firms have taken advantage of this opportunity (Crystal, 1995), prompting Murphy and 
                                                 
48 I define compliant compensation as compensation that is qualified under §162(m) and, therefore, tax 
deductible.   
49 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C) 
50 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C)(i) 
51 26 USC §162(m)(4)(C)(ii) 
76 
 
Oyer (2004) to comment that some firms replaced pre-§162(m) “sensible” incentive compensation plans 
with “overly generous formulas”  which preserve the compensation tax deduction while minimizing the 
imposition of costly risk on the executive.52  Such low-risk incentive plans are designed to preserve the 
board’s discretion over the incentives and not to closely link CEO compensation to objective firm 
performance measures.  However, the board does not have sole discretion over §162(m) compliant 
incentives because the shareholders must vote to authorize the incentive plan.53  The shareholders’ vote 
should be influenced by their awareness of the firm’s compensation practices.  I assume that 
shareholder awareness is a function of firm disclosure because shareholders are generally dependent 
upon disclosures for information concerning the firm’s compensation practices.   
 On September 8, 2006, the SEC published Release No. 33-8732A (2006 DIS), effective for fiscal 
years ending on or after December 15, 2006 and requiring that firms must include a new “Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis” section in their proxy statements.  Each firm must provide an explanation and 
analysis of all material elements of the firm’s compensation goals, practices, and decisions for the CEO, 
the CFO, the three other highest-paid executive officers, and the directors (Robinison et al., 2011).  
Murphy (2012) describes the required disclosures as a “plethora” of additional information.  This 
information must be certified by the CEO and CFO.   Because §162(m) does not define “performance 
goals” nor require any specific disclosures, all disclosures required under 2006 DIS expand the 
mandatory disclosures for all §162(m) affected firms, both compliant and noncompliant. 
                                                 
52 With an overly generous formula, the board increases the likelihood that firm’s performance easily satisfies the 
incentive performance goals, authorizing an excessively large bonus.  From this excessively large authorized bonus 
(which qualifies under §162(m)), the board can exercise negative discretion and grant a bonus of a smaller amount 
that they deem advisable.  This procedure helps to minimize the riskiness of the incentives. 
53 The shareholders’ vote must take place a minimum of every five years if the compensation committee is granted 
the discretion to establish the annual performance targets. 26 CFR §1.162-27(a)(4)(vi) 
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However, what are the effects of increased compensation disclosure?   The governance 
improvement hypothesis54 posits that increased disclosure reduces executive compensation excess rents 
(Lo, 2003).  Autrey et al. (2007) establish conditions which characterize how mandated disclosure relates 
to CEO performance.  If the CEO can influence the measure disclosed, risk may increase, but so should 
CEO effort which may increase firm performance.  If CEO effort cannot influence the disclosed measure, 
the disclosure will impose risk and create compensation design inefficiencies (Autrey et al., 2007).   
Prior literature has empirically examined the benefits and limitations of increased compensation 
disclosure.  Results generally indicate that executive perquisites increased following the 1978 disclosure 
mandates, options increased dramatically following the 1993 disclosure mandates, and Canadian 
executive compensation levels significantly increased following the 1993 Canadian disclosure mandates.  
Citing this evidence, Murphy (2012) concludes that “there is little evidence that enhanced disclosure has 
lead to reductions in objectionable practices.”  
Alternatively, prior literature has provided some empirical evidence demonstrating other 
circumstances in which improvements to compensation design followed increased disclosure.  Canadian 
executive compensation increased following the 1993 compensation disclosure mandates, but so did the 
link between CEO compensation and firm performance or pay-performance sensitivity (Craighead et al., 
2004).  The UK’s “Say-on-Pay” vote55 had no effect on compensation levels or growth, but there is 
evidence that the “Say-on-Pay” requirements led to increased CEO compensation pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (Ferri and Maber, 2013).  Bebchuk et al. (2002) contends that CEOs have the incentive to 
obscure and legitimize their extraction of rents, through a process termed camouflage, leading to 
                                                 
54 The Governance Improvement Hypothesis argues that increased disclosure should lead to value-increasing 
governance improvements, including the reduction of executive compensation rents.  Therefore, increased 
disclosures should reduce the CEO’s ability to extract inefficient rents and inefficiently influence his or her own 
compensation design (Lo, 2003). 
55 The UK mandates an annual, non-binding shareholder vote to approve their firm’s annual executive pay report. 
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inefficient compensation arrangements.  Lo (2003) provided empirical evidence of conditions under 
which increased disclosure reduces compensation rents.  Therefore, although there are conditions 
under which increased disclosure may increase inefficiency, specifically when the incentives are based 
on noisy performance measures, and empirical evidence is mixed, such that increased compensation 
disclosures can either increase or decrease total compensation levels, prior research provides some 
evidence that increased disclosure affects CEO compensation design by strengthening the relation 
between compensation and firm performance.   
The 2006 DIS was the first major compensation disclosure overhaul since the passage of 
§162(m) in 1993 and it greatly expanded compensation disclosures (Robinson et al., 2011).  In 2006, 
proxy statements averaged 45 pages for the 100 largest firms.56  One year later, in 2007, their proxy 
statements averaged more than 70 pages, with the increased focused largely on compensation (Murphy, 
2012).  In the first year following the 2006 DIS, even though prior literature documents that disclosure 
defects were common, the majority of firms provided compensation benchmarks, the elements of 
compensation, and the specific factors and criteria considered for determining CEO compensation 
(Robinson et al., 2011).  Despite the reporting errors, this represents a significant increase in the extent 
of compensation design information being disclosed.   
Because compensation disclosures increased significantly for the first time since 1994 and prior 
literature has documented that increased disclosure can increase the link between compensation and 
firm performance, I propose that the 2006 DIS increased the link between §162(m) compliant incentives 
and firm performance.  These changes should reduce firms’ use of low risk (to the executive) “overly 
generous formulas” for compliant incentives, which were designed to preserve board discretion and not 
to closely link compliant incentives to performance.   
                                                 
56 These firms are classified as the largest based upon revenues (Murphy, 2012). 
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Without the low risk formulas, firms can provide more objective, less flexible performance goals, 
which increase the risk of §162(m) compliant incentives.  An increase in risk reduces the CEO’s expected 
utility from the compliant incentives in the absence of an increase in the corresponding risk premium.  
To avoid the associated risk, firms can elect noncompliance with §162(m) to some greater degree.  
Because CEOs prefer lower risk compensation as discussed, CEOs have greater incentive to use their 
influence to secure noncompliant compensation following the 2006 regulatory change.  Therefore, I 
predict that CEOs will exert more influence to secure noncompliant compensation following the 2006 
regulatory change, and further that the likelihood of their success increases with their individual power.  
As a consequence, I predict that the 2006 DIS strengthened the relation between CEO power and 
§162(m) noncompliance. 
To illustrate the influence of the 2006 DIS on noncompliance behavior, consider the following 
examples of the number of pages of the firm’s annual proxy statement dedicated to executive 
compensation and each firm’s statement of their §162(m) policy.  These examples illustrate how 
executive compensation disclosure expanded following the 2006 DIS with a corresponding change of the 
firm’s §162(m) policy, electing greater noncompliance behavior. 
Intel’s 200657 proxy statement, its last pre-2006 DIS proxy statement, dedicated 13 pages to 
executive compensation and provided the following §162(m) policy statement:   
“… Intel’s Executive Officer Incentive Plan … have each been approved by stockholder vote; as a 
result … are qualified …  performance-based compensation not subject to Section 162(m) of the 
Tax Code. However, to maintain flexibility in compensating Intel’s executive officers in a manner 
designed to promote varying corporate goals, it is not a policy of the Committee that all 
executive compensation must be deductible.” 
 
                                                 
57 Intel’s 2006 proxy statement, filed with the SEC on March 28, 2006, reports CEO compensation through the year 
ended December 31, 2005.  All of the information and statements presented in this section are available online at 
sec.gov. 
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Although Intel directors in 2006 reserved the right to pay noncompliant compensation, the 
statement clearly indicates that their incentive compensation programs are qualified under §162(m), i.e. 
compensation that is tax deductible pursuant to §162(m).  One year later and subject to the 2006 DIS 
requirements, Intel’s compensation discussion increased to 22 pages.  In addition, the proxy statement 
indicates Intel’s plan to modify its §162(m) policy and provide noncompliant incentives with the 
following statement: 
“Intel’s Executive Officer Incentive Plan and 2006 Equity Incentive Plan have each been 
structured with the intention that cash payments and stock options awarded under these plans 
be qualified performance-based compensation not subject to Section 162(m) of the tax code. 
Proposal 4 in this proxy statement is proposing that stockholders approve the 2007 Executive 
Officer Incentive Plan; however, due to the plan’s design, it is not expected to meet other 
qualifications for tax deductibility under Section 162(m) of the tax code.58 To maintain 
flexibility in compensating Intel’s executive officers in a manner designed to promote varying 
corporate goals, it is not a policy of the Committee that all executive compensation must be tax-
deductible.”  
 
In the 2008 proxy statement, the second year in which Intel was subject to 2006 DIS, Intel’s 
compensation discussion grew to 28 pages, providing discussions of compensation determinants, peer 
groups and even a section titled the “History of Executive Compensation at Intel.”  In addition, the 2008 
§162(m) policy statement clearly indicates Intel’s policy of providing noncompliant incentives.       
“Certain performance-based compensation approved by stockholders is not subject to this 
deduction limit. Intel structured its 2006 Equity Incentive Plan with the intention that stock 
options awarded under this plan would qualify for tax deductibility. However, in order to 
maintain flexibility and promote simplicity in the administration of these arrangements, other 
compensation such as RSUs and payments under the 2007 Executive Officer Incentive Plan are 
not designed to qualify for tax deductibility.” 
 
In two years, Intel increased its discussion of executive compensation and transformed its 
§162(m) policy from compliant incentives in 2005 to noncompliant incentives in 2007.  Therefore, during 
                                                 
58 Emphasis added. 
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this two year period of increasing compensation disclosures, Intel decreased its use of compliant 
incentives and increased its use of noncompliant incentives. 
As a second example, Micros Systems, Inc.’s §162(m) policy also changed following 2006 DIS.  
Prior to the passage of 2006 DIS, Micros Systems’ proxy statement included the following wording: 
“The Company expects that [§162(m)] will not limit its tax deductions for executive 
compensation in the near term.” 59 
Following the passage of 2006 DIS but prior to its taking effect, Micros Systems dedicated seven 
pages to executive compensation and provided a clear indication of some noncompliance with the 
following statement:   
“[§162(m)] limited the Company’s compensation deductions in fiscal year 2006.  These provisions 
may limit the Company’s tax deductions for executive compensation in the future.”   
 Subject to 2006 DIS, Micros Systems increased its compensation discussion to 13 pages and 
modified its §162(m) policy disclosure as follows: 
“To the extent feasible, we structure executive compensation to preserve deductibility for federal 
income tax purposes. In this regard, our stock option plan is designed to preserve, to the extent 
otherwise available, the deductibility of income realized upon the exercise of stock 
options. However, the availability of tax deductions is not a factor that the Compensation 
Committee considers in determining the amounts or types of compensation offered.” 
Similar to Intel, Micros Systems transformed its §162(m) policy from generally compliant 
incentives to noncompliant incentives as the firms incorporated the 2006 DIS changes.   Both firms may 
have changed their §162(m) policy to avoid the litigation experienced by Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM).  
Because ADM’s CEO’s total compensation exceeded $1 million in 1993, ADM has been affected by 
§162(m) since it was first effective in 1994.  Following the 2006 DIS mandates, a shareholder filed a 
                                                 
59 Emphasis added. 
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derivative claim based upon §162(m) (Resnik v. Woertz, et al., C.A. No 10-527-GMS, filed June 6, 2010).  
The shareholder claimed waste, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and inadequate disclosure, 
largely because ADM’s incentive program permitted aggregate payments to directors and executives of 
$1,263,500,000 in a single year, including $90,250,000 per individual director.60  Because the limits were 
so high, the shareholder claimed that the limits on the §162(m) performance-based awards were 
“illusory,” a claim, which implies that ADM used an “overly generous formula” in the terminology of 
Murphy and Oyer (2004).  Following the court’s refusal to dismiss the claim, the parties settled wherein 
the defendants stipulated to limits under the plan of $45 million per executive officer and $5 million per 
non-employee director.61  In addition, the executives agreed to greater compensation disclosures and to 
pay up to $1.5 million of plaintiffs’ legal fees.  If ADM had avoided using “illusory” §162(m) performance-
based award limits following the 2006 DIS, this law suit and its settlement may have been avoided.   
Following the passage of §162(m), some firms immediately and carefully modified their 
compensation arrangements to comply (Livingstone, 1997).  These actions may have been based less on 
tax savings and more on promoting positive shareholder relations.  Survey results found that 87% of 
firms intended to implement §162(m) changes for positive shareholder relations while only 43% of firms 
felt that the tax savings from §162(m) compliance was important, Towers Perrin Survey, Investor’s 
Business Daily, March 10, 1995 (Perry and Zenner, 2001).  Similarly, with the increased compensation 
disclosures mandated in 2006, firms likely considered the effect of the new disclosures on shareholder 
relations in their CEO compensation design, including the firm’s §162(m) noncompliance decisions.  
Illustrating the continued importance of shareholder relations and compensation disclosures, Intel and 
Micros Systems modified their §162(m) noncompliance policy as compensation disclosures increased.  
                                                 
60 blogs.law.harvard.edu (February 5, 2013) Recent Developments in Executive Compensation Litigation, Posted by 
Richard J. Sandler, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP  
61 David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen, Carl E. Volz, and Angela M. Liu (February 11, 2013) Defending Section 
162(m) Executive Compensation Derivative Suits in the United States, DechertOnPoint,  
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Firms may generally act preemptively to avoid negative relations such as those experienced in the ADM 
case.   
Based upon the preceding development, I propose that the 2006 regulation generally increased 
the inherent risk of compliant incentives because firms proactively modified their compensation 
arrangements to avoid the negative shareholder relations that may develop if the firms disclose their 
“overly generous” compliant performance goals.  To avoid this increased risk, risk averse CEOs have 
greater incentive to use their influence to secure more noncompliant compensation following 2006.       
Therefore, I predict that the 2006 DIS affected firm noncompliance behavior by strengthening the 
relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance. 
Hypothesis VII:  The association between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance became stronger 
following the 2006 SEC increased disclosure requirements. 
 
3.3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.3.1. Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance 
Hypotheses VI and VII predict how CEO influence on §162(m) noncompliance changed following the 
2003 and 2006 regulatory changes.  To test these hypotheses, I estimate Equation (3) which relates 
§162(m) noncompliance to CEO power.  To further examine Hypothesis VI, I also estimate Equation (4) 
which I discuss in Section 3.3.2.  For both Equations (3) and (4), when the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable, I estimate a logistic regression.  Otherwise, I estimate an OLS regression. 
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𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  
    +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽8𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽9𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾%𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽14𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷%𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽15𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀%𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽16𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                 (3) 
POST CHANGEit = An indicator variable which equals 1 if the year t is in the Base Period, and 0 otherwise.  
The years included in the Base Period are determined by the hypothesis.  If the estimation of Equation 
(3) tests Hypothesis VI (VII), the Base Period includes those years prior to the implementation of the 
2003 (2006) regulation as provided in Section 3.3.      
Equation (3)’s dependent variable measures §162(m) noncompliance.  I use six measures of 
noncompliance, three indicator and three continuous variables, which I refer to as NC MEASURE, 
explained in detail in Section 2.4.     
  The independent variables include a measure of CEO power, CEO FACTOR, created using 
principal component analysis.  The principal component analysis combines multiple measures or proxies 
of a characteristic into a single measure with minimal loss of information.  I form CEO FACTOR from four 
proxies of CEO power, CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, CEO OWN%, and CEO/CHAIR.  CEO TENURE is a common 
proxy for CEO power (Finklestein and Hambrick, 1989; Laksmana, 2008; Hamm et al., 2011) and is 
typically positively correlated with CEO decision making authority (Dechow and Sloan, 1991).  Second, 
CEO AGE may significantly influence CEO compensation since age influences his or her employment 
horizon (Mehran, 1995) and can significantly influence CEO power apart from tenure (Rose and Shepard, 
1997).  Third, the CEO’s stock ownership, CEO OWN%, determines the CEO’s voting authority and is 
positively related to CEO power (Ittner et al., 1997; Mehran, 1995).  Fourth, a CEO who also serves as 
the Chairman of the Board will generally have greater power (Ittner et al., 1997) which may have a 
negative influence on the quality of governance (Robinson et al., 2011).  Therefore, the final proxy which 
I use to form CEO FACTOR is CEO/CHAIR, an indicator variable which equals 1 if the CEO also serves as 
the Chairman of the Board, and 0 otherwise (Ittner et al., 1997; Robinson et al., 2011).      
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The estimated regression coefficient on CEO FACTOR measures the relation between CEO power 
and firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior.  The coefficient of interest is on CEO FACTOR * POST 
CHANGE, which measures how the relation between CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance 
behavior changed following either the 2003 regulation in Hypothesis VI or the 2006 regulation in 
Hypothesis VII.  The definition of POST CHANGE and the sample observations depend upon the 
applicable hypothesis as discussed below.      
For Hypothesis VI, which predicts that the CEO power-noncompliance relation weakened 
following the 2003 board independence regulation, the sample includes first, observations with firm 
years ending from June 15, 2003 through May 31, 2004, the Base Period in which the observations are 
not subject to the influence of 2003 IND.  The sample also includes observations from August 15, 2004 
through July 31, 2005, the Post Period in which the observations are subject to 2003 IND.  I separate the 
Base Period and Post Period because 2003 IND provides for a phase-in of its effectiveness discussed in 
Section 3.2.3.1.  POST CHANGE equals 1 for the Post Period observations, and 0 otherwise.   A negative, 
statistically significant coefficient on CEO FACTOR* POST CHANGE would provide evidence that the 
relation between CEO FACTOR and NC MEASURE changed following 2003 IND, consistent with the 
relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance weakening following the 2003 IND and 
supporting Hypothesis VI. 
For Hypothesis VII, which predicts that the CEO power-noncompliance relation strengthened 
following the 2006 disclosure regulation, the sample set includes observations with firm years ending 
from December 15, 2005 through November 30, 2007.  The 2006 DIS regulations are effective for years 
ending on or after December 15, 2006.  Therefore, POST CHANGE equals 1 for those observations with 
years ending on or after December 15, 2006, and 0 otherwise.   A positive, statistically significant 
coefficient on CEO FACTOR* POST CHANGE provides evidence that 2006 DIS changed the relation 
86 
 
between CEO FACTOR and NC MEASURE, consistent with the relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance becoming stronger following 2006 DIS, supporting Hypothesis VII. 
Controls.  I include independent variables to control for the influence of firm and governance 
factors.  I include the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(ASSETS) to control for firm size (Balsam and 
Yin, 2005; Carter et al., 2007) and Return-on-Assets, ROA, and buy-and-hold market returns, RET, to 
control for firm performance (Robinson et al., 2011).  To control for firm risk, I include debt-to-total 
asset ratio, LEVERAGE, (Beaver et al., 1970; Botosan and Plumlee, 2005); one minus the cash-to-total 
asset ratio, ILLIQUIDITY (Beaver et al, 1970); the standard deviation of Return-on-Assets, σ(ROA),and the 
standard deviation of market returns, σ(RET), over the five prior years (Balsam and Yin, 2005; Core et al., 
2008).  I include the Market-to-Book ratio, MTB, to control for growth and investment opportunities 
(Carter et al., 2007; Cadman et al, 2010).  To control for the tax cost of noncompliance, I include TAX 
BENEFIT, the simulated marginal tax rate multiplied the CEO’s total compensation in excess of $1 million 
scaled by firm total assets (Balsam and Ryan, 1996; Balsam and Yin, 2005).  To control for the quality of 
governance, I include board size, BOARD SIZE (Yermack, 1996; Laksmana, 2008); the percent of 
interlocked board members, INTERLOCK% (Hallock, 1997; Core et al., 1999); and the percentage of non-
independent board members, Non-I BOARD%, and compensation committee members, Non-I COMP 
COMM% (Pfeffer, 1981; Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  To control for the board’s insulation from 
shareholder action, commonly referred to as “entrenchment,” I include the Bebchuk et al. (2009)62 six-
factor E-Index, E- INDEX, as the measure of entrenchment.   
                                                 
62 The six factors include staggered board terms, “poison pill” and “golden parachute” provisions, and limitations 
upon the shareholder ability to amend charter amendments and by-laws and approve mergers.  The Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Farrell (2009) paper provides a detailed description of the factors within the E-index.  
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/studies.shtml is the link to a list of research papers which utilize the E-
Index, 158 as of October 21, 2012. 
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The independent variables also include the Fama/French 12 industry classification63 indicator 
variables, INDUSTRY CODES, and year indicators, YEAR INDICATORS, to control for industry and year 
effects, respectively. 
3.3.2. CEO power and §162(m) Noncompliance Before versus After the 2003 Regulatory Change 
The regulatory change in 2003, which I label 2003 IND, was designed to reduce inefficient CEO influence 
over CEO compensation design by mandating increased independence within the firm governance 
process.  Because board independence varied across sample firms prior to the 2003 IND, the influence 
of the 2003 IND on CEO power may depend upon each firm’s pre-2003 IND board independence level, 
which I label Base Period independence.  I expect those firms which already had stronger Base Period 
board independence to be less affected by 2003 IND than those firms with weaker Base Period board 
independence.  Therefore, I divide the sample into two groups based upon each firm’s Base Period 
board independence, and examine if the expanded board independence requirements captured by 2003 
IND influenced each group differently.   
To divide the sample based on each firm’s general base period board independence, I use 
principal component analysis to form a single measure of board independence, BOARD FACTOR, from 
the three measures of board independence, INTERLOCK%, Non-I BOARD%, and Non-I COMP COMM%, as 
detailed in Section 3.3.1.  Based upon the sample median Base Period BOARD FACTOR, I divide the 
sample into the two groups: firms with low Base Period independence, LOW, and firms with high Base 
Period independence, HIGH.       
To examine if the influence of the 2003 IND depended upon the firm’s Base Period board 
independence, I estimate Equation (4) separately for LOW and HIGH independent firms.  Equation (4) 
                                                 
63 Fama-French industries are defined at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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relates CEO power to §162(m) noncompliance.  Because the LOW/HIGH classification is dependent upon 
the Base Period BOARD FACTOR, I exclude all firms from the Post Period which were not included in the 
Base Period. 
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  
    +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽8𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽9𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽11𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽13𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                 (4) 
The dependent variables measure §162(m) noncompliance, NC MEASURE, and are the same as 
the variables used in Equation (1).  The independent variables measure CEO power, CEO FACTOR, and 
the changing influence of CEO power, CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE, the same variables as used in 
Equation (3), but only to test Hypothesis VI.  The independent variables which serve as the controls are 
also the same as the controls in Equation (3) with the following exceptions.  Because I divide the firm 
into LOW governance independence and HIGH governance independence firms based upon 
INTERLOCK%, Non-I BOARD%, and Non-I COMP COMM%, as detailed in this Section 3.3.2, I exclude these 
three measures from Equation (4).      
 
3.4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
I obtain my data from the following WRDS data bases, Compustat Execucomp; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Marginal Tax Rate; and RiskMetrics; annual firm proxy statements publicly available 
at sec.gov; and the simulated marginal tax rates available from John Graham, Duke University64 as 
described in Section 2.5. To include all observations affected by §162(m), I include all firm-year 
observations with tax years beginning on or after January 1, 1994 through 2012.  To avoid biased results 
                                                 
64 https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html 
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from the inclusion of small public firms with CEO compensation not large enough to be constrained by 
§162(m), I include only firms which satisfy certain compensation requirements also described in Section 
2.5.  After excluding observations missing net income, total assets or CEO compensation information, 
the final data set consists of 18,504 firm-year observations for the period 1994 through 2012, as shown 
in Table 9.  These observations include 1,916 unique firms with a mean (median) of 9.7 (9) firm-year 
observations per firm.  The observations include 3,119 unique CEOs with a mean (median) of 5.9 (5) 
firm-year observations per CEO.  I calculate all analyses utilizing 1994 constant dollars, unless otherwise 
noted.   
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 In Table 10, I provide the descriptive statistics for my sample.  The mean (median) firm total 
book assets equaled $7.9 (2.1) billion with mean (median) total market capitalization of $8.3 (2.0) 
billion.  The average (median) CEO was 56 (56) years old with 7.2 (5) years tenure as the CEO.  Mean 
(median) CEO annual compensation totaled $5.9 (3.5) million with $789,000 (734,000) in the form of 
salary, $1.3 (0.7) million from cash incentives and $3.5 (1.6) million from equity compensation.  I define 
noncompliant compensation §162(m) in Section 2.4.  CEO total compensation included a mean (median) 
of 17% (3%) noncompliant compensation, which I define as noncompliant compensation, defined in 
Section 2.4, scaled by CEO total annual compensation.  The mean (median) firm paid $370,000 (19,000) 
of additional annual tax expense65 as a result of the lost tax deduction, which includes the 8,070 (44%) 
compliant firm-year observations with zero additional tax expense.  Of the total sample, 1,683 firms paid 
noncompliant compensation for a mean (median) of 6 (5) years.   
                                                 
65 I estimate the annual extra tax expense by multiplying the CEO’s total noncompliant compensation by the firm’s 
estimated marginal tax rate. 
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[Insert Table 10 Here] 
Table 11 provides the annual number of observations and §162(m) noncompliance rates based 
on the Salary NC, Cash NC, and Total NC definitions of noncompliance, defined in Section 2.4.   Firms 
paid noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash compensation or any compensation which is 
noncompliant with §162(m) in 18%, 44% and 56% of Chapter 3’s 18,504 firm-year observations, 
respectively.  The percentage of §162(m) affected firms that paid noncompliant compensation increased 
from 1994 to 2012 for all definitions of noncompliance, even though the number of affected firms, 
which is the denominator for calculating the noncompliant percentage, also increased each year.  
Inflation likely contributed to the growth of noncompliance behavior because the $1 million non-
performance based compensation deduction allowance is not adjusted for inflation, as discussed in 
Section 2.1.  In 1994, 337 (68%) of the 496 affected firms in my sample paid no noncompliant 
compensation.  By 2006, 800 (66%) of the 1,213 sample observations paid some noncompliant cash 
compensation.   Of the 1,916 total firms in my sample, 1,683 paid some noncompliant compensation, 
1,552 paid some noncompliant cash compensation, and 579 paid some noncompliant salary from 1994 
through 2012.   
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 My measure of CEO power, CEO FACTOR, is formed using principal component analysis from 
four proxies of CEO power, CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, CEO OWN%, and CEO/CHAIR, as explained in Section 
3.3.1.  CEO FACTOR, the principal component, is a linear combination of the proxies.  Each proxy 
contributes to the principal component as measured by its loading.  Table 12 presents the loadings in 
Panel A and the descriptive statistics of CEO FACTOR in Panel B.  CEO FACTOR has a mean (median) 
value of 4.0 (3.9), an eigenvalue of 1.80 and explains 44.9% of the variance of the four proxies.  
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 [Insert Table 12 Here] 
 
3.5. CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN TRENDS 
Section 162(m) was enacted to improve CEO compensation design and weaken CEO influence through 
the mechanisms detailed in Section 3.2.1.  If CEOs influence their compensation design, it is reasonable 
to expect that CEOs will use their influence to increase their compensation levels, especially salary, and 
to shield their compensation from performance variance, which reduces compensation sensitivity.  To 
provide the background for understanding how §162(m) affected CEO influence over compensation 
design, I describe CEO compensation of §162(m) affected firms from 1994 through 2012 by providing a 
general time-series analysis of CEO compensation trends that does not provide statistical tests.  My 
descriptive analyses illustrate that CEO compensation levels increased, CEO salary levels have stagnated 
and demonstrate a trend that suggests that §162(m) established an informal benchmark of $1 million 
annual salary, fixed salary as a percentage of total compensation decreased, and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity varied, but has not consistently increased or decreased from 1994 through 2012.  I next 
present my analyses of CEO total compensation levels, the composition of CEO compensation, and CEO 
compensation sensitivity of §162(m) affected firms from 1994 through 2012.  I use constant dollars 
unless otherwise noted.   
3.5.1. CEO Total Compensation Levels 
I find that CEO total compensation levels of §162(m) affected firms increased from 1994 through 2012.  
As illustrated in Figure 3 and consistent with prior studies, my study provides evidence that mean CEO 
total annual compensation increased following the passage of §162(m).  After peaking in 2000, mean 
CEO total compensation declined until 2003.  From 2003 through 2012, mean CEO total compensation 
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remained relatively stagnant, but still above 1994 levels.  From 1994 through 2012, median CEO total 
annual compensation demonstrates a relatively consistent increase. 
My sample only includes firms which are affected by §162(m) so that the number of firms in my 
sample increased each year as more firms became affected by §162(m).  Over time and as a result of 
inflation, smaller firms, which paid their CEOs lower total compensation levels, paid their CEO increasing 
levels of annual compensation to eventually surpass $1 million and became affected by §162(m).  As 
these smaller firms joined my sample, the sample should be biased against finding an increase in CEO 
total compensation levels.  Even with this bias and after controlling for inflation, this study provides 
evidence that CEO compensation levels increased during the tenure of §162(m) and, therefore, this 
analysis does not provide evidence that CEO influence over total annual compensation levels weakened 
from 1994 through 2012.         
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
3.5.2. The Composition of CEO Compensation 
Figures 4a and 4b show that the mean and median CEO salary levels stagnated from 1994 through 2012.  
Prior studies documented that the growth rate of salary levels slowed following the passage of §162(m) 
in 1994 through 1998 (Hall and Liebman, 2000; Rose and Wolfram, 2000), particularly for CEOs whose 
salary levels were above or close to the $1 million fixed compensation limit (Rose and Wolfram, 2000, 
2002; Perry and Zenner, 2001).  Therefore, my descriptive analysis suggests that §162(m)’s initial 
constraining influence on the growth of CEO salary levels continued over the longer term, through 2012.    
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b here] 
As further evidence that §162(m) affected salary growth, Figure 5a provides CEO annual salary 
levels in nominal, non-CPI adjusted dollars.  I include the annual mean, median, and 90th percentile CEO 
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salary levels and a line representing the effect of inflation on an initial salary of $1 million in 1994.  From 
1994 through 2012, inflation’s growth rate outpaced the growth of CEO salary levels, including the 90th 
percentile CEO salary levels.  To further illustrate how salary levels are benchmarked at the $1 million 
mark, Figure 5b provides the median and 90th percentile CEO salary and variable compensation levels in 
non-CPI adjusted dollars.  While the salary levels remain near $1 million and demonstrate little variation 
from 1994 through 2012, variable compensation increases and displays a considerable difference 
between the median and 90th percentile levels.  Therefore, I find that salary levels stagnated from 1994 
through 2012, informally benchmarked near §162(m)’s $1 million tax deduction allowance, so that firms 
primarily rely on variable compensation for the growth in CEO total compensation levels.   
 [Insert Figures 5a and 5b here] 
My study illustrates that CEO total compensation levels grew while salary levels stagnates for 
the period 1994 through 2012.  Therefore, I examine salary as a percentage of total compensation, 
defined as CEO annual salary divided by total annual compensation.  Figures 6a and 6b show that the 
mean and median salary as a percentage of CEO total compensation declined following the passage of 
§162(m) in 1994 and through 2012.  In 1994, salary provided a mean (median) of 29% (27%) of CEO total 
compensation.  This percentage consistently declined to a mean (median) of 21% (17%) in 2011 and 23% 
(18%) in 2012.  Because the reliance on fixed compensation decreased for CEOs at §162(m) affected 
firms, this finding is consistent with CEO influence over fixed compensation weakening during the tenure 
of §162(m). 
[Insert Figures 6a and 6b here] 
Consistent with prior studies such as Murphy (2011), I find that the increase in variable 
compensation was primarily the consequence of an increased use of equity compensation.  Figures 7a 
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(7b) provide the mean (median) annual percentages of CEO total compensation from 1994 through 2012 
from option compensation, defined as the value of options grants divided by total compensation, from 
restricted stock grants, defined as the value of restricted stock grants divided by total compensation, 
and from cash incentives, defined as cash incentives divided by total compensation.  From 1994 through 
2001, options provided the increase in total compensation, increasing both absolutely and as a 
percentage of CEO total compensation, while cash incentives declined as a percentage of CEO total 
compensation.  Between 1995 and 2001, approximately 80% of Execucomp firms granted options to 
their CEOs compared to the 20% which granted restricted stock (Carter et al., 2007).  Prior studies 
document two reasons for the strong use of options.  First, the pre-2006 preferential accounting 
treatment for options in which firms were not required to deduct the extrinsic value of option grants 
contributed to their use (Hall and Murphy, 2002; Carter et al., 2007).  Second, option compensation is 
deemed to meet §162(m)’s “pre-established objective performance requirement” (Kautter, 1994), 
meaning option compensation qualifies as a tax deduction pursuant to §162(m) subject to only minor 
procedural requirements.  For firms affected by §162(m), the attractiveness of options increased relative 
to all other forms of compensation in 1994 (Balsam and Ryan, 2008).  Suggesting that §162(m) 
contributed to the growth of CEO option compensation, the increased use of options was greater for 
firms affected by §162(m) relative to unaffected firms (Balsam and Ryan, 2008).   
Following 2001, I find that options as a percentage of CEO total compensation decreased, likely 
influenced by the 2000 “dot.com” bubble reducing the attractiveness of options, and the use of 
restricted stock grants and cash incentives as percentages of CEO compensation increased.  Figures 7a 
and 7b show that following 2001, the growth of stock grants outpaced all other forms of compensation, 
surpassing the use of CEO option compensation in 2006 when FAS 123R eliminated option’s preferential 
accounting treatment.  From 2006 through 2012, I find that restricted stock grants exceeded option 
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grants for firms affected by §162(m).  Since 2008, restricted stock is the single largest component of CEO 
compensation.  
[Insert Figures 7a and 7b here] 
 Figure 8 illustrates the mean annual percentages of total compensation from noncompliant 
salary, defined as salary in excess of $1 million divided by CEO total compensation, from noncompliant 
cash compensation, defined as all §162(m) noncompliant cash compensation divided by CEO total 
compensation, and from total noncompliant compensation, defined as all §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation divided by CEO total compensation.  Mean noncompliant salary as a percentage of total 
compensation remained relatively flat, increasing from 0.6% in 1994 to 0.9% (1.3%) in 2011 (2012).  The 
mean percentage of noncompliant cash compensation also remained relatively flat, but for the 2006 
increase that corresponds with the 2006 disclosure mandates.   
However, the mean percentage of total noncompliant compensation steadily increased from 
2001 through 2012.  Total noncompliant compensation includes the noncompliant portion of restricted 
stock grants,66 the use of which has grown as illustrated by Figures 7a and 7b.  I assume that restricted 
stock grants are §162(m) noncompliant because they historically have been time-based and, as a 
consequence, cannot qualify under §162(m).  Even if the restricted stock grants are performance based, 
the awards do not automatically qualify under §162(m) as do options.  The analysis provided in Figure 8 
suggests that the increased use of noncompliant compensation is principally the consequence of the 
increased use of restricted stock grants.   
                                                 
66 I define the noncompliant portion of restricted stock grants as the portion of the award in excess of $1 million, 
once considering the other nonperformance based cash awards.  For example, if the CEO received no other 
compensation, the noncompliant portion is the value of the restricted stock grant less $1 million.  Alternatively, if 
the CEO received $1 million in salary, all of the stock award is noncompliant compensation. 
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[Insert Figure 8 here] 
In summary, variable compensation as a percentage of CEO total compensation increased from 
1994 through 2012.  However, I find that the composition of the variable component changed.  From 
1996 through 2005, options provided the largest component of CEO compensation.  Because the value 
that options provide the CEO is dependent upon firm performance increasing the firm’s market value 
while subject to market wide performance, this increased reliance on options suggests that CEO 
influence over compensation design weakened following the passage of §162(m).  Following 2001, the 
use of restricted stock and cash incentives increased.  Because stock grants67 and cash incentives 
provide the CEO value even if the firm’s market value decreases, which makes these forms of 
compensation less dependent upon firm performance, the substitution of restricted stock and cash 
incentives for options suggests an increase of CEO influence.  Therefore while the increase in variable 
compensation supports the proposition that CEO influence over compensation design weakened, the 
form of variable compensation used does not provide evidence of a consistent change of CEO influence.   
3.5.3. CEO Compensation Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity  
I find little or no evidence of a consistent increase in CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance 
from 1994 through 2012.  This is significant because the express purpose of §162(m) was to increase the 
link between CEO compensation and firm performance (Balsam and Ryan, 1996).  Pay-for-performance 
sensitivity (PPS) relates the change of CEO total compensation to the change of firm performance 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Therefore to examine the changing CEO compensation sensitivity to firm 
performance, I conduct a time-series analysis of annual CEO PPS from 1994 through 2012.   
                                                 
67 Stock grants provide the CEO some value as long as the market value of the firm’s stock exceeds $0. 
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To measure annual PPS from 1994 through 2012, I estimate Equation (5) annually.  The 
dependent variable is the change of the natural log of CEO total compensation, Δln(TOTAL 
COMPENSATION) (Leone et al., 2006).  PPS is measured by the coefficient, α1, on the independent 
variable of interest, the change in performance, ∆PERFORMANCE.  I use two measures of performance, 
return-on-assets for accounting performance, ∆ROA, and buy-and-hold returns for market performance, 
∆RET.  Control variables include the natural log of total firm revenues, ln(SALES), to control for firm size 
(Leone et al., 2006) and the Fama/French 12 industry classification indicator variables, INDUSTRY CODES, 
to control for industry effects.   
To provide a benchmark for comparison, I also estimate Equation (5) for firms unaffected by 
§162(m).68  I obtain the control group CEO compensation data from Execucomp and the firm 
performance data from Compustat.  To select the control group, I include all CEOs from 1994 through 
2012 but exclude all observations for a CEO once his firm joins my sample, which yields 12,835 firm-year 
observations.  I exclude all observations in which mean CEO total compensation for years t and t-1 
equals or exceeds $1 million, which reduces the sample to 5,572 observations.  Excluding all 
observations without the lag data for the same CEO reduces the sample to 3,531 observation and 
excluding observations without the data for the lagged ROA or RET reduces the sample to 2,933 and 
3,265 observations, respectively.    
   ∆ ln(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) =   𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝛼2 ln(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆) 
                                                                     +  ∑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈                                                   (5) 
I first estimate Equation (5) measuring the change of performance, ∆PERFORMANCE, using the 
change of accounting performance, ∆ROA, and plot the estimated annual PPS coefficient, α1, in Figure 9.  
I estimate Equation (5) separately for my sample of affected firms and for the control group.  For 
                                                 
68 All public firms are subject to the requirements of §162(m).  However, I define firms as unaffected if their annual 
CEO total compensation is less than $1 million because they are within §162(m)’s annual tax deduction allowance. 
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affected firms, PPS increased from 1994 to 1995, but then decreased through 1997.  However, beginning 
in 1997, PPS demonstrates an overall upward trend, providing some indication that the relation 
between CEO total compensation and accounting performance increased from 1997 through 2012.  The 
control group did not replicate this general upward trend post 1997. 
[Insert Figure 9] 
I next estimate Equation (5) measuring ∆PERFORMANCE using the change of market 
performance, ∆RET, separately for my sample of affected firms and for the control group.  I plot the 
estimated annual PPS measure of CEO total compensation sensitivity to market performance, α1, in 
Figure 10.  Similar to Figure 9, PPS demonstrates an initial increase from 1994 through 1995, but 
decreases through 1997.  Beginning in 1997, although there were some years which demonstrate an 
increase, CEO compensation’s sensitivity to market performance remains relatively unchanged through 
the remaining tenure of §162(m).   The control group demonstrates a similar pattern, but with greater 
variability. 
[Insert Figure 10] 
 In summary, my 1994 through 2012 time-series analysis of CEO compensation of §162(m) 
affected firms provides evidence that CEO compensation levels increased, CEO fixed salary levels 
stagnated, CEO fixed salary as a percentage of total compensation decreased, and CEO PPS varied.  This 
descriptive evaluation of CEO compensation suggests that §162(m) influenced salary levels, establishing 
an informal $1 million annual salary benchmark, and limited the CEO’s ability to receive high levels of 
unconditioned compensation.  However, I do find consistent evidence that §162(m) affected the 
influence that CEOs have over their total compensation levels or the sensitivity of their compensation to 
firm performance.    
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3.6. REGRESSION RESULTS 
I next present the results of testing Hypotheses VI and VII using Equations (3) and (4).   
3.6.1. Hypothesis VI:  Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance 
 
Table 13 presents firms’ Base Period and Post Period 2003 IND board independence statistics.  The 
median (mean) number of non-independent board members fell from 3 (2.8) members in the Base 
Period to 2 (2.6) members in the Post Period, Panel A.  Although the majority of firms provided a board 
of directors with an independent majority and a fully independent compensation committee in the Base 
Period, board independence increased slightly in the Post Period, increasing from a mean (median) of 
70% (71%) in the Base Period to 72% (73%) in the Post Period, Panel B.   
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
Table 14 presents the results of testing Hypothesis VI using Equation (3), which relates CEO 
power to §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  Hypothesis VI predicts that the CEO power-§162(m) 
noncompliance relation weakened following the 2003 SEC board independence regulation, which I refer 
to as 2003 IND.  Based on the results of Equation (3), I find no evidence that the 2003 IND changed the 
association between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance, failing to support Hypothesis VI.  In four 
of the six estimations, the estimated coefficients on CEO FACTOR are positive and statistically significant.  
These findings provide evidence that as CEO power increased during the years prior to the influence of 
the 2003 IND, the likelihood and level of noncompliant salary and cash compensation also increased.  
The change in the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance is measured by the 
coefficient on the independent variable of interest, the interaction term CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE.  
None of the coefficients on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE are statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
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estimation of Equation (3) fails to provide any evidence that 2003 IND changed the association between 
CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior.   
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
3.6.2. Hypothesis VI:  Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance dependent upon Board 
Independence 
 
Equation (4) relates CEO power to §162(m) noncompliance separately for firms with lower and higher 
board independence.  To estimate Equation (4), I first divide firms into LOW and HIGH board 
independent firms based upon their Base Period board independence as measured by BOARD FACTOR.  I 
form BOARD FACTOR using principal component analysis from three measures of board independence, 
Non-I BOARD%, Non-I COMP COMM%, and INTERLOCK%.  The Base Period mean (median) BOARD 
FACTOR score is 3.054 (2.755).  The lack of board independence increases as BOARD FACTOR increases.  
Therefore, a LOW independent score ranges from 2.755 to 8.956 and a HIGH score ranges from 1.837 to 
2.755.  In the Post Period, the mean (median) BOARD FACTOR is 2.948 (2.700), suggesting a slight 
increase in board independence.  Table 15 presents the definitions and loadings of the board 
independence measures and BOARD FACTOR’s descriptive statistics. 
[Insert Table 15 Here] 
Table 16 presents firms’ Base and Post periods board independence statistics.  Because firms are 
classified based upon the Base Period that is pre-2003 IND, I remove firms which are not present in the 
Base Period must be removed from the sample, reducing the observations from the 1,663 included in 
Table 14 to 1,603.     
[Insert Table 16 Here] 
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Table 17 presents the results of estimating Equation (4) which examines Hypothesis VI for LOW 
board independent firms in Panel A and HIGH board independent firms in Panel B.  I expect that the 
2003 IND will have the greatest influence on the firms with LOW Base Period board independence 
because these firms should experience the greatest change to the independence of their governance 
processes.   
[Insert Table 17 Here] 
 The estimation results suggest that the 2003 regulation had a greater influence on those firms 
with lower pre-2003 IND board independence in regards to noncompliant salary, but otherwise the 
results do not provide evidence that the 2003 IND affected the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliant 
relation.   Consistent with Hypothesis VI, when the dependent variable is SALARY_I, which indicates 
whether the CEO received some noncompliant salary in excess of $1 million, the coefficient on CEO 
FACTOR*POST CHANGE is negative and statistically significant, (-0.379, p=0.090).  This finding suggests 
that, for firms with LOW Base Period board independence, the positive relation between CEO FACTOR 
and SALARY_I decreased from 0.681 (p<0.001) in the Base Period to 0.302 (0.681-0.379=0.302) in the 
Post Period.  Therefore, for firms with LOW Base Period board independence, the positive relation 
between CEO power and the likelihood that the firm pays their CEO §162(m) noncompliant salary 
weakened following the 2003 IND.   
However, for the LOW board independent firms, five of the six coefficients of interest, on CEO 
FACTOR*POST CHANGE, fail to demonstrate statistical significance and indicate mixed results with two 
positive and three negative coefficients.  Therefore with the exception of noncompliant salary, Equation 
(5) does not provide evidence that the 2003 regulation affected the relation between CEO power and 
non-salary §162(m) noncompliant compensation, even for firms with lower board independence prior to 
the passage of the 2003 regulation. 
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Panel B presents the estimation results for firms with HIGH Base Period board independence.  
The results are fully consistent with Table 14 and provide no empirical support for Hypothesis VI.  Four 
of the six coefficients on CEO POWER are positive and statistically significant and none of the 
coefficients on the variable of interest, CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE, demonstrate statistical significance.   
Therefore, Equation (4) provides only very limited evidence that the 2003 IND weakened the 
relation between CEO power and noncompliant compensation for those firms with lower board 
independence prior to 2003.  I find statistical significance only for the salary component of 
compensation and only at the .09 level and the remainder of the estimations, five for the LOW and all six 
of the HIGH firms, do not provide support for Hypothesis VI.  I next estimate Equation (4) for an 
extended sample period. 
3.6.3. Hypothesis VI:  Extended Analysis Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance dependent 
upon Board Independence 
 
Because the initial analyses in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 do not provide consistent evidence that the 2003 
IND changed the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance, with the exception of the 
noncompliant salary for CEOs at lower board independent firms, I extend the sample period of the 
Hypothesis VI analysis and estimate Equation (4) using a two-year Base Period and a two-year Post 
Period.  The SEC signed the 2003 IND on November 4, 2003.  Firms were not required to comply to 2003 
IND immediately, but some firms may have responded early for positive shareholder relations.  
Therefore, I set a two-year Base Period which ends on November 30, 2003.  Firms must meet the 
requirements beginning with their first meeting after January 15, 2004, such that firms must comply 
with 2003 IND for years ending in September 2004.  Therefore, I set the two-year Post Period which 
begins with firm years ending on or after September 15, 2004.   
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 Table 18 presents the extended Base Period and Post Period board independence statistics.   
With this longer period, I find a greater increase in board independence.  The median (mean) number of 
non-independent board members decreased from 3 (3.1) in the Base Period to 2 (2.6) in the Post Period 
while the number of independent members increased from 6 (6.6) to 7 (7.0), as shown in Panel A.  The 
percentage of independent board members increased from a mean (median) of 68% (70%) in the Base 
Period to 73% (75%) in the Post Period, as shown in Panel B. 
[Insert Table 18 Here] 
 I repeat the earlier analysis for the longer sample period.  I test Hypothesis VI by estimating 
Equation (4), which relates CEO power to firm noncompliance, separately for LOW and HIGH board 
independent firms.   
[Insert Table 19 Here] 
 Table 19 presents the extended period results of estimating Equation (4) for LOW board 
independent firms in Panel A and HIGH board independent firms in Panel B.  Consistent with Hypothesis 
VI and the Table 17 results, the coefficient of interest on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.379, p=0.018) for LOW board independent firms when the dependent variable 
is SALARY_I.  This finding suggests that the 2003 regulatory change weakened the positive relation 
between CEO power and noncompliant salary from 0.814 in the Base Period (p<.001) to 0.435 (0.814-
0.379=0.435) in the Post Period for firms with lower board independence prior to 2003.   
However similar to the Table 17 results, the results of estimating Equation (4) for the extended 
period fail to provide consistent evidence that the 2003 regulation otherwise affected the relation 
between CEO power and firm §162(m) noncompliance.  The remaining five estimations of Equation (4) 
for the LOW board independent firms fail to demonstrate statistical significance.  Similarly, five of the six 
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estimations of Equation (4) for the HIGH board independent firms fail to demonstrate statistical 
significance.  One of the six coefficients on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE for HIGH board independent 
firms is negative and statistically significant, when TOTAL_I is the dependent variable (-.338; p=.073), 
which provides very limited support for Hypothesis VI.     
 In summary, the estimation results do not provide consistent evidence that the 2003 regulation 
reduced the relation between CEO power and all §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  However, I find 
that the regulation reduced the positive relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary for those 
firms with lower board independence prior to the regulatory change.  The evidence suggests that in 
those firms with lower independent governance prior to 2003, the mandated increase in board 
independence weakened the ability of a CEO to use his or her influence to secure an annual salary in 
excess of $1 million.  Therefore, the estimations of Equation (4) provides only limited support for 
Hypothesis VI, which predicts that increased board independence improves the quality of governance. 
3.6.4. Hypothesis VII:  Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance  
Table 20 presents the results of estimating Equation (3) and provides support for Hypothesis VII.  
Equation (3) relates my measure of CEO power, CEO FACTOR, to six measures of §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation, NC MEASURE, and estimates the change in that relation following the 2006 disclosure 
regulation, measured by the coefficient on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE.  All six of the coefficients of 
interest on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE are positive and four are statistically significant at the .001 level.   
This provides evidence that the relation between CEO FACTOR and NC MEASURE strengthened following 
the 2006 DIS, supporting the prediction that the relation between CEO power and§162(m) 
noncompliance strengthened following the 2006 increased compensation disclosure mandates and 
supporting Hypothesis VII.   
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When the dependent variable, NC MEASURE, measures some level of §162(m) noncompliant 
cash compensation, including salary, three of the four coefficients on CEO FACTOR are positive and 
statistically significant at the .05 level or lower.  When the dependent variable, NC MEASURE, can be 
based only on the use of noncompliant restricted stock grants with no noncompliant cash 
compensation, the two coefficients on CEO FACTOR are negative with one statistically significant at the 
.07 level.  However, all six estimations of Equation (3) provide evidence of a positive relation between 
CEO FACTOR and all measures of noncompliance, NC MEASURE, following the 2006 DIS,  which supports 
the proposition that there is a stronger, positive relation between CEO power and firm §162(m) 
noncompliance following the 2006 DIS.   
[Insert Table 20 Here] 
3.6.5. Hypothesis VII:  Extended Analysis Relating CEO power to §162(m) Noncompliance  
To further evaluate how the relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary was affected by the 
2006 regulation, I extend the sample period and estimate Equation (3) to test Hypothesis VII.  In the 
shorter time period discussed in Section 3.6.4, the coefficient which measures the changed CEO power-
noncompliance relation, CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE, did not demonstrate statistical significance at the 
.10 level when NC MEASURE measured noncompliant salary.  However, fixed compensation is inherently 
more “sticky” than variable compensation.  Therefore, it may take longer for the 2006 regulation to 
strengthen the relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary and an extended analysis may 
better evaluate the effect of the 2006 DIS on the CEO power-noncompliance relation.  I extend the time 
period in the Hypothesis VII sample such that the Base Period includes observations with years ending 
December 15, 2004 through December 14, 2006 and the Post Period includes observations with years 
ending December 15, 2006 through November 30, 2008.   
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Table 21 presents the Equation (3) coefficients and levels of significance.  Consistent with 
Hypothesis VII and Table 20, all six coefficients on CEO FACTOR*POST CHANGE are positive and four are 
statistically significant at the .10 level.  For the two estimations which relate CEO power to noncompliant 
salary, statistical significance improves.  Although both estimations do not demonstrate significance at 
the .10 level, the positive relation between CEO FACTOR and SALARY_I improves to demonstrate 
marginal significance (.100; p=.118).  This provides some indication that the positive relation between 
CEO power and the likelihood that the CEO receives noncompliant salary increased following 2006.   
[Insert Table 21 Here] 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
Section 162(m) was enacted with the express purpose of reducing excessive compensation.   Assuming 
that powerful CEOs controlled their own compensation design, §162(m) provides mechanisms to reduce 
CEO influence.  However, scandals continued and the tech bubble burst.  Further regulation attempted 
to limit CEO power, specifically the increased independent requirements of 2003 and the increased 
disclosures of 2006.  I examine CEO compensation design, §162(m), and the influence of the 
environmental changes to determine if the regulations influenced the relation of CEO power and 
§162(m) noncompliance.    
 I find, relying upon a series descriptive time-series analyses, that salary levels have not grown in 
constant dollars so that salary as a percentage of total compensation decreased, but CEO total 
compensation increased and sensitivity to performance demonstrates no persistent trend from 1994 
through 2012.  Consistent with Hypothesis VI, I find that the 2003 independence regulation reduced the 
positive relation between CEO and §162(m) noncompliant salary at firms with lower board 
107 
 
independence prior to 2003.  Consistent with Hypothesis VII, this study provides evidence that the 2006 
DIS strengthened the relation of CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance behavior.   
 These findings contribute the following to the compensation literature.  First, the analyses in 
this study suggest that §162(m) affected CEO salary levels, establishing $1 million as an informal 
benchmark for CEO salary and reducing salary as a percentage of CEO total compensation.  However, I 
do not find that §162(m) reduced CEO total compensation levels or consistently increased pay-for-
performance sensitivity.   
Second, the 2003 IND weakened the relation between CEO power and noncompliant salary at 
firms with lower board independence.  This evidence supports the proposition that increased 
independent governance processes reduce the ability of a CEO to use his power to secure noncompliant 
salary, which is salary above the $1 million §162(m) benchmark.  This finding supports that proposition 
that increased board independence increases the quality of governance.  
Finally, my study provides evidence that the relation between CEO power and firm §162(m) 
noncompliance behavior strengthened following the 2006 DIS.  These results suggest that the 2006 DIS 
influenced compensation disclosures, influenced compliant incentives, and influenced CEO 
compensation design.  Arguably, the increase in disclosures should have weakened the positive 
association between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.  The fact that I find no weakening of the 
CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation provides evidence that CEOs prefer noncompliant 
compensation and the increase disclosure did not weaken CEO influence over firm noncompliance or, in 
general terms, compensation design.  Although the increased compensation disclosure likely failed to 
weaken the relation between CEO power and noncompliance, §162(m) noncompliant compensation 
may provide measure of powerful CEOs following 2006.    
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4.0 CONCLUSION 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 summarizes my dissertation and findings.  I present an overview in Section 4.1.  I summarize 
the findings in Section 4.2.  Section 4.3 presents my contributions to the literature and 
recommendations for future research.  I conclude in Section 4.4. 
 
4.1. OVERVIEW 
Congress enacted §162(m) to increase the link between CEO compensation and firm performance and 
reduce “excessive” CEO compensation, but it was enacted because of the popular belief that CEOs 
controlled their own compensation design.  Section 162(m) noncompliance is a compensation design 
decision.  Therefore, I examine the factors which influence §162(m) noncompliance from 1998 through 
2011, focusing on the influence of CEOs, and CEO compensation design trends of firms affected by 
§162(m) from 1994 through 2012 to examine the motivation of CEO compensation design and the 
influence of CEOs.  To examine how CEOs influence their compensation design, specifically §162(m) 
noncompliance, I also exploit two SEC regulations that changed the CEO compensation environment 
exogenous of CEO power during the sample period that I study, 1994 through 2012.  The SEC regulations 
increased independent governance requirements in 2003 and increased compensation disclosures in 
2006.  Because these two exogenous shocks changed the CEO compensation design environment and 
were intended to affect CEO influence, I examine how these regulations changed the relation between 
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CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance to better understand how CEOs influence their own 
compensation design.   
 
4.2. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
Chapter 2 examines the factors which influence noncompliance with §162(m) from 1998 through 2011.  
I find that §162(m) noncompliance is positively related to firm size, firm risk, and CEO power and, with 
limited evidence, negatively related to firm performance.  These findings are consistent with agency 
theory, which argues that CEO compensation is designed to maximize shareholder welfare.  If my 
empirical analysis provided evidence that §162(m) noncompliance increases with CEO power and poor 
quality governance, my study would support managerial power theory, which argues that CEOs 
systematically control their own compensation design because public corporations inherently provide 
poor quality governance.  I find that §162(m) noncompliance is positively related to CEO power.  While I 
find that §162(m) noncompliance is positively related to CEO power and board size, one common 
measure of governance quality that recent literature suggests is a poor proxy of governance quality at 
large firms, I do not provide consistent evidence that firm noncompliance behavior increases with poor 
quality governance.  Therefore, although Chapter 2 provides evidence that CEO power is positively 
related to firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior, because I find that firm §162(m) noncompliance 
behavior is related to the economic determinants of CEO compensation design and not poor quality 
governance, my findings suggest that firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior maximizes shareholder 
welfare.  Therefore, my findings suggest that agency theory better explains firm §162(m) noncompliance 
behavior relative to managerial power theory.   
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 Chapter 3 examines CEO compensation design trends for those firms affected by §162(m).  I 
document that CEO salary levels of §162(m) affected firms tended to remain flat from 1994 through 
2012, concentrating near or below $1 million in absolute dollars.  With little growth in salary levels, 
salary as a percentage of CEO total compensation decreased, from a mean (median) of 29% (27%) in 
1994 to 21% (17%) in 2011 and 23% (18%) in 2012.  Because §162(m) provides a fixed compensation tax 
deduction allowance of $1 million, these results suggest that §162(m) established $1 million as the 
benchmark for CEO annual salary from 1994 through 2012.  However during this same period, I find that 
CEO total compensation levels increased and sensitivity to firm performance did not consistently 
increase.  Therefore, although the evidence suggests that §162(m) affected CEO salary levels, which 
implies that §162(m) weakened CEO control over their salary in excess of the $1 million benchmark, I do 
not find strong evidence that §162(m) affected CEO total compensation levels or sensitivity, which 
implies that §162(m) did not affect CEO influence over their total compensation design. 
 Chapter 3 examines how the 2003 SEC regulation, which mandated increased board 
independence requirements, affected the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.  I 
provide evidence that the 2003 SEC regulation weakened the positive relation between CEO power and 
§162(m) noncompliant salary for those firms with lower pre-2003 board independence.  This evidence 
suggests that greater board independence weakens CEO influence over §162(m) noncompliant salary, 
which is salary in excess of the $1 million benchmark.  This finding supports the proposition that 
increased independent governance improves governance quality.  However, I find no evidence that the 
2003 regulation affected the CEO power-non-salary §162(m) noncompliance relation.  This finding is 
consistent with the compensation trend analysis, supporting the proposition that §162(m) affected CEO 
salary levels, but not necessarily total compensation design.   
 Chapter 3 examines how the 2006 SEC regulation, which mandates increased compensation 
disclosures, affected the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.  I provide evidence 
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that the 2006 SEC regulation strengthened the relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance.  Arguably, increased compensation disclosure should remediate agency problems so as 
to weaken the relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliance.  Because the evidence 
suggests that increased disclosure strengthened the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation, the 
evidence provided in this study supports the proposition that the increased disclosures limited the 
ability of firms to provide lower risk, “overly generous” compliant incentives, that CEOs prefer lower risk, 
noncompliant compensation and they use their power to secure it.  Because the increased disclosure did 
not reduce noncompliance or weaken the relation between noncompliance and CEO power, my study 
supports the proposition that CEOs have some influence over their own compensation design, their 
influence did not weaken as a consequence of the 2006 increased disclosures, and CEO influence over 
their own compensation design may reflect CEO value in a manner that is acceptable by shareholders.  
 
4.3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
My study makes five primary contributions to the literature.  First, I examine noncompliance behavior 
over the longer-term, from 1998 through 2011, including measures of governance quality and levels of 
§162(m) noncompliant compensation, and provide evidence that firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior 
is principally related to the economic determinants of compensation design, specifically firm risk, firm 
size, and firm performance, and not measures of poor quality governance, with the exception of board 
size.  Therefore, my study provides evidence that agency theory better explains the relation between 
§162(m) and CEO compensation design relative to managerial power theory.  My analysis also discusses 
various qualifications of these general patterns. 
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Second, Chapter II provides evidence that firm §162(m) noncompliance behavior increases with 
CEO power.  Although the Chapter II analysis does not prove causality, this finding implies that CEOs use 
their influence to secure noncompliant compensation.   
Third, I document that CEO salary levels at §162(m) affected firms stagnated, suggesting that 
§162(m) affected CEO salary levels from 1994 through 2012.  The prior literature documented that 
§162(m) slowed the growth of salary levels immediately following the passage of §162(m), from 1994 
through 1998.  My study expands these earlier analyses to illustrate that CEO salary levels have 
stagnated through 2012, suggesting that §162(m) effectively established $1 million as an annual CEO 
salary benchmark. 
Fourth, I provide evidence that the 2003 board independence regulation weakened the positive 
relation between CEO power and §162(m) noncompliant salary for those firms with lower independent 
governance.  This suggests that greater board independence weakens CEOs’ influence over his or her 
compensation design, specifically the ability to secure §162(m) noncompliant salary, salary in excess of 
the $1 million benchmark.  In general terms, this finding provides evidence that increased independent 
governance processes improves the quality of governance. 
Finally, Chapter III provides evidence that the relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance strengthened following the 2006 disclosure mandates.  I provide evidence that CEO 
power is positively related to all measures of §162(m) noncompliance following 2006.  Because I find 
that the 2006 regulation did not weaken the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation, that CEO total 
compensation levels increased, and no consistent evidence that pay-for-performance sensitivity 
increased, my study supports the proposition that the 2006 regulation did not reduce CEO power over 
their total compensation design.    
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Future research of §162(m) noncompliance behavior can provide valuable information 
concerning the influence that CEOs have over their own compensation design.  Because I find that there 
is a strong positive relation between CEO power and all of my measures of §162(m) noncompliant 
compensation following 2006, my findings suggest that CEOs influence firm noncompliance.  Therefore, 
further studies can examine the quality of noncompliant compensation as a measure or proxy of CEO 
power.  In addition, because §162(m) noncompliance is a compensation design decision, my study 
suggests that CEOs influence their own compensation design.  Therefore, future studies can examine the 
relation between noncompliant compensation and subsequent firm performance to help determine if 
the CEO influence over noncompliance benefits future shareholder wealth.  In addition, future studies 
can compare the sensitivity of CEOs at compliant versus noncompliant firms to determine if §162(m) 
noncompliance behavior reflects the willingness of firms to subject their CEO compensation design to 
strict firm performance requirements. 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
My dissertation provides evidence of a positive relation between CEO power and §162(m) 
noncompliance, but I do not find evidence that this relation is inefficient or detrimental to shareholders.  
First, I find that §162(m) noncompliance is related to economic factors in a manner consistent with 
shareholder welfare maximization and not measures of poor quality governance.  Second, increased 
disclosures did not weaken the CEO power-§162(m) noncompliance relation, suggesting that the 
investment community generally accepts some level of firm noncompliance, which provides further 
support for the proposition that §162(m) noncompliance is not per se inefficient CEO rent extraction.  
My study suggests that firm noncompliance behavior is a compensation design decision which reflects 
compensation determinants, which must necessarily include CEO risk preferences.  I provide evidence 
114 
 
that §162(m) affected CEO salary levels, but I cannot conclude that it affected total compensation design 
or the influence of CEOs in general.  Therefore, my study does not provide evidence that §162(m) 
weakened the influence which CEOs have over their compensation design.  However, my findings 
suggest that following 2006, §162(m) noncompliant compensation may be an informative measure of 
CEO power.        
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Table 1:  Total annual §162(m) noncompliant/non-tax deductible compensation paid to Execucomp executives and 
the estimated total annual tax expense from §162(m) noncompliance 
 
 
 
 
YEAR 
Total 
Noncompliant 
Compensation 
Mean 
Marginal 
Tax Rate 
Total Annual 
Tax Cost 
From §162(m) 
1994 $ 465,343,046  28%  $130,296,053  
1995   647,567,654  28%  181,318,943  
1996 1,006,627,743  27% 271,789,491  
1997 1,544,899,738  27%  417,122,929  
1998   2,714,120,522  25%   678,530,131  
1999 1,924,902,990  25%   481,225,747  
2000 2,366,568,065  24%    567,976,336  
2001 1,987,370,526  23% 457,095,221  
2002   2,278,996,675  23%  524,169,235  
2003 2,766,343,719  23%  636,259,055  
2004 3,471,641,307  23% 798,477,501  
2005  3,925,210,217  22%   863,546,248  
2006  7,204,107,195  22%   1,584,903,583  
2007 8,934,580,028  21%  1,876,261,806  
2008 7,786,179,572  18% 1,401,512,323  
2009  6,300,086,095  15%   945,012,914  
2010 8,138,493,184  15% 1,220,773,978  
2011  9,138,141,267  15% 1,370,721,190  
2012   9,080,503,526  15% 1,362,075,529  
TOTAL $81,681,683,068   $15,769,068,212  
n=164,136 
I estimate the annual §162(m) noncompliant/non-tax deductible compensation paid to Execucomp executives by 
calculating the §162(m) noncompliant compensation paid to each covered executive listed on Execucomp and 
summing the total. 
IRC Section 162(m) defines the tax deduction for public firms’ top executives, which I refer to as covered 
executives, described in Section 1.1 of this dissertation.   
I define §162(m) noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million in a fiscal year: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-performance based plan cash 
awards, and restricted stock awards. 
Total Noncompliant Compensation is the sum of all §162(m) noncompliant compensation paid to all covered 
executives listed on Execucomp, by year and for the whole sample period from 1994 through 2012 
The Mean Marginal Tax Rate is the mean annual simulated marginal tax rate for all firms in my sample described in 
detail in Section 2.5 of this dissertation. 
I calculate the Total Annual Tax Cost From §162(m) by multiplying the Total Noncompliant Compensation, per year, 
by the Mean Marginal Tax Rate, for that particular year. 
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Table 2:  Presentation of Three CEO scenarios 
 
 
 
 
CEO 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
$8.5 Million 
§162 (m)  Non-
Compliant 
CEO Compensation 
CEO’s    
COMPENSION 
TAX  
DEDUCTION 
 
§162(m)  
ADDITIONAL 
TAX 
EXPENSE† SALARY BONUS SALARY BONUS TAX BENEFIT 
#1 1,000,000 7,500,000 -0- -0- $8,500,000 
* 35% = 
$2,975,000 
-0- 
#2 1,500,000 7,000,000 500,000 -0- $8,000,000 
* 35% = 
$2,800,000 
500,000 * 
35%= 
175,000 
#3 750,000 7,750,000 -0- 7,500,000 $1,000,000 
* 35% = 
$350,000 
7,500,000 * 
35%= 
2,625,000 
† Additional Tax Expense is the estimated corporate federal income tax payable by the firm as a direct result of the 
lost compensation tax deduction from the firm’s failure to fully comply with the deductibility requirements of 
§162(m), assuming the flat corporate income tax rate of 35%. 
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Table 3:  Chapter 2 Sample Selection 
 
 
Firm-Year Observations 
Compustat Firms with a CEO included on Execucomp as of June 1, 2013 for 
   Fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1994 through 2012 
 
33,273 
Deletions:  
     Firms which did not pay a single CEO ≥ $1 million total compensation 
          for a minimum of 2 years 
 
(4,686) 
     Firms which did not pay a single CEO ≥ $900,000 cash compensation 
          for a minimum of 2 years 
 
(4,116) 
     Observations missing key firm financial data: 
          Compensation components, total assets, net income, or market returns 
(5,250) 
     Observations prior to the first year the firm paid $1 million total compensation (717) 
     Observations missing data required for Equation (1)  (6,878) 
Final Sample 11,626 
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Table 4:  Chapter 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Firm Characteristics       
   Total Assets 
         (in millions) 
11,626 8,734  28,691   928 2,305 6,943  
   Market Capitalization 
         (in millions) 
11,626 9,737  28,173   942  2,355  6,936  
   Marginal Tax Rate 11,626 26% 10% 18% 33% 35% 
CEO Characteristics       
   Tenure as CEO 11,626 7.3 7.2 2 5 10 
   CEO’s age 11,613 55.8 7.0 51 56 60 
Compensation  (in thousands of dollars)  
   Total1  11,626 6,346  11,754 2,138 3,966  7,334  
AMOUNT OF TOTAL COMPENSATION WHICH IS §162(m):  
   Compliant2 11,626 4,688  8,962  1.690 2,884  5,143  
   Noncompliant3 11,626 1,658  7,119  0 255  1,711  
Board Characteristics        
   Insider % 11,626 18% 9% 11% 14% 22% 
   Linked % 11,626 10% 12% 0% 8% 15% 
   Independent % 11,626 73% 15% 63% 75% 86% 
Compensation Committee       
   Insider % 11,626 0.3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 
   Linked % 11,626 5% 14% 0% 0% 0% 
   Independent % 11,626 95% 15% 100% 100% 100% 
1 I define CEO Total Compensation as CEO total annual compensation, reported by Execucomp as TDC1.   
2 I define the CEO’s §162(m) compliant compensation the CEO’s Total Compensation less the §162(m) 
noncompliant compensation portion. 
3 I define §162(m) noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, only to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-incentive plan based cash bonus and restricted 
stock awards.  
Descriptive statistics are not CPI adjusted. 
Years: 1998 – 2011 
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Table 5:  Chapter 2 Sample Compliance Rates by Industry 
 
 
 
Fama/French 12-Industry 
Classification 
 
Observations 
per Industry 
% of Noncompliant Firms 
Salary 
NC1 
Cash 
NC2 
Total 
NC3 
Consumer Non-Durables 950 25% 48% 61% 
Consumer Durables 330 22% 52% 63% 
Manufacturing 1,870 19% 47% 60% 
Energy 545 29% 62% 75% 
Chemicals & Allied Products 552 23% 51% 67% 
Business Equipment 2,014 9% 43% 51% 
Telephone &Television 247 51% 72% 81% 
Utilities 835 21% 49% 66% 
Shops 1,657 26% 51% 62% 
Health 1,006 26% 53% 61% 
Money & Finance 129 10% 43% 61% 
Other 1,491 16% 50% 63% 
TOTAL 11,626 20% 50% 61% 
1 I define a firm as Salary NC if it paid its CEO a salary in excess of $1 million. 
2 I define a firm as Cash NC if it paid its CEO any §162(m) noncompliant cash compensation.  I define cash 
compensation as noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation or non-incentive plan based cash bonus 
exceeds $1 million. 
3 I define a firm as Total NC if it paid its CEO any §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  I define compensation as 
noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation, non-incentive plan based cash bonus or restricted stock 
grants exceed $1 million. 
I calculate the percentage of noncompliant firms by dividing the number of Salary NC, Cash NC, and Total NC 
firm-year observations in an industry or in the total sample by the total number of firm-year observations for the 
respective industry or the total sample of 11,626 firm-year observations, as appropriate. 
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Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics of Equation (1) Independent Variables 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
LEVERAGE 11,626 0.55 0.20 0.41 0.55 0.68 
ILLIQUIDITY 11,626 0.87 0.15 0.82 0.93 0.98 
σ(ROA) 11,626 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.06 
σ(RET) 11,626 1.41 33.96 0.24 0.34 0.51 
ln(ASSETS) 11,626 7.63 1.42 6.56 7.47 8.57 
ROA 11,626 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.09 
RET 11,626 0.07 0.69 -0.21 0.03 0.26 
ln(CEO TENURE) 11,626 1.55 0.97 0.69 1.61 2.30 
CEO OWN% 11,626 2.7% 6.8% 0.2% 0.7% 1.9% 
CEO/CHAIR  11,626 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
CEO PAY SLICE 11,626 40% 11% 34% 40% 47% 
BOARD SIZE 11,626 9.5 2.3 8 9 11 
E-INDEX 11,626 2.32 1.21 1 2 3 
INTERLOCK%  11,626 0.6% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
NI  BOARD% 11,626 27.4% 15.4% 14.3% 25.0% 37.5% 
NI COMP COMM% 11,626 5.5% 14.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
MTB 11,626 1.94 1.32 1.20 1.54 2.19 
TAX BENEFIT 11,626 0.54 1.48 0.08 0.22 0.55 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: 
LEVERAGEit   = total debt/total assets of firm i in year t 
ILLIQUIDITY it  = 1- cash plus cash equivalents/ total assets of firm i in year t 
σ(ROA)it = standard deviation of firm i’s ROA for years t-1 through t-5 
σ(RET)it = standard deviation of firm i’s RET for years t-1 through t-5 
Ln(ASSETS) it = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t for firm i 
ROA it = book net income/average total assets of firm i in year t 
RET it  = buy and hold market returns of firm i in year t 
Ln(CEO TENURE)it = natural log of the number of years the CEO has been in that position (if missing, the number 
of years at the firm) in firm i as of the end of year t 
CEO OWN% it = percentage of shares owned by the CEO in firm i at the end of year t 
CEO/CHAIR it  = an indicator variable which equals 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the Board of 
firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise 
CEO PAY SLICE it = CEO total compensation/(the sum of the CEO and four highest paid executives’ total 
compensation) of firm i in year t 
BOARD SIZE it = number of members on the firm i’s board of directors in year t 
E-INDEX it = sum of six entrenchment indicators:  staggered board terms, a “poison pill” provision, a 
“golden parachute” provision, and limitations upon the shareholder ability to amend the 
charter, amend the by-laws and approve mergers (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell, 2008). 
INTERLOCK% it = percentage of interlocked board members 
NI  BOARD% it = (insider board members + linked board members)/total board members of firm i in year t 
NI COMP COMM% it = (insider compensation committee members + linked compensation committee members)/total 
compensation committee members of firm i in year t 
MTBit = (market value of equity + book value of liabilities)/book value of assets of firm i in year t 
TAX BENEFIT it = ((non-cpi adjusted CEO total compensation - $1 million)*simulated corporate federal income 
tax marginal tax rate)/non-cpi adjusted total assets of firm i in year t 
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Table 7:  An examination of the influence of firm, CEO, and board characteristics on §162(m) noncompliance 
 
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:         Predicted 
NC MEASURE       Sign  
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator: 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation: 
SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
Intercept  -19.098 *** -10.050 *** -7.915 *** -0.037 *** -0.087 *** -0.365 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS I:              
LEVERAGE                        + 0.720 ** 0.331  0.356  0.0004  0.004  0.034 ** 
  (0.037)  (0.159)  (0.129)  (0.809)  (0.555)  (0.040)  
ILLIQUIDITY                        + -0.870  -0.886 *** -0.087  -0.007 *** -0.003  -0.015  
    (0.157)  (0.010)  (0.770)  (0.008)  (0.786)  (0.496)  
σ(ROA)                              + 0.639  0.115  0.193  0.004  0.019  0.004  
  (0.383)  (0.787)  (0.625)  (0.121)  (0.139)  (0.866)  
σ(RET)                                + 0.001 * 0.001  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 *** 
  (0.052)  (0.158)  (0.442)  (0.153)  (0.236)  (0.008)  
HYPOTHESIS II:              
ln(ASSETS)                         + 1.427 *** 0.787 *** 0.607 *** 0.005 *** 0.009 *** 0.037 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS III:              
ROA                                     - 1.135  -0.275  0.280  -0.001  -0.038 ** -0.066 ** 
  (0.111)  (0.498)  (0.470)  (0.800)  (0.019)  (0.016)  
RET                                      - -0.086  -0.034  0.120  0.000  -0.001  0.002  
  (0.310)  (0.527)  (0.140)  (0.938)  (0.280)  (0.592)  
HYPOTHESIS IV:              
ln(CEO TENURE)              + 0.458 *** 0.021  -0.069 * 0.001 *** 0.004 ** -0.004  
  (<.001)  (0.662)  (0.100)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.236)  
CEO OWN%                       + 3.073 * 1.245 * 0.926  0.046 ** 0.098 ** 0.043  
     (0.008)  (0.097)  (0.198)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.368)  
CEO/CHAIR                       + 0.820 *** 0.297 *** 0.137  0.003 *** 0.005 * 0.004  
      (<.001)  (0.001)  (0.102)  (<.001)  (0.082)  (0.502)  
CEO PAY SLICE                 + 3.792 *** 4.241 *** 4.704 *** -0.004  0.052 *** 0.430 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.355)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS V:              
BOARD SIZE                       + 0.109 *** 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.001 *** 0.0001  0.0002  
  (<.001)  (0.001)  (<.001)  (0.001)  (0.892)  (0.894)  
E-INDEX                             + 0.024  -0.028  0.010  -0.001  -0.003 *** -0.003  
  (0.614)  (0.408)  (0.766)  (0.116)  (0.008)  (0.282)  
INTERLOCK%                     + 0.433  -0.080  2.613 ** 0.004  -0.049 * 0.095  
    (0.821)  (0.945)  (0.014)  (0.807)  (0.060)  (0.201)  
Non-I  BOARD%                + 1.036 ** -0.142  -0.565 * 0.005  0.017  -0.024  
  (0.036)  (0.661)  (0.060)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.266)  
Non-I COMP COMM%     + -1.029 ** -0.288  -0.178  -0.005 ** -0.014 * 0.005  
   (0.015)  (0.313)  (0.486)  (0.045)  (0.070)  (0.792)  
CONTROLS:              
MTB  0.057  -0.037  -0.114 *** 0.000 * -0.001  -0.006 ** 
  (0.224)  (0.326)  (0.002)  (0.077)  (0.148)  (0.015)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.036  0.119  0.290 *** 0.000  0.002  0.011 * 
  (0.254)  (0.157)  (<.001)  (0.169)  (0.183)  (0.050)  
R-Square  0.3507  0.4289  0.3166  0.1318  0.1125  0.3377  
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5 Ln(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 
   + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑊𝑁%𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂/𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡    + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐴𝑌 𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡   
   + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾%𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽15𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷%𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀%𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽17𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽18𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  
   + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                                                                               Equation (1) 
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
p values in parentheses; Years:  1998 through 2011; n=11,626, See Table 3; Firm and CEO clustered standard errors 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.7; Condition Index < 40; No variable contributes more than 40% to the 
variance of two or more variables.   
Variable Definitions: Appendix B 
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Table 8:  An examination of the factors which influence firms’ initial decisions to be §162(m) noncompliant  
 
 
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE: Predicted §162 Compensation Type 
NC MEASURE Sign SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I 
Intercept  -16.463 *** -7.725 *** -5.037 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS I:        
LEVERAGE + 0.180  0.362  0.447  
  (0.622)  (0.220)  (0.145)  
ILLIQUIDITY + 0.652  -1.140 *** -0.469  
    (0.352)  (0.005)  (0.247)  
σ(ROA) + 0.843  0.235  -0.086  
  (0.268)  (0.663)  (0.859)  
σ(RET) + 0.000  0.001  0.001  
  (0.869)  (0.409)  (0.732)  
HYPOTHESIS II:        
ln(5 YR μ(ASSETS)) + 0.990 *** 0.421 *** 0.241 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS III:        
ROA - 2.246 ** -1.376 *** -0.750  
  (0.049)  (0.009)  (0.175)  
RET - -0.193  -0.037  0.302 *** 
  (0.267)  (0.734)  (0.003)  
HYPOTHESIS IV:        
ln(CEO TENURE) + 0.273 *** -0.133 ** -0.277 *** 
  (0.001)  (0.024)  (<.001)  
CEO OWN% + 0.353  -0.071  -0.228  
     (0.713)  (0.928)  (0.794)  
CEO/CHAIR  + 0.614 *** 0.253 ** -0.010  
      (<.001)  (0.028)  (0.932)  
CEO PAY SLICE + 2.969 *** 4.666 *** 4.018 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS V:        
BOARD SIZE + 0.055 * 0.042  0.046  
  (0.075)  (0.121)  (0.108)  
E-INDEX + 0.038  0.028  0.068  
  (0.475)  (0.497)  (0.131)  
INTERLOCK%  + 1.224  0.838  1.531  
    (0.542)  (0.559)  (0.305)  
Non-I  BOARD% + 1.236 ** 0.241  0.005  
  (0.024)  (0.544)  (0.990)  
Non-I COMP COMM% + -0.582  -0.364  -0.131  
   (0.251)  (0.300)  (0.725)  
CONTROLS:        
MTB  0.107 ** -0.014  -0.143 *** 
  (0.040)  (0.740)  (0.006)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.016  0.033  0.214 *** 
  (0.384)  (0.642)  (<.001)  
PRIOR NC  0.614 *** 0.395 ***   
  (<.001)  (<.001)    
R-Square  0.0617  0.2120  0.1383  
n  8,553  5,016  3,156  
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽3𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝜎(𝑅𝐸𝑇)𝑖𝑡    
    + 𝛽5 Ln(5 𝑌𝑅 𝜇(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆))𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽9 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑊𝑁%𝑖𝑡   
    + 𝛽10𝐶𝐸𝑂/𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽11𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝐴𝑌 𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐸 − 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾%𝑖𝑡    
    + 𝛽15𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷%𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽16𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀%𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽17𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽18𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  [+ 𝛽19𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 𝑁𝐶 𝑖𝑡] † 
    + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                                                               Equation (3) 
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
p values in parentheses; Years:  1998 through 2011; Firm and CEO clustered standard errors. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
† The independent variable, PRIOR NC, is excluded when TOTAL_I is the dependent variable. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations of Equation (2a): VIF <1.7; Condition Index < 40; No variable contributes more 
than 40% to the variance of two or more variables.  
Firms’ Initial Decisions:  Firms generally compensate their CEO compliant compensation and, following their initial decision to 
compensate their CEO with some noncompliant compensation, generally continue with the practice of compensating that 
executive with noncompliant compensation in future years, discussed in greater detail in Section 2.7.  It is this initial decision, i.e. 
the first time they pay a form of noncompliant compensation, which I examine in Section 2.7.  To examine firms’ initial decisions 
to pay noncompliant compensation, I use a hazard model and limit the sample observations as detailed in Section 2.7.  I exclude 
all of the observations of those firms that always in my sample paid their CEO noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash 
compensation or any noncompliant compensation if the dependent variable is SALARY_I, CASH_I, and TOTAL_I, respectively.  I 
include all of the observations of those firms that never in my sample paid their CEO noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash 
compensation or any noncompliant compensation if the dependent variable is SALARY_I, CASH_I, and TOTAL_I, respectively.  
For all other firms, I exclude all observations following the year that the firm initially pays their CEO noncompliant salary, 
noncompliant cash compensation or any noncompliant compensation if the dependent variable is SALARY_I, CASH_I, and 
TOTAL_I, respectively.   
Variable Definitions: Appendix B 
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Table 9:  Chapter 3 Sample Selection 
 
 
Firm-Year Observations 
Compustat Firms with a CEO included on Execucomp for 
   Fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 1994 through 2012 
 
33,273 
Deletions:  
     Firms which did not pay a single CEO ≥ $1 million total compensation 
          for a minimum of 2 years 
 
(4,686) 
     Firms which did not pay a single CEO ≥ $900,000 cash compensation 
          for a minimum of 2 years 
 
(4,116) 
     Observations missing key firm financial data: 
          Compensation components, total assets, net income, or market returns 
(5,250) 
     Observation prior to the first year the firm paid $1 million total compensation (717) 
Final Sample 18,504 
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Table 10:  Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Firm Characteristics       
   Total Assets 
         (in millions) 
18,504 7,862 26,555 818 2,061 6,107 
   Market Capitalization 
         (in millions) 
18,504 8,277 24,332  813 2,045          5,833 
   Marginal Tax Rate  17,196 26% 11% 18% 33% 35% 
CEO Characteristics       
   Tenure as CEO  18,504 7.2 7.3 2 5 10 
   CEO’s age 18,465 56 7.0 51 56 60 
Compensation  (in thousands)  
   Total1   18,504   5,898    10,867  1,923 3,522          6,631 
   Salary  18,504  789     382    556     734              960 
   Cash Incentives2  18,504     1,302    2,243       351  746          1,509 
   Equity Incentives3  18,504 3,507 9,948    500  1,566          3,850 
   Deferred 18,504  121  496 0      8                88 
   Miscellaneous4   18,504  179  1,461 0 0                68 
§162(m):    
   Noncompliant Percentage5  18,504 17% 23% 0% 3% 31% 
   Tax Expense (in thousands)6 17,196 370  2,014 0  19              284 
    
  NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS:7 
      
     Years of Noncompliance8 1,683 6.2 4.1 3 5 8 
     Years in Sample9 1,683 10.3 5.25 5 10 15 
1 Total compensation is CEO total annual compensation, reported by Execucomp as TDC1.   
2 Cash Incentives is the sum of the CEO’s cash bonus plus all non-equity incentive compensation. 
3 Equity Incentives is the sum of the option grants and restricted stock grants, which are included in CEO Total 
Compensation. 
4 Miscellaneous compensation includes severance payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for 
cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, plus signing bonuses.  
5 §162(m) Noncompliant Percentage = §162(m) Noncompliant Compensation / CEO Total Compensation   
I define §162(m) Noncompliant Compensation as the sum of the following items, only to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-incentive plan based cash bonus and restricted 
stock awards.  
6 Tax Expense = §162(m) Noncompliant Compensation * Simulated Marginal Tax Rate as defined in Section 2.5 
7 NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS are the 1,683 unique firms in the Chapter 3 sample that pay some §162(m) 
Noncompliant Compensation to their CEO.   Chapter 3’s sample includes a total of 1,916 unique firms, detailed in 
Table 9.  The NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS’ descriptive statistics, including Years of Noncompliance and Years in 
Sample, are calculated using only the 1,683 noncompliant firms. 
8 Years of Noncompliance is the number of years that the firm paid some §162(m) Noncompliant Compensation to 
their CEO. 
9 Years in Sample is the number of years that the firm was included in the Chapter 3 sample.   
Descriptive statistics are not CPI adjusted. 
Years: 1994 - 2012 
n=18,504, see Table 9 
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Table 11:  The annual number of observations and percentages of §162(m) noncompliant firms 
 
 
 Observations % of Noncompliant Firms 
YEAR Per Year Salary NC1 Cash NC2 Total NC3 
1994 496 9% 15% 32% 
1995 696 9% 15% 32% 
1996 795 9% 17% 33% 
1997 870 9% 17% 33% 
1998 922 11% 18% 35% 
1999 955 11% 19% 34% 
2000 974 13% 22% 36% 
2001 984 15% 22% 38% 
2002 1,013 15% 23% 40% 
2003 1,065 16% 25% 46% 
2004 1,116 18% 27% 53% 
2005 1,144 19% 26% 59% 
2006 1,213 21% 66% 73% 
2007 1,276 22% 77% 78% 
2008 1,274 25% 80% 80% 
2009 1,279 24% 78% 79% 
2010 1,255 25% 82% 83% 
2011 1,114 28% 86% 87% 
2012 63 25% 94% 94% 
TOTAL 18,504 18% 44% 56% 
Number of Unique Firms: 
      TOTAL                                                 Salary NC           Cash NC             Total NC 
1,916  579 1,552 1,683 
1 I define a firm as Salary NC if it paid its CEO a salary in excess of $1 million. 
2 I define a firm as Cash NC if it paid its CEO any §162(m) noncompliant cash compensation.  I define cash 
compensation as noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation or non-incentive plan based cash bonus 
exceeds $1 million. 
3 I define a firm as Total NC if it paid its CEO any §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  I define compensation as 
noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation, non-incentive plan based cash bonus or restricted stock 
grants exceed $1 million. 
I calculate the percentage of noncompliant firms by dividing the number of Salary NC, Cash NC, and Total NC 
firms in a year or in the total sample of 18,504 firm-year observations by the total number of observations for the 
respective year or the total sample, as appropriate. 
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Table 12:  Descriptive Statistics of CEO FACTOR, the Chapter 3 measure of CEO power 
 
 
PANEL A:  Loadings estimated using principle component analysis for CEO FACTOR 
MEASURE LOAD 
CEO TENURE 80 
CEO AGE 71 
CEO OWN% 59 
CEO/CHAIR 55 
Eigenvalue 1.80 
% Variance explained 45% 
 
PANEL B:  CEO FACTOR Descriptive Statistics 
 
N 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile 
 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
 
Maximum 
18,268 4.000 1.000 1.798 3.444 3.892 4.439 11.323 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: 
CEO TENURE = the number of years the CEO has been in that position (if missing, the number of 
years at the firm) in firm i as of the end of year t 
CEO AGE = the CEO’s age at firm i as of the end of year t 
CEO OWN% = CEO percentage of ownership of firm i in year t 
CEO/CHAIR   = an indicator variable which equals 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the 
Board of firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise 
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Table 13: Board Independence Descriptive Statistics by Period, Using One-Year Base and Post Periods 
 
 
PANEL A: The number of Independent Board Members pre and post 2003 IND 
   Number of Board Members 
PERIOD N TYPE OF MEMBER MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
Base Period 811 Non-independent 2.8 1 2 3 4 12 
  Independent 6.6 0 5 7 8 17 
Post Period 852 Non-independent 2.6 1 2 2 3 9 
  Independent 6.7 2 5 7 8 16 
 
PANEL B: The pre and post 2003 IND CEO Power measure, CEO FACTOR, and Board Independence Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
 
BASE Period 
      
CEO FACTOR 4.00 1.96 3.40 3.92 4.45 9.54 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  
1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 70% 0% 60% 71% 82% 94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 93% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
POST Period 
      
CEO FACTOR 4.04 2.08 3.42 3.91 4.47 10.62 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 72% 18% 63% 73% 83% 94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 94% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending June 15, 2003 through May 31, 2004 
                  Post Period – Years ending August 15, 2004 through July 31, 2005 
CEO FACTOR is a measure of CEO power formed from CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, CEO OWN%, and CEO/CHAIR.  I 
predict that the CEO’s power increases as the value estimated for CEO FACTOR increases. 
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Table 14:  Hypothesis VI: An examination of how the 2003 SEC independence regulation influenced the CEO 
power - §162(m) noncompliance relation, using one-year base and post periods 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE: 
 
 
predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE sign SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 0.772 *** 0.283 *** -0.042  0.003 ** 0.007 ** -0.005  
  (<.001)  (0.005)  (0.622)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.457)  
CEO FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
- 
 
-0.105 
  
0.033 
  
-0.011 
  
0.000 
  
-0.005 
  
-0.003 
 
   CHANGE  (0.379)  (0.733)  (0.900)  (0.652)  (0.143)  (0. 607)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.649 *** 0.951 *** 0.666 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.036 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
ROA  4.542  2.772  0.431  0.021  0.001  -0.090  
  (0.118)  (0.132)  (0.712)  (0.263)  (0.968)  (0.204)  
RET  0.065  0.255  0.388 *** 0.000  0.001  0.015 * 
  (0.783)  (0.134)  (0.002)  (0.985)  (0.770)  (0.062)  
LEVERAGE  1.716 *** 0.636  0.334  0.003  0.008  0.033  
  (0.001)  (0.186)  (0.333)  (0.279)  (0.169)  (0.181)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -2.564 ** -1.458 * -0.183  -0.011 *** -0.015 * -0.026  
    (0.031)  (0.060)  (0.755)  (0.006)  (0.050)  (0.508)  
σ(ROA)  0.383  0.565  0.791  0.004  0.008  -0.008  
  (0.860)  (0.523)  (0.203)  (0.221)  (0.215)  (0.782)  
σ(RET)  -0.511  -0.162  -0.479 *** 0.000  0.000 ** -0.001 *** 
  (0.255)  (0.411)  (0.009)  (0.612)  (0.017)  (<.001)  
MTB  -0.029  -0.142  -0.276 *** -0.001  -0.003 ** -0.016 *** 
  (0.865)  (0.192)  (0.001)  (0.109)  (0.020)  (0.001)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.263 *** 0.266  0.638 *** 0.000  0.003  0.041 *** 
  (0.005)  (0.136)  (<.001)  (0.767)  (0.105)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  0.066  0.067  0.086 ** 0.000  0.000  0.002  
  (0.238)  (0.116)  (0.024)  (0.198)  (0.955)  (0.466)  
INTERLOCK%   -7.495 * -2.121  0.765  -0.033 ** 0.009  0.009  
    (0.082)  (0.536)  (0.780)  (0.038)  (0.925)  (0.966)  
Non-I  BOARD%  0.209  -0.475  -0.777  0.002  -0.001  0.013  
  (0.824)  (0.471)  (0.151)  (0.659)  (0.940)  (0.737)  
Non-I COMP   -0.325  0.188  0.324  0.001  -0.004  -0.037  
   COMM%  (0.677)  (0.754)  (0.504)  (0.889)  (0.628)  (0.275)  
E-INDEX  0.141  0.111  0.122 ** -0.001  0.001  0.005  
  (0.131)  (0.101)  (0.044)  (0.239)  (0.348)  (0.265)  
R-Square  0.3481  0.2471  0.2260  0.1611  0.0635  0.1432  
n  1,663     1,663    1,663  1,663  1,663   1,663  
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
                                + ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆   + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                Equation (4)                                            
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Year and industry indicator variables included, but not listed for brevity. 
p values in parentheses; Years provided in Table 13. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.9; Condition Index < 40.01; No variable contributes more than 38% to 
the variance of two or more variables.  
Variable Definitions: Appendix B 
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Table 15:  The Descriptive Statistics of BOARD FACTOR, a measure of board independence 
 
 
PANEL A:  Loadings estimated using principle component analysis for BOARD FACTOR 
MEASURE LOAD 
Non-I  BOARD% 86 
Non-I COMP COMM% 83 
INTERLOCK% 29 
Eigenvalue 1.52 
% Variance explained 51% 
 
PANEL B:  BOARD FACTOR Descriptive Statistics 
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
Minimum 
Lower 
Quartile 
 
Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
 
Maximum 
Pre 2003 IND 851 3.054 1.837 2.298 2.755 3.436 8.956 
Post 2003 IND 880 2.948 1.823 2.240 2.700 3.313 7.808 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: 
Non-I  BOARD% it = (insider board members + linked board members)/total board members of firm i 
in year t 
Non-I COMP COMM% it = (insider compensation committee members + linked compensation committee 
members)/total compensation committee members of firm i in year t 
INTERLOCK% it = percentage of interlocked board members 
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Table 16:  Board Independence Descriptive Statistics by Period, Using One-Year Base and Post Periods for the 
Alternate/Equation (5) Analysis 
 
 
PANEL A: The number of Independent Board Members pre and post 2003 IND 
   Number of Independent Board Members 
PERIOD N TYPE OF MEMBER MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
Base Period 811 Non-independent 2.8 1 2 3 4 12 
  Independent 6.6 0 5 7 8 17 
Post Period 792 Non-independent 2.6 1 2 2 3 9 
  Independent 6.8 2 5 7 8 16 
 
PANEL B: The pre and post 2003 IND Board Independent measure, BOARD FACTOR, CEO Power measure, CEO FACTOR, and 
Board Independence Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
 
BASE Period       
BOARD FACTOR 3.1 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.5 9.0 
CEO FACTOR 4.0 2.0 3.4 3.9 4.4 9.5 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 70% 0% 60% 71% 82% 94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 93% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
POST Period 
      
BOARD FACTOR 2.9 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.3 7.2 
CEO FACTOR 4.1 2.1 3.5 3.9 4.5 9.7 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 72% 18% 63% 74% 83% 94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 94% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending June 15, 2003 through May 31, 2004 
                  Post Period – Years ending August 15, 2004 through July 31, 2005 
BOARD FACTOR is a measure of board independence formed from Non-I BOARD%, Non-I COMP COMM%, and 
INTERLOCK%.  The board’s independence decreases as the value estimated for BOARD FACTOR increases. 
CEO FACTOR is a measure of CEO power formed from CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, CEO OWN%, and CEO/CHAIR.  I 
predict that the CEO’s power increases as the value estimated for CEO FACTOR increases. 
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Table 17:  Hypothesis VI: An examination of how the 2003 SEC independence regulation influenced the CEO 
power - §162(m) noncompliance relation, using one-year base and post periods and dividing the firms based upon 
base period independence  
 
 
PANEL A: Hypothesis VI -  Firms with LOW Board Independence in the Base Period 
 
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                           Equation (5)           
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:           predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE          sign     SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 0.681 *** 0.162  -0.148  0.003 *** 0.007 ** -0.014 * 
  (<.001)  (0.213)  (0.188)  (<.001)  (0.011)  (0.062)  
CEO 
FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
 
- 
 
 
-0.379 
 
 
* 
 
 
0.017 
  
 
-0.017 
  
 
0.000 
  
 
-0.005 
  
 
-0.006 
 
   CHANGE  (0.090)  (0.919)  (0.910)  (0.973)  (0.186)  (0. 533)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.770 *** 0.926 *** 0.753 *** 0.005 *** 0.007 *** 0.033 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.003)  (<.001)  
ROA  3.002  0.779  -2.929 * -0.001  0.004  -0.224 ** 
  (0.323)  (0.709)  (0.084)  (0.943)  (0.918)  (0.042)  
RET  -0.532  -0.459  0.003  -0.001  -0.003  -0.007  
  (0.192)  (0.121)  (0.990)  (0.672)  (0.578)  (0.654)  
LEVERAGE  1.519 * 0.431  -0.138  0.003  0.012  0.032  
  (0.076)  (0.515)  (0.794)  0.522  (0.314)  (0.339)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -3.111 ** -2.294 ** -0.202  -0.022 *** -0.022  -0.023  
    (0.046)  (0.031)  (0.815)  0.001  (0.299)  (0.689)  
σ(ROA)  -2.142  -1.100  0.475  0.000  0.005  0.006  
  (0.486)  (0.636)  (0.768)  0.963  (0.774)  (0.911)  
σ(RET)  -1.650 *** -0.471  -0.867 *** 0.000  0.000  -0.006  
  (0.011)  (0.216)  (0.004)  0.699  (0.784)  (0.204)  
MTB  -0.328 * -0.273 * -0.294 ** -0.001  -0.006 * -0.020 ** 
  (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.021)  0.431  (0.051)  (0.012)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.867 *** 0.553 *** 0.994 *** 0.001  0.009 *** 0.054 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  0.581  (0.005)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  -0.017  0.066  0.093 ** 0.001 ** 0.001  0.005  
  (0.809)  (0.213)  (0.047)  0.030  (0.458)  (0.155)  
E-INDEX  0.171  0.187 ** 0.132 * -0.001  0.001  0.004  
  (0.134)  (0.030)  (0.069)  0.319  (0.665)  (0.403)  
R-Square  0.3336  0.2449  0.2672  0.1893  0.0653  0.1680  
n  769     769    769  769  769   769  
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Table 17 (continued) 
PANEL B: Hypothesis VI -  Firms with HIGH Board Independence in the Base Period 
 
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                           Equation (5)           
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:           predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE          sign     SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 1.158 *** 0.481 ** 0.153  0.004 ** 0.007 ** 0.015  
  (<.001)  (0.014)  (0.335)  (0.012)  (0.034)  (0.221)  
CEO 
FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
 
- 
 
 
0.061 
  
 
-0.088 
 
 
 
 
-0.071 
 
 
 
 
-0.000 
  
 
-0.004 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
 
 
   CHANGE  (0.862)  (0.743)  (0.752)  (0.856)  (0.447)  (0.883)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.868 *** 1.148 *** 0.658 *** 0.005 *** 0.010 *** 0.040 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
ROA  6.089 ** 2.573  2.694 * 0.037 *** -0.011  -0.106  
  (0.041)  (0.222)  (0.077)  (0.008)  (0.727)  (0.354)  
RET  0.187  0.448 ** 0.567 *** 0.000  0.002  0.025 ** 
  (0.594)  (0.020)  (0.006)  (0.999)  (0.484)  (0.045)  
LEVERAGE  2.133 ** 0.513  0.530  0.001  0.002  0.012  
  (0.015)  (0.422)  (0.282)  (0.753)  (0.819)  (0.754)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -2.547  -0.283  -0.016  -0.001  -0.003  -0.002  
    (0.102)  (0.779)  (0.982)  (0.900)  (0.823)  (0.976)  
σ(ROA)  3.711  3.014  1.639  0.014  0.055  0.005  
  (0.369)  (0.271)  (0.420)  (0.423)  (0.180)  (0.975)  
σ(RET)  -0.164  -0.019  -0.251  0.000  0.000  -0.001  
  (0.776)  (0.832)  (0.265)  (0.947)  (0.634)  (0.506)  
MTB  -0.042  -0.090  -0.247 ** -0.002 * -0.002  -0.017 ** 
  (0.813)  (0.483)  (0.015)  (0.094)  (0.418)  (0.028)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.308  0.403 *** 0.547 *** -0.001  0.002  0.057 *** 
  (0.209)  (0.001)  (<.001)  (0.612)  (0.287)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  0.152 ** 0.086  0.098 ** 0.000  -0.001  0.000  
  (0.034)  (0.127)  (0.046)  (0.900)  (0.391)  (0.957)  
E-INDEX  0.129  0.029  0.111  -0.001 ** 0.002  0.003  
  (0.260)  (0.744)  (0.136)  (0.029)  (0.195)  (0.549)  
R-Square  0.4065  0.3048  0.2159  0.1674  0.0851  0.1609  
n  834  834    834    834    834     834  
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Year and industry indicator variables included, but not listed for brevity. 
p values in parentheses 
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending June 15, 2003 through May 31, 2004 
                  Post Period – Years ending August 15, 2004 through July 31, 2005 
Firms with a Based Period BOARD FACTOR greater than (less than or equal to) the mean are classified as LOW 
(HIGH) board independent.   
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.9; Condition Index < 40.01; No variable contributes more than 38% to 
the variance of two or more variables.  
Variable Definitions: Appendix B  
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Table 18:  Board Independence Descriptive Statistics by Period, Using Two-Year Base and Post Periods  
 
 
PANEL A: The number of Independent Board Members pre and post 2003 IND 
   Number of Board Members 
PERIOD N TYPE OF MEMBER MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
Base Period 1,386 Non-independent 3.1 1 2 3 4 13 
  Independent 6.6 0 5 6 8 17 
Post Period 1,390 Non-independent 2.6 1 2 2 3 9 
  Independent 7.0 2 5 7 9 16 
 
PANEL B: The pre and post 2003 IND Board Independent measure, BOARD FACTOR, CEO Power measure, CEO FACTOR, and 
Board Independence Statistics  
VARIABLE MEAN MINIMUM Q1 MEDIAN Q3 MAXIMUM 
 
BASE Period 
      
BOARD FACTOR 3.1 1.8 2.3 2.8 3.5 8.4 
CEO FACTOR 4.0 1.9 3.4 3.9 4.4 8.6 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  
 
1% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
50% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 
 
 
68% 
 
 
0% 
 
 
57% 
 
 
70% 
 
 
80% 
 
 
94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 91% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
POST Period 
      
BOARD FACTOR 2.8 1.8 2.2 2.5 3.2 7.3 
CEO FACTOR 4.0 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.5 9.7 
Percentage of Interlocked 
Board Members  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 
Percentage of 
Independent Board 
Members 73% 18% 64% 75% 83% 94% 
Percentage of 
Independent 
Compensation Committee 
Members 94% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending December 15, 2001 through November 30, 2003 
                  Post Period – Years ending September 15, 2004 through August 30, 2006 
BOARD FACTOR is a measure of board independence formed from Non-I BOARD%, Non-I COMP COMM%, and 
INTERLOCK%.  The board’s independence decreases as the value estimated for BOARD FACTOR increases. 
CEO FACTOR is a measure of CEO power formed from CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, CEO OWN%, and CEO/CHAIR.  I 
predict that the CEO’s power increases as the value estimated for CEO FACTOR increases. 
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Table 19: Hypothesis VI: An examination of how the 2003 SEC independence regulation influenced the CEO power 
- §162(m) noncompliance relation, using two-year base and post periods and dividing the firms based upon base 
period independence     
 
 
PANEL A: Hypothesis VI -  Firms with LOW Board Independence in the Base Period 
 
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                           Equation (5)           
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:           predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE          sign     SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 0.814 *** 0.270 *** -0.047  0.005 *** 0.005 *** -0.007  
  (<.001)  (0.006)  (0.571)  (<.001)  (0.009)  (0.245)  
CEO 
FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
 
- -0.379 ** -0.058  -0.013  -0.001  -0.001  0.005  
   CHANGE  0.018  (0.645)  (0.906)  0.584  0.824)  (0.549)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.533 *** 0.864 *** 0.637 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 ** 0.028 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.023)  (<.001)  
ROA  3.273 * -0.322  -0.080  0.004  -0.089 *** -0.118 ** 
  (0.066)  (0.752)  (0.926)  (0.593)  (<.001)  (0.045)  
RET  0.272  0.292  0.507 *** 0.000  -0.004  0.014  
  (0.364)  (0.143)  (0.003)  (0.960)  (0.389)  (0.266)  
LEVERAGE  0.971 * 0.420  -0.047  0.004  0.015 * 0.035  
  (0.094)  (0.309)  (0.893)  (0.272)  (0.064)  (0.147)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -1.844  -1.501 ** 1.305 ** -0.014 ** -0.018  0.042  
    (0.107)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.017)  (0.191)  (0.307)  
σ(ROA)  0.993  0.308  0.072  0.004  -0.010  -0.019  
  (0.596)  (0.752)  (0.931)  (0.467)  (0.441)  (0.611)  
σ(RET)  -0.590  -0.090  -0.035  0.000  0.000  -0.002  
  (0.120)  (0.407)  (0.345)  (0.985)  (0.853)  (0.524)  
MTB  -0.112  -0.081  -0.136 * 0.000  0.001  -0.006  
  (0.389)  (0.371)  (0.075)  (0.910)  (0.700)  (0.270)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.309 *** 0.299 *** 0.616 *** -0.001  0.001  0.027 *** 
  (0.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.252)  (0.257)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  0.052  0.069 * 0.092 *** 0.001 *** 0.001  -0.003  
  (0.287)  (0.066)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.400)  (0.239)  
E-INDEX  0.203 *** 0.142 ** 0.159 *** -0.001  0.001  0.008 ** 
  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.285)  (0.356)  (0.036)  
R-Square  0.3210  0.2190  0.2390  0.1566  0.0552  0.1419  
n  1,456  1,456  1,456  1,456  1,456  1,456  
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Table 19 (continued) 
PANEL B: Hypothesis VI -  Firms with HIGH Board Independence in the Base Period 
 
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                           Equation (5)           
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:           predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE          sign     SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 1.161 *** 0.699 *** 0.262 * 0.004 *** 0.005  -0.011  
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.056)  (<.001)  (0.217)  (0.261)  
CEO 
FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
 
- 0.016  -0.303  -0.338 * -0.001  -0.002  0.014  
   CHANGE  (0.960)  (0.184)  (0.073)  (0.522)  (0.762)  (0.317)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  2.066 *** 1.176 *** 0.747 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.033 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
ROA  1.503  0.458  1.277  -0.004  0.004  0.056  
  (0.454)  (0.745)  (0.258)  (0.710)  (0.899)  (0.477)  
RET  0.387  0.199  0.291 * -0.001  -0.010 ** 0.017  
  (0.234)  (0.350)  (0.097)  (0.480)  (0.047)  (0.176)  
LEVERAGE  3.228 *** 1.134 ** 0.428  -0.002  0.009  0.002  
  (<.001)  (0.034)  (0.327)  (0.640)  (0.492)  (0.962)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -1.075  -0.480  -0.377  0.000  0.015  -0.001  
    (0.388)  (0.540)  (0.545)  (0.983)  (0.417)  (0.989)  
σ(ROA)  1.763  -0.211  0.362  -0.013  0.046  0.122  
  (0.593)  (0.927)  (0.836)  (0.389)  (0.347)  (0.321)  
σ(RET)  -1.088 ** -0.218  -0.073  0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (0.027)  (0.481)  (0.704)  (0.310)  (0.708)  (0.748)  
MTB  0.134  -0.007  -0.294 *** -0.001 * -0.001  -0.026 *** 
  (0.346)  (0.943)  (0.001)  (0.079)  (0.610)  (<.001)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.604 *** 0.557 *** 0.549 *** 0.000  0.003  0.047 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.676)  (0.215)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  -0.043  -0.016  0.029  -0.001 ** -0.002  -0.002  
  (0.431)  (0.698)  (0.427)  (0.020)  (0.104)  (0.549)  
E-INDEX  0.119  0.003  0.067  -0.002 *** -0.002  0.002  
  (0.183)  (0.966)  (0.246)  (0.001)  (0.294)  (0.671)  
R-Square  0.4027  0.2885  0.2336  0.1787  0.0411  0.1520  
n  1,320  1,320  1,320  1,320  1,320  1,320  
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Year and industry indicator variables included, but not listed for brevity. 
p values in parentheses 
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending December 15, 2001 through November 30, 2003 
                  Post Period – Years ending September 15, 2004 through August 30, 2006 
Firms with a Based Period BOARD FACTOR greater than (less than or equal to) the mean are classified as LOW 
(HIGH) board independent. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.9; Condition Index < 40.01; No variable contributes more than 38% to 
the variance of two or more variables.  
Variable Definitions: Appendix B  
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Table 20:  Hypothesis VII: An examination of how the 2006 SEC compensation disclosure mandate influenced the 
CEO power - §162(m) noncompliance relation 
 
  
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE: 
 
 
predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE sign SALARY_I  CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 0.833 *** -0.165 * -0.106  0.005 *** 0.005 ** -0.010 * 
  (<.001)  (0.054)  (0.160)  (<.001)  (0.045)  (0.069)  
CEO FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
+ 
 
0.073 
  
0.379 
 
*** 
 
0.218 
 
*** 
 
0.000 
  
0.014 
 
*** 
 
0.023 
 
*** 
   CHANGE  (0.300)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.767)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.628 *** 0.916 *** 0.823 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 *** 0.059 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
ROA  2.388  -2.332 ** -2.498 ** -0.010  -0.071  -0.193 ** 
  (0.168)  (0.033)  (0.011)  (0.250)  (0.189)  (0.024)  
RET  0.082  -0.083  0.328 ** 0.000  -0.007  0.028 ** 
  (0.728)  (0.562)  (0.046)  (0.559)  (0.132)  (0.025)  
LEVERAGE  1.601 *** 0.216  -0.072  -0.002  -0.002  0.050  
  (0.009)  (0.586)  (0.858)  (0.453)  (0.912)  (0.181)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.515  -0.395  0.021  -0.002  0.014  0.018  
    (0.643)  (0.478)  (0.969)  (0.723)  (0.444)  (0.694)  
σ(ROA)  -1.089  0.662  1.118  0.004  0.015  0.071  
  (0.569)  (0.387)  (0.113)  (0.527)  (0.427)  (0.289)  
σ(RET)  -0.002  0.001  0.003  0.000  0.000 * 0.000  
  (0.750)  (0.379)  (0.622)  (0.294)  (0.060)  (0.754)  
MTB  0.101  -0.001  -0.079  0.001  -0.002  -0.020 *** 
  (0.357)  (0.992)  (0.324)  (0.230)  (0.553)  (0.004)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.405 *** 0.674 *** 1.051 *** 0.002  0.010 * 0.082 *** 
  (0.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.237)  (0.061)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  0.056  0.103 *** 0.087 ** 0.001 ** 0.001  -0.005  
  (0.273)  (0.003)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.608)  (0.135)  
INTERLOCK%   1.792  0.807  2.971  -0.036 ** -0.228 *** 0.198  
    (0.710)  (0.772)  (0.438)  (0.043)  (<.001)  (0.462)  
Non-I  BOARD%  0.258  -0.896  -0.538  0.008  0.006  -0.101 ** 
  (0.753)  (0.108)  (0.343)  (0.140)  (0.783)  (0.036)  
Non-I COMP   -0.568  0.021  -0.147  -0.006 * -0.017  0.016  
COMM%  (0.331)  (0.967)  (0.741)  (0.070)  (0.266)  (0.683)  
E-INDEX  0.099  0.043  0.060  0.000  -0.005 ** 0.000  
  (0.173)  (0.406)  (0.251)  (0.695)  (0.012)  (0.970)  
R-Square  0.3757  0.3699  0.2175  0.1739  0.1100  0.2215  
n  2,197  2,197    2,197  2,197   2,197   2,197  
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                  Equation (4)       
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending December 15, 2005 through December 14, 2006 
                  Post Period – Years ending December 15, 2006 through November 30, 2007 
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Control, year indicators and industry indicator variables included, but not listed for brevity. 
p values in parentheses 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.9; Condition Index < 40.01; No variable contributes more than 38% to 
the variance of two or more variables.  
Variable Definitions: Appendix B 
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Table 21: Hypothesis VII: An examination of how the 2006 SEC compensation disclosure mandate influenced the 
CEO power - §162(m) noncompliance relation, using two-year base and post periods  
 
  
 
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE: 
 
 
predicted 
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator 
NC Compensation Type 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation 
NC Compensation Type: 
NC MEASURE sign SALARY_I  CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
CEO FACTOR + 0.742 *** -0.076  -0.097  0.004 *** 0.004 ** -0.010 ** 
  (<.001)  (0.318)  (0.119)  (<.001)  (0.019)  (0.020)  
CEO FACTOR* 
   POST  
 
+ 0.100  0.434 *** 0.192 *** 0.000  0.014 *** 0.020 *** 
   CHANGE  (0.118)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.537)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
              
ln(ASSETS)  1.571 *** 0.892 *** 0.770 *** 0.005 *** 0.009 *** 0.055 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
ROA  1.816 * -1.419 ** -1.672 ** -0.004  -0.062 * -0.188 *** 
  (0.077)  (0.034)  (0.013)  (0.485)  (0.057)  (0.001)  
RET  -0.081  -0.057  0.355 *** -0.001  -0.009 ** 0.018 * 
  (0.655)  (0.612)  (0.004)  (0.155)  (0.014)  (0.051)  
LEVERAGE  1.393 *** 0.413  0.228  -0.001  0.005  0.056 ** 
  (0.002)  (0.171)  (0.437)  (0.771)  (0.618)  (0.039)  
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.633  -0.505  0.085  -0.004  0.007  0.005  
    (0.468)  (0.274)  (0.848)  (0.275)  (0.586)  (0.887)  
σ(ROA)  -0.520  0.470  0.894  0.003  0.019  0.056  
  (0.721)  (0.465)  (0.118)  (0.474)  (0.194)  (0.231)  
σ(RET)  0.001 * 0.001  0.002  0.000  0.000 * 0.000  
  (0.049)  (0.290)  (0.633)  (0.765)  (0.090)  (0.382)  
MTB  0.114  -0.033  -0.145 ** 0.000  -0.001  -0.017 *** 
  (0.188)  (0.580)  (0.029)  (0.418)  (0.831)  (0.002)  
TAX BENEFIT  0.304 *** 0.560 *** 0.903 *** 0.001  0.006 ** 0.069 *** 
  (0.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.119)  (0.035)  (<.001)  
BOARD SIZE  0.068  0.084 *** 0.089 *** 0.001 ** 0.001  -0.002  
  (0.107)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.619)  (0.371)  
INTERLOCK%   4.051  -0.223  1.693  -0.024 ** -0.156 *** 0.005  
    (0.326)  (0.907)  (0.523)  (0.048)  (<.001)  (0.979)  
Non-I  BOARD%  -0.309  -0.971 ** -0.864 * 0.008 * 0.013  -0.112 *** 
  (0.664)  (0.038)  (0.062)  (0.063)  (0.414)  (0.004)  
Non-I COMP   -0.257  0.365  0.224  -0.004  -0.019 * 0.029  
COMM%  (0.625)  (0.375)  (0.561)  (0.210)  (0.085)  (0.378)  
E-INDEX  0.094  0.022  0.047  0.000  -0.003 * 0.002  
  (0.129)  (0.618)  (0.280)  (0.831)  (0.069)  (0.578)  
R-Square  0.3686  0.3823  0.2175  0.1751  0.1285  0.2480  
n  3,914  3,914  3,914  3,914  3,914   3,914  
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽2 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡    
+ ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆   +  ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆  +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                    Equation (4)                              
YEARS:     Base Period – Years ending December 15, 2004 through December 14, 2006 
                  Post Period – Years ending December 15, 2006 through November 30, 2008 
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
Year and industry indicator variables included, but not listed for brevity. 
p values in parentheses 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.9; Condition Index < 40.01; No variable contributes more than 38% to 
the variance of two or more variables.  
Variable Definitions: Appendix B  
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Figure 1:  Total annual §162(m) noncompliant/non-tax deductible compensation paid to Execucomp executives 
 
 
n=164,136 
I estimate the annual §162(m) noncompliant/non-tax deductible compensation paid to Execucomp executives by 
calculating the §162(m) noncompliant compensation paid to each covered executive listed on Execucomp and 
summing the total. 
I define §162(m) noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million in a fiscal year: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-performance based plan cash 
awards, and restricted stock awards. 
IRC Section 162(m) defines the tax deduction for public firms’ top executives, which I refer to as covered 
executives, described in Section 1.1 of this dissertation.   
Total Noncompliant Compensation is the sum of all §162(m) noncompliant compensation paid to all covered 
executives listed on Execucomp, by year from 1994 through 2012. 
Table 1 lists the total annual §162(m) noncompliant compensation. 
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Figure 2:  Estimated total annual tax cost from §162(m) noncompliance 
 
 
n=164,136 
I calculate the Total Annual Tax Cost From §162(m) by multiplying the Total Noncompliant Compensation, per year, 
by the Mean Marginal Tax Rate, for that particular year.  
Total Noncompliant Compensation is the sum of all §162(m) noncompliant compensation paid to all covered 
executives listed on Execucomp, by year from 1994 through 2012. 
I define §162(m) noncompliant compensation as the sum of the following items, to the extent their payment 
exceeds $1 million in a fiscal year: salary, any miscellaneous compensation, non-performance based plan cash 
awards, and restricted stock awards. 
IRC Section 162(m) defines the tax deduction for public firms’ top executives, which I refer to as covered 
executives, described in Section 1.1 of this dissertation.   
The Mean Marginal Tax Rate is the mean annual simulated marginal tax rate for all firms in my sample described in 
detail in Section 2.5 of this dissertation. 
Table 1 provides the total annual §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  The mean (median) simulated marginal 
tax rate for the Chapter 3 sample is 26% (33%), see Table 10.   
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Figure 3: Mean and median CEO total annual compensation levels 
 
n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9 
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Figure 4a: Mean annual CEO salary and variable compensation levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Median annual CEO salary and variable compensation levels 
 
 
 
For Figures 4a and 4b: 
 n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9 
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Figure 5a: Mean, median, and 90th percentile CEO annual salary levels in non-cpi adjusted dollars, compared to 
inflation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b: Median and 90th percentile CEO annual salary and variable compensation levels in non-cpi adjusted 
dollars  
 
For Figures 5a and 5b: 
n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9  
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Figure 6a:  Mean annual CEO Salary as a percentage of Total Compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6b:  Median annual CEO Salary as a percentage of Total Compensation 
 
 
For Figures 6a and 6b: 
Salary Compensation Percentage=Salary/Total Compensation 
n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9 
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Figure 7a:  Mean annual percentages of total compensation from options, stock, and cash incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7b:  Median annual percentages of total compensation from options, stock, and cash incentives  
 
For Figures 7a and 7b: 
The percentage of total compensation from: 
Options = Option Grants/Total Compensation 
Cash Incentives = Non-Salary Cash Compensation/Total Compensation 
Stock = Restricted Stock Grants/Total Compensation 
n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9  
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Figure 8:  Mean annual percentage of CEO total compensation from noncompliant salary, noncompliant cash 
compensation, and any compensation that is §162(m) noncompliant 
 
Percentage of Noncompliant Compensation is defined as follows: 
SALARY=Salary in excess of $1 million / CEO Total Compensation 
CASH=Noncompliant Cash Compensation defined in Section 2.4 / CEO Total Compensation 
TOTAL=Noncompliant Compensation defined in Section 2.4 / CEO Total Compensation 
n=18,504, Chapter 3’s sample of §162(m) affected firms defined in Table 9 
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Figure 9: Annual CEO compensation sensitivity to accounting performance 
 
 
Figure 9 illustrates annual CEO compensation sensitivity to accounting performance by plotting α1 from estimating 
the following equation annually for affected firms and for control firms:   
∆ ln(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) =   𝛼0 +  𝛼1∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛼2𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)  +   ∑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈  
Affected = The Chapter 3 sample of firms affected by §162(m); Of the total 18,504 firm-year observations in 
Chapter 3, 2,841 are excluded because of missing data.  Therefore, the total sample for this analysis is 15,663 firm-
year observations.      
Control = Firms unaffected by §162(m); The definition and sample selection of the 2,933 firm-year observations is 
provided in Section 3.5.3. 
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Figure 10: Annual CEO compensation sensitivity to market performance 
 
Figure 10 illustrates annual CEO compensation sensitivity to market performance by plotting β1 from estimating the 
following equation annually for affected firms and for control firms:   
∆ ln(𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁) =   𝛽0 +  𝛽1∆𝑅𝐸𝑇 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆) +   ∑𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈  
Affected = The Chapter 3 sample of firms affected by §162(m); Of the total 18,504 firm-year observations in 
Chapter 3, 2,841 are excluded because of missing data.  Therefore, the total sample for this analysis is 15,663 firm-
year observations.      
Control = Firms unaffected by §162(m); The definition and sample selection of the 3,265 firm-year observations of 
firms unaffected by §162(m) is provided in Section 3.5.3. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
 
 
  THE PRESENT-VALUE COST OF §162(M) NONCOMPLIANCE 
 
 
Table 22: Estimated annual and present-value federal income tax cost from noncompliance with §162(m) 
 
 
FIRMS WHICH PAY THEIR CEO:  
Noncompliant 
Salary 
Noncompliant 
Cash 
Compensation 
Any 
Noncompliant 
Compensation 
 (SALARY NC1) (CASH NC2) (TOTAL NC3) 
Panel A:  Annual TAX COST and noncompliant compensation for noncompliant firms 
     TAX COST                                      mean 995,585 699,653 646,650 
                                                          (median) (385,480) (223,447) (217,879) 
                                                                 n 3,090 7,765 9,828 
     N-C COMPENSATION                   mean  3,781,460 2,849,120 2,581,170 
                                                          (median) (1,994,230) (1,261,800) (1,082,890) 
                                                                 n 3,299 8,182 10,434 
    TAX COST as a percentage of CEO Total 
     Compensation, Mean (Median)  
 
8% (5%) 
 
7% (5%) 
 
7% (5%) 
Panel B:  Estimated present-value tax cost of a firm’s noncompliant election in year the firm elects to first pay 
some noncompliant salary, cash or any noncompliant compensation 
        P-V TAX COST*                          mean 4,307,350 3,033,642 2,769,611 
                                                         (median) 1,570,184 982,039 942,540 
TAX COST: N-C COMPENSATION multiplied by the firms estimated marginal tax rate, defined in Section E 
N-C COMPENSATION: I define compensation as noncompliant, non-tax deductible per §162(m), to the extent the 
sum of the CEO’s salary, non-incentive plan based cash bonus, restricted stock grants, and miscellaneous 
compensation, which includes severance payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of 
stock options, payouts for unused vacation, tax reimbursements and signing bonuses, exceeds $1 million. 
P-V TAX COST: The discounted, present value of the expected TAX COST in the first year that the firm pays 
noncompliant salary, cash or any noncompliant compensation.  I assume annual inflation of 3.1%, which is the 
average cpi-inflation rate from 1994 through 2012, and five years of noncompliance, which is the mean period of 
noncompliance in my sample.  The median period of noncompliance is six years, which should increase with time.  
1 SALARY NC.  I define a firm as SALARY NC if the firm paid their CEO a salary in excess of $1 million. 
2 CASH NC.  I define a firm as CASH NC if the firm paid their CEO any §162(m) noncompliant cash compensation.  I 
defined cash compensation as noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation, which includes severance 
payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of stock options, payouts for unused 
vacation, tax reimbursements and signing bonuses, or post-2006 non-incentive plan based cash bonus exceeds $1 
million. 
3 TOTAL NC.  I define a firm as TOTAL NC if the firm paid their CEO paid any §162(m) noncompliant compensation.  I 
defined compensation as noncompliant if any salary, miscellaneous compensation, which includes severance 
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payments, debt forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of stock options, payouts for unused 
vacation, tax reimbursements and signing bonuses, post-2006 non-incentive plan based cash bonus or restricted 
stock grants exceed $1 million.  
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APPENDIX B: 
 
 
 
 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Definitions of the Dependent Variables: The Measures of Noncompliant Compensation, NC MEASURE  
NC MEASURE = §162(m) Noncompliant Compensation, defined three ways, SALARY, CASH or TOTAL 
 
SALARY is noncompliant if it exceeds $1 million.   
   SALARY_I equals 1 is the CEO’s SALARY exceeds $1 million, and 0 otherwise.  
   SALARY_R is the amount of salary paid in excess of $1 million divided by CEO total compensation. 
 
CASH compensation includes a noncompliant component if the sum of salary, miscellaneous 
compensation and non-incentive plan based cash bonus exceeds $1 million.   
CASH_I equals 1 is the CEO’s compensation contains a §162(m) noncompliant cash component, and 0 
otherwise.  
CASH_R is the amount of noncompliant cash compensation divided by CEO total compensation. 
 
TOTAL compensation includes a noncompliant component if the sum of salary, miscellaneous 
compensation, non-incentive plan based cash bonus, and restricted stock exceeds $1 million.   
TOTAL_I equals 1 is the CEO’s compensation contains a §162(m) noncompliant component, and 0 
otherwise.  
    TOTAL_R is the amount of noncompliant compensation divided by CEO total compensation. 
 
Definitions of the Independent Variables 
   
BOARD FACTOR it  = Measure of board independence formed by principal component analysis from the 
following variables: INTERLOCK%, Non-I  BOARD% and Non-I COMP COMM% of 
firm i in year t 
BOARD SIZE it = number of members on the firm i’s board of directors in year t 
CEO AGE = the CEO’s age at firm i as of the end of year t 
CEO/CHAIR it  = an indicator variable which equals 1 if the CEO also serves as the Chairman of the 
Board of firm i in year t,  and 0 otherwise 
CEO FACTOR it  =  Measure of CEO power formed by principal component analysis from the following 
variables: CEO TENURE, CEO AGE, and CEO/CHAIR of firm i in year t 
CEO OWN% it = percentage of shares owned by the CEO in firm i at the end of year t 
CEO PAY SLICE it = CEO total compensation/(the sum of the CEO and four highest paid executives’ 
total compensation) of firm i in year t 
CEO TENURE = the number of years the CEO has been in that position (if missing, the number of 
years at the firm) in firm i as of the end of year t 
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E-INDEX it = sum of six entrenchment indicators:  staggered board terms, a “poison pill” 
provision, a “golden parachute” provision, and limitations upon the shareholder 
ability to amend the charter, amend the by-laws and approve mergers (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Farrell, 2008). 
INTERLOCK% it = percentage of interlocked board members 
LEVERAGEit   = total debt/total assets of firm i in year t 
ILLIQUIDITY it  = 1- cash plus cash equivalents/ total assets of firm i in year t 
Ln(ASSETS) it = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t for firm i 
Ln(CEO TENURE)it = natural log of the number of years the CEO has been in that position (if missing, the 
number of years at the firm) in firm I as of the end of year t 
Ln(5 YEAR MEAN 
               ASSETS) it 
= natural log of mean total assets for firm i for years t-1 through t-5 
MTBit = (market value of equity + book value of liabilities)/book value of assets of firm i in 
year t 
Non-I  BOARD% it = (insider board members + linked board members)/total board members of firm i in 
year t 
Non-I COMP   
   COMM% it 
= (insider compensation committee members + linked compensation committee 
members)/total compensation committee members of firm i in year t 
POST CHANGE it = Indicator Variable which equals 1 if year t is in Base Period, and 0 otherwise. 
PRIOR NCit 
 
= An indicator variable which equals 1 if the firm paid any noncompliant 
compensation in the year t-1, and 0 otherwise. 
RET it  = buy and hold market returns of firm i in year t 
ROA it = book net income/average total assets of firm i in year t 
σ(RET)it = standard deviation of firm i’s RET for years t-1 through t-5 
σ(ROA)it = standard deviation of firm i’s ROA for years t-1 through t-5 
TAX BENEFIT it = ((non-cpi adjusted CEO total compensation - $1 million)*simulated corporate 
federal income tax marginal tax rate)/non-cpi adjusted total assets of firm i in year 
t 
BOARD SIZE it = number of members on the firm i’s board of directors in year t 
INTERLOCK% it = percentage of interlocked board members 
Non-I  BOARD% it = (insider board members + linked board members)/total board members of firm i in 
year t 
Non-I COMP COMM% it = (insider compensation committee members + linked compensation committee 
members)/total compensation committee members of firm i in year t 
E-INDEX it = sum of six entrenchment indicators:  staggered board terms, a “poison pill” 
provision, a “golden parachute” provision, and limitations upon the shareholder 
ability to amend the charter, amend the by-laws and approve mergers (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Farrell, 2008) 
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APPENDIX C:  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTAL FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
Table 23:  The loadings estimated using principal component analysis to construct the factors measuring firm risk, 
firm performance, CEO power and the quality of governance 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS: HI H3 H4 H5 
 
Firm Risk 
Firm 
Performance 
CEO Power 
Governance 
Quality 
PC FACTOR: RISK 
Str                       
RISK 
Perf                    
PERF Factor CEO 
Exper 
CEO 
Exec 
BD 
NonI                
BD Eff     
MEASURES        
LEVERAGE                        82 3      
ILLIQUIDITY                        84 -14      
σ(ROA)                              -27 74      
σ(RET)                                14 82      
ROA                                      74     
RET                                       74     
ln(CEO TENURE)                75 -20   
ln(CEO AGE)                 70 -3   
CEO OWN%                         44 -52   
CEO/CHAIR                         67 25   
CEO PAY SLICE                   14 84   
BOARD SIZE                           4 78 
E-INDEX                                  -22 51 
INTERLOCK%                         48 43 
Non-I  BOARD%                    85 -15 
Non-I COMP 
COMM%     
     80 -8 
Eigenvalue 1.487 1.238 1.090 1.717 1.075 1.637 1.088 
Variance Explained 68% 55% 70% 54% 
Principal Component (PC Factor) Interpretations: 
RISK Str: Because LEVERAGE and ILLIQUIDITY significantly contribute to this principal component, I use this PC 
Factor to measure firm risk based upon corporate structure. 
RISK Perf: Because σ(ROA) and σ(RET) significantly contribute to this principal component, I use this PC Factor to 
measure firm risk based upon performance variability. 
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Table 23 (continued) 
CEO Exper: Because ln(CEO TENURE),  ln(CEO AGE), and CEO/CHAIR provide the greatest contribution to this 
principal component, along with CEO OWN% to a lesser degree, I use this PC Factor to measure the CEO’s power 
principally from his experience and position in the firm. 
CEO Exec: CEO PAY SLICE provides the greatest contribution to this principal component, followed by CEO/CHAIR.  
Therefore, I use this PC Factor to measure the CEO’s power in relation to the firm’s executive team. 
Table 23 (continued) 
BD NonI: Because Non-I BOARD% and Non-I COMP COMM% provide the greatest contribution to this principal 
component, along with INTERLOCK% to a lesser degree,  I use this PC Factor to measure the lack of independent 
governance processes. 
BD Eff: Because BOARD SIZE and E-INDEX provide the greatest contribution to this principal component, along with 
INTERLOCK% to a lesser degree, I use this PC Factor to measure board effectiveness. 
Variable Definitions: Appendix B 
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Table 24: An examination of the influence of firm, CEO, and board characteristics on §162(m) noncompliance 
 
  
DEPENDENT   
    VARIABLE:       Predicted 
NC MEASURE       Sign  
 
§162 Non-compliance Indicator: 
§162 NC Compensation scaled by 
Total Compensation: 
SALARY_I CASH_I TOTAL_I SALARY_R CASH_R TOTAL_R 
Intercept  -15.358 *** -8.442 *** -5.435 *** -0.039 *** -0.060 *** -0.197 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS I:              
RISK Str                       + 0.029  -0.041  0.062  -0.001 ** 0.000  0.005  
  (0.752)  (0.448)  (0.217)  (0.016)  (0.936)  (0.139)  
RISK Perf                      + 0.045 ** 0.062  0.049  0.0002 * 0.002 ** 0.003 ** 
    (0.020)  (0.118)  (0.242)  (0.087)  (0.023)  (0.035)  
HYPOTHESIS II:              
ln(ASSETS)                         + 1.440 *** 0.825 *** 0.617 *** 0.006 *** 0.009 *** 0.036 *** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS III:              
PERF Factor                                    - 0.031  -0.037  0.077 ** -0.000  -0.003 ** -0.003  
  (0.522)  (0.313)  (0.034)  (0.616)  (0.016)  (0.372)  
HYPOTHESIS IV:              
CEO Exper              + 0.875 *** 0.261 *** 0.118 *** 0.004 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 ** 
  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.004)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.011)  
CEO Exec                       + 0.226 *** 0.376 *** 0.425 *** -0.002 ** 0.001  0.042 *** 
     (<.001)  (<.001)  (<.001)  (0.015)  (0.599)  (<.001)  
HYPOTHESIS V:              
BD NonI                + 0.008  -0.025  -0.020  0.000  0.001  0.003  
  (0.892)  (0.550)  (0.578)  (0.348)  (0.245)  (0.204)  
BD Eff     + 0.158 *** 0.068  0.145 *** 0.000  -0.004 *** -0.002  
   (0.004)  (0.101)  (<.001)  (0.501)  (0.006)  (0.427)  
CONTROLS:              
MTB  0.101 ** -0.028  -0.126 *** 0.000  -0.002 * -0.007 *** 
  (0.026)  (0.445)  (<.001)  (0.245)  (0.096)  (0.006)  
TAX   0.075  0.174 ** 0.354 ** 0.0004 * 0.003  0.015 *** 
  (0.184)  (0.048)  (<.001)  (0.085)  (0.112)  (0.035)  
R-Square        0.3505         0.4245        0.3077      0.1279  0.1117        0.3258   
𝑁𝐶 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓  +  𝛽3 Ln(𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 
    + 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐵𝐷 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐵𝐷 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽9𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 
      + ∑ 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑆 + ∈𝑖𝑡                                                                  
***, **, and * indicate that statistical significance is demonstrated at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
p values in parentheses  
Years:  1998 through 2011  
n=11,613, Table 3’s firm-year observations less 13 observations without the CEO’s age  
Firm and CEO clustered standard errors. 
Multicollinearity diagnostics for all estimations: VIF <1.4; Condition Index < 20; No variable contributes more than 40% to the 
variance of two or more variables.  
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